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ABSTRACT 
 
The relationship between emotion and cognition is a topic that raises great interest in 
research. Recently, a view of these two processes as interactive and mutually influencing each 
other has become predominant. This dissertation investigates the reciprocal influences of 
emotion and cognition, both at behavioral and neural level, in two specific fields, such as 
attention and decision-making.  
Experimental evidence on how emotional responses may affect perceptual and attentional 
processes has been reported. In addition, the impact of three factors, such as personality traits, 
motivational needs and social context, in modulating the influence that emotion exerts on 
perception and attention has been investigated.  
Moreover, the influence of cognition on emotional responses in decision-making has been 
demonstrated. The current experimental evidence showed that cognitive brain regions such as 
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex are causally implicated in regulation of emotional responses 
and that this has an effect at both pre and post decisional stages.  
There are two main conclusions of this dissertation: firstly, emotion exerts a strong influence 
on perceptual and attentional processes but, at the same time, this influence may also be 
modulated by other factors internal and external to the individuals. Secondly, cognitive 
processes may modulate emotional prepotent responses, by serving a regulative function 
critical to driving and shaping human behavior in line with current goals.    
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INTRODUCTION 
 
After many years of neglect, over the course of the last decades scientists have started to 
increasingly recognize the importance of emotions for survival and adaptation of the 
human being (Damasio, 1994). Many studies emphasize how emotions affect our 
decisions, learning and memory, and how they provide the motivation to act when 
facing incoming stimuli from the environment. A topic that has been the object of 
particular attention in the field of cognitive neuroscience is the relationship between 
emotion and cognition, and how they interact on a neural level. Do emotion and 
cognition act in completely independent ways or rather are they interactively related? 
The debate concerning the existence of a neural functional separation between the 
“emotional” and “cognitive” brain is still open. For a long time, emotion and cognition 
have been viewed as largely separated systems in the brain with specific and 
independent neural correlates. Popular examples of a functionally specialized brain 
organization described the amygdala as the center of emotion and the lateral prefrontal 
cortex as the center of cognition in the brain. More recently, however, research has 
started to point at an interactive neural network as the key to understanding complex 
human behaviors (Pessoa, 2008). Studies on brain lesions have paved the way for this 
direction. The classical case of Phineas Cage, for instance, is one of the first pieces of 
evidence that damage in specific brain regions, such as the prefrontal cortex, may cause 
impairments in both cognitive and emotional behavior (Damasio, 1994). The increasing 
use of neuroimaging and neurophysiology techniques has contributed to clarify the 
neural functioning of emotional and cognitive processes and eventually their interplay. 
Indeed, several studies have shown that brain regions mediating emotion overlap with 
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those that mediate cognition to such a degree that it is difficult to distinguish between 
them (Gray, 2004). The best examples of the mutual influence between emotion and 
cognition derive from studies on attention and executive functions. For instance, it has 
been demonstrated by using different tasks that emotionally positive and negative 
stimuli, compared to neutral ones, may direct the allocation of attention, commonly 
conceived as a cognitive function, in an automatic way and without awareness 
(Eastwood et al., 2001; Ohman et al., 2001; Anderson, 2005; Vuilleumier & Schwartz, 
2001). On the other hand, there are many studies that indicate the crucial role of 
cognitive processes in inhibiting and controlling emotional behavior (Ochsner et al., 
2002, 2004).  
In the present thesis, the interactive relationship between emotion and cognition will be 
further addressed. In particular, this work will focus on whether and how emotional 
responses may affect cognitive processes, as well as on how emotional responses may 
be influenced by cognitive processes, including the brain regions that are causally 
implicated in the cognitive control of emotions.  
 
This dissertation is divided into three main parts:  The first part provides an overview of 
the previous literature concerning emotion and cognition, by addressing in particular the 
definition of these two processes and their neural correlates (Chapter 1). The second 
part reviews extant literature on the impact of emotion on cognition, with particular 
focus on how emotions affect perceptual and attentional processes (Chapter 2). In this 
framework, three experimental studies will be presented, each investigating a different 
factor that may affect the impact that emotion exerts on cognitive processes: personality 
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traits of participants (Chapter 3), the motivational needs of participants (Chapter 4), and, 
finally, the social context (Chapter 5).  
Specifically, the study reported in chapter 3 will investigate the influence of a particular 
trait of personality, such as aggression, in discriminating facial expressions of different 
emotions, using two different tasks with static and dynamic stimuli. The experiment 
presented in chapter 4 will focus on attentional processes, showing that internal changes 
in the motivational value of stimuli may modulate attention allocation. Finally, the 
study presented in chapter 5 will show that emotional stimuli guide allocation of 
attention but that this bias may be itself altered, in turn, by other aspects such as social 
context. 
The third part of the present thesis will focus on the influence of cognitive processes on 
emotion. Specifically, in chapter 6 previous literatures on this topic will be reviewed, 
providing examples of the regulative function of cognitive processes mainly from the 
field of decision-making. Two further experimental studies will be reported in the last 
two chapters, in the attempt to clarify the role of cognitive brain regions such as 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) in regulation and control of human behavior. In 
particular, two techniques (TMS and tDCS) have been used to disrupt activity in 
DLPFC in two different decision-making situations, such as moral judgment (Chapter 
7), and change of preferences after difficult decision-making (Chapter 8), where 
regulation of emotional responses is required.  
The general conclusions will include further discussion of the present experiments and 
aim to offer cues for possible future research. 
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CHAPTER 1 - Emotion and Cognition: an overview 
 
 
1.1 Cognition and Emotion: What does this mean? 
What are emotions? What is their function? What neural systems underlie them? These 
are only some of the key questions that cognitive psychology and affective neuroscience 
have attempted to answer in the last 30 years, after the explosion of interest towards 
emotion field. Hundreds of studies about emotion exist but the debate concerning a 
unique and exhaustive definition of the term emotion has not been solved yet. The 
difficulty of a definition that find a general agreement is likely due to the fact that 
emotions arise from the interaction of several factors, and that they involve human 
beings in several ways. For instance, some authors conceive emotions as personal 
subjective experiences, elicited by rewards and punishments (Rolls, 2000); others define 
them as the expression or manifestation of somatic and autonomic reactions (Damasio, 
1999). Additional theories focus on emotions as states that lead to behaviors judged as 
emotional (e.g. fear or anger), and that are crucial for adaptation and survival for both 
animals and humans to their environment (Ekman, 1992). Moreover, during evolution, 
emotions were shaped by culturally acquired conventions and rules as shown by more 
extended definition of emotions, including moral emotions such as envy and pride 
(Haidt, 2001). 
Despite the great number of features of human emotion, almost everyone accepts the 
assumption that emotions are associated with physiological reactions. This vital link 
between emotional states and physiological responses has been the starting point of 
most of the studies concerning emotion in both animals and in humans. Historically, 
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among the great number of theories concerning emotion, some have focused on events 
that happen on the periphery of the body (James-Lange, 1884), others on neural 
processes (Cannon-Bard, 1931), and others more on the integration of these two aspects 
(Schachter & Singer, 1970).  
Although a clear definition of emotion has generated many controversies, there is 
relative agreement about what constitutes cognition. Usually, when we refer to 
cognition, we indicate those processes, such attention, memory, working memory and 
problem-solving, that involve high-level mental functions and that are characteristic of 
human beings (Pessoa, 2008). One of the major functions of cognitive mechanisms is 
inhibition and control of behavior, which we can refer to as cognitive control. Cognitive 
control is a fundamental human faculty and it represents the ability to behave in accord 
with goals, intentions, and rules, even when behavior runs counter to reflexive or highly 
competitive responses. One of the major characteristics of cognitive control is the 
flexibility that allows us to perform novel tasks with very little experience. Cognitive 
control is essential to modulate lower level sensory, memory and motor operations in 
order to drive goal-directed behaviors and constitute a crucial process for the human 
well-being. Indeed, even if often emotions play an important adaptive role for preparing 
to quickly respond to relevant stimuli in the environment, sometimes such fast, 
automatic emotional responses do not operate in accordance to our intentions and need 
to be overridden during goal-directed behavior. In this context, cognitive control can be 
defined as the best means to achieve what we recognize as intelligent behavior (Miller, 
2000). 
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1.2 Neural correlates of emotions and cognition 
An open debate in the field of emotion research concerns the existence of innate neural 
circuits dedicated specifically to emotions. If many authors attempted to define 
emotions, others devoted themselves to research of more specific and elaborated 
description of neural circuits underlying emotions. The work of Papez (1937) has been 
particularly influential in this regard. The network that he proposed as central neural 
circuit of emotion involved the hypothalamus, anterior thalamic nucleus, hippocampus, 
cingulate cortex and their interconnections. As explained by Papez “the sensory 
excitations which reach the lateral cortex through the internal capsule, receive their 
emotional coloring from the concurrent processes of hypothalamic origin which 
irradiate them from the gyrus cinguli (Papez, 1937)”. Many of the pathways that Papez 
proposed are correct, although there is less evidence that all regions he specified are 
central to emotions. The anatomical model proposed later by Maclean (1949, 1952) and 
known as Lymbic System, is more broadly supported by current data. This model is an 
integration of previous models with the addition of crucial regions such as amygdala 
and prefrontal cortex and, it classified brain structures by an evolutionary architecture. 
The essential idea that Maclean proposed was that the emotional experiences come from 
the integration of sensations from the world with information from the body and 
proposed that events in the world lead to body changes. Information about these 
changes return to the brain where they are integrated with ongoing perception of the 
outside world. Emotional experiences constitute the by-product of this integration, 
which is the function of the limbic system.  Despite some recent critics about the role of 
some regions of the Lymbic System, this concept survived to the current days as the 
dominant conceptualization of emotional brain and has been the focus of research in 
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affective neuroscience. Among the regions of the Lymbic System who have been 
confirmed to be consistently implicated in emotional processes there are the amygdala 
(Bechara et al., 1995; LeDoux, 1992) and the prefrontal cortex (PFC, Bechara et al.,  
1999), as well as anterior cingulate cortex. Interestingly there is evidence that the same 
brain regions are also implicated in cognitive processes (for review see Pessoa, 2008). 
 
            
 
Figure 1.1:Set of brain regions that comprise the emotional brain, based on an informal assessment of the 
frequency with which they appear in the literature. The regions in red are those that appear with great 
frequenzy, while the yellow ones are found less frequently.Subcortical frequent regions are Amygdala, 
Hypothalamus and Nucleus Accumbens (NA); Cortical frequent regions are Ventro Medial prefrontal 
Cortex (VMPFC), Orbitofrontal Cortex (OFC) and Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC). Regions that appear 
less frequently are the brain stem, the ventral tegmental area (VTA), the hippocampus, the 
periaquaeductal grey (PAG), the septum and the basal forebrain (BF) at subcortical level; And, the 
anterior insula (AI), the prefrontal cortex (PFC), the anterior temporal lobe (ATL), the posterior cingulate 
cortex (PCC), superior temporal sulcus, and somatosensory cortex at cortical level. (Adapted from 
Pessoa, 2008) 
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1.2.1 The amygdala 
The amygdala is a complex structure involved in a great number of normal behavioral 
functions. Like most of the brain regions, it is not a single mass but is composed of 
distinct subareas and nuclei that are distinguished on the basis of histological criteria 
and functions (LeDoux, 2012). Studies on brain lesions as well as neuroimaging and 
neurophysiology established the amygdala to be one of the most important brain regions 
for emotion, in particular for processing of social signal of emotion, emotional 
conditioning and consolidation of emotional memories (Dalgeish, 2004). Fear, meant as 
the ability to recognize and learn about dangers, has been the emotion most associated 
with the activity of amygdala. For instance, neuroimaging studies showed amygdala to 
be activated in response to induction of positive and negative emotional states during 
fear conditioning paradigm. Others lesions studies in humans indicated that lesions in 
this region led to emotional blunting and reduced fear conditioning (Feistein et al., 
2011; for review see Phillips et al., 2003). Interestingly, several studies have focused on 
the perception of emotional cues, showing that activity of amygdala is highly linked to 
recognition of cues of threat or danger (Davidson et al., 2000). However, the amygdala 
has also been shown to be involved in a variety of other emotional functions. For 
example, it has been demonstrated to have a pivotal role in processing social signals of 
emotion. Previous literature in animals showed that neurons in the amygdala respond 
primarily to faces (Rolls, 1999) and that this response can be selective to dynamic social 
stimuli such as approach behavior (Brothers et al., 1990). Although discrete lesion of 
amygdala is rare, literature has reported specific impairment in recognition of facial 
expressions but not facial identity in patients with restricted amygdala damage (Adolphs 
et al., 1996; Calder et al., 1996; Young et al., 1995). A relatively body of research 
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focused on the role of the amygdala in processing of rewards to motivate and reinforce 
behavior. The lateral and central amygdala has been involved in various aspects of 
reward learning and motivation as well as drug addiction (LeDoux, 2012). The crucial 
involvement of this region in a multitude of functions is probably due to its great 
number of interconnections spread all over the brain, particularly with cortex.  
 
 
1.2.3 The prefrontal cortex 
The prefrontal cortex is a strip of gray matter located at the front of the brain just above 
the orbits of the eyes. It plays a crucial role among the many system of the brain, which 
are highly interrelated. Its location is strategic, with extensive anatomical connections to 
posterior cortical regions as well as subcortical regions. It is connected with regions that 
control motor and chemical responses and it receives signals from all the brain’s 
sensory regions that control the states of the body, reason why it is involved in 
categorizing events as positive or negative. The orbitofrontal part of PFC has 
historically been linked to emotions. The first display of the involvement of PFC in 
emotion processing comes from the case of Phineas Gage in 1848, a man that 
miraculously recovered from an accident that damaged dramatically a big part of his 
prefrontal cortex. This lesion caused him a radical change in personality and emotional 
behavior. He became irreverent, impatient, quick to anger and unreliable and he could 
not manage his emotions anymore. To date, many are the evidence that confirmed the 
link between prefrontal cortex and emotions. The ventromedial prefrontal cortex has 
been extensively investigated by Damasio and colleagues (1994, 1996), who claimed 
that it provides a crucial substrate for affect-guided decision making. The somatic 
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marker hypothesis by Damasio suggested a key role of bodily feedback in emotions, 
especially implicating the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. According to this theory, PFC 
is crucial in processing “somatic markers”, meant as physiological reactions that track 
previous emotionally significant events and provide signals that define current events 
with emotionally related consequences in the past. In situations where logical analysis is 
not sufficient the “emotional push” given by the somatic marker allows to make 
decisions. In support of this, Damasio and his colleagues reported cases of different 
patients with lesions in ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Damasio, 1994; Bechara et al., 
1994) who tries and failed to deal with decisions in contexts of uncertainty. To date, this 
latter it is not the only function attributed to prefrontal cortex in emotions.  
Studies by Rolls (1996, 1999) in monkeys suggested that orbitofrontal PFC works 
together with the amygdala to learn and represent the relationship between information 
about external sensory stimuli to interoceptive information that represents emotional 
significance. According to Rolls, neurons in PFC detect changes in the reward value of 
learned stimuli and change their response in accord with them. In addition, there are 
observations that medial prefrontal cortex is also involved in fear conditioning 
processing and particularly in extinction process: lesions of the medial PFC lead to a 
potentiating fear responses and retardation of extinction (Gewirtz & Davis, 1997; 
LeDoux & Phelps, 1993). Thus, medial PFC together with other neocortical regions 
may be related in regulating amygdala responses to stimuli based on their current 
affective value.  
The dual system model by Davidson and colleagues (2000), proposes that PFC may 
function to guide behavior towards the most adaptive current goals (Davidson & Irwin, 
1999). These authors suggest this region to promote adaptive responses competing with 
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alternatives that are linked to immediate emotional consequences. In this model, they 
argue a differential contribution of left and right side of PFC to positive and negative 
emotions, respectively. They divide two fundamental systems that underlie approach 
and withdrawal related to emotion and motivation: the approach system aimed at 
facilitating appetitive behavior and generating positive affects when close to a certain 
goal and, the withdrawal system aimed at encouraging retreat of an organism from 
aversive stimuli or organizations of appropriate response to threat. Left-sided PFC 
regions are involved in appetitive and positive goals, while right-sided PFC regions are 
involved in keeping negative goals that require behavioral inhibition and withdrawal. 
This system also generates withdrawal-related negative emotions such as fear or 
disgust. As reported by Davidson and colleagues (2004), evidence of the valence-
asymmetry hypothesis is provided by both studies on patients with lesions and normal 
subjects (Morris et al., 1996; Davidson et al., 2000).  
             
 
Figure 1.2 This figure represents localization of dorsolateral (DLPFC) and ventromedial (VMPFC) 
prefrontal cortex in the brain. 
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The prefrontal cortex (PFC) is a crucial region not only for emotional but also for 
cognitive processes. While ventromedial (VMPFC) and orbitofrontal (OFC) parts of 
prefrontal cortex have been commonly associated to emotion, lateral regions of 
prefrontal cortex have been associated to cognition. Indeed, there is relative agreement 
that dorsolateral part of PFC may be considered as the most prominent and pure 
cognitive area in the brain. This area has a great number of connections that make of it 
an ideal region to process the wide range of information that we need for complex 
behavior and to exert top-down control on low sensory brain processes. Indeed, it is 
directly connected with higher-order sensory and motor cortex and indirectly (through 
VMPFC) with limbic structures that process internal information such as reward 
(Fuster, 2001). Studies on both monkeys and human lesions showed evidence of a 
functional organization of lateral PFC along a rostral-caudal axis as well as a dorsal-
ventral axis (Petrides, 2005). On the one hand, the most caudal frontal region is more 
responsible for fine motor control and direct sensory-motor mapping, whereas the 
caudal lateral frontal region is implicated in higher order control processes aimed at 
regulating the selection among multiple contending responses and stimuli based on 
conditional operations. The most rostral lateral part of prefrontal cortex instead seems to 
be critical for more abstract role in cognitive control.  Furthermore, considering a 
dorsal-ventral division of the lateral prefrontal cortex, dorsolateral region has been 
shown to relate to working-memory functions, while ventrolateral part to active 
judgment on information held in posterior cortical association regions (Petrides, 1994; 
for review see Petrides, 2005). Consistently, neuroimaging studies provided evidence 
that dorsolateral regions of prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) are responsible for monitor and 
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selection of goal-relevant information while ventrolateral is implicated in maintenance 
of this information (Wagner et al., 2001).  
Studies in monkey showed that one of the most important functions of lateral prefrontal 
cortex is to extract information about rules across experience and use them to drive 
though and actions (Miller, 2000). Moreover, lateral PFC has been shown to be critical 
for learning of associations between sensory cues, outcomes and voluntary actions, 
ability required to make prediction and guide goal-directed behavior (Watanabe et al., 
1992). In humans many are the examples of implication of lateral prefrontal cortex in a 
variety of cognitive processes such as working memory (Cohen et al., 1997; D’Esposito 
et al., 1998), abstract reasoning (Kroger et al., 2002) as well as general problem solving 
(Duncan et al., 2000). Anterior part of DLPFC has been shown to activate particularly 
in difficult problem-solving and reasoning tasks (Kroger et al., 2002). Kroger and 
colleagues (2002) for instance provided fMRI findings of greater activation of DLPFC 
by increasing complexity of the task as well as adding distracters during performance). 
Consistently, previous neuropsychological studies with patients with lesions in lateral 
prefrontal cortex showed dramatic impairment in the ability to solve matrix problems 
requiring integration of information at multiple dimensions (Waltz et al., 1999).  
A fundamental cognitive mechanism whose dorsolateral PFC is responsible for is the 
inhibition and control of behavior. Indeed, successful behavior control requires the 
capacity to monitor ongoing actions to prevent responses when they would violate rules 
governing behavior. The so-called go-no go task has been widely used to investigate 
this function. In this task participants are asked to execute a motor response when 
presented the “go” stimulus but to withold the response when presented the “no-go” 
stimulus. fMRI and neuropsychological studies have provided evidence that lateral 
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prefrontal cortex has crucial implication in response inhibition (Aron et al., 2004; Sharp 
et al., 2010).  
 
 
1.2.3 The anterior cingulate cortex 
The cingulate cortex is another region crucially involved in both emotion and cognition. 
It is a thick strip of cortex encircling the corpus callosum and is one of the most 
prominent features on the mesial surface of the brain. From the functional viewpoint, 
findings supported the idea that anterior (rostral) cingulate cortex is specialized for 
affective processes, while midcingulate cortex (dorsal) is specialized for cognitive 
processes (for review see Bush et al., 2000). Consistently, the anterior part of this region 
is densely connected with the amygdala, the anterior and mediodorsal nuclei of the 
thalamus, and the orbitofrontal cortex, while dorsal is mainly connected with the 
posterior parietal and dorsolateral prefrontal cortices, as well as the medial pulvinar, 
lateroposterior, and laterodorsal nuclei of the thalamus.  
Early studies showed that lesions of ACC produced a bunch of symptoms, including 
apathy, inattention, deregulation of autonomic functions and emotional instability (Tow 
& Whitty, 1953). Indeed, some contemporary studies pointed at the ACC as the center 
of generation of physiological and behavioral responses (Critchley, 2005), others 
implicate this region in the representation of the value of stimuli and actions and, in  the 
monitoring of somatic states (Kalisch et al., 2006, Ocshner & Gross, 2005). Others 
studies attribute to cingulate cortex  the integration of visceral, attentional and 
emotional information that is crucially involved in the regulation of affects and the top-
down modulation of limbic and endocrine systems (Etkin et al., 2006; Schiller & 
15 
 
Delgado, 2010). However, the affective subdivision of ACC is routinely activated in 
functional imaging studies involving all kinds of emotional stimuli (Phan et al., 2003; 
Murphy et al., 2003). 
Several studies suggested ACC to be important in both emotional and cognitive conflict.  
The Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) and its emotional variant have been extensively used to 
study conflict. Recent neuroimaging findings have shown that ACC monitors the 
conflict between functional states of the organism and any new information that has 
potential affective or motivational consequences (Dalgeish, 2004). Etkin and colleagues 
(2011) argued for a dorsal-ventral ACC functional dissociation, where the dorsal part of 
ACC is mostly involved in detecting emotional conflict whereas the ventral division, 
together with medial PFC and amygdala, is mostly involved in regulation of emotional 
conflict. Finally, studies on emotion regulation have shown activation of  dorsal ACC in 
reappraisal, namely the modulation of emotional processing through deliberate and 
conscious application of top-down executive control (Gross, 2002) and activation of 
ventral ACC in affect labeling of emotional faces (Lieberman et al., 2007) or self-
distracting from fear-conditioned stimuli (Delgado et al., 2008). 
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CHAPTER 2 - Emotion affects cognitive processes  
 
 
2.1 Emotion affects attention 
The ability to detect information in the environment and process it based on its current 
relevance or salience is attributed to selective attention and executive functions (Driver, 
2001). Attention can be defined as a set of neural mechanisms that reduce the inputs in 
an environment full of stimuli and facilitate perceptual processing of relevant aspects of 
the environment (Yantis, 2000). Consistently, neuroimaging and event related potential 
studies in humans have demonstrated that processing of attended information is greater 
compared to the processing of unattended information (Desimone & Duncan, 1995). 
Top-down signals coming from a network of frontal and parietal regions seem to be 
critical in the control of attention and in modulating activity within visual processing 
regions (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002). Nevertheless, visual system has limited processing 
capacity and paying attention to certain features of the visual field causes neglecting of 
others (Broadbent, 1958). Information must compete for processing resources 
(Desimone & Duncan, 1995). The competition between information can be modulated 
in different ways, by bottom-up stimulus-driven processes in the visual cortex (e.g. 
stimulus salience) or by attentional top-down processes in higher level regions of the 
brain (e.g. attending a particular location, for review see Pessoa et al, 2002). Thus, 
attention leads to increase the influence of behaviorally relevant stimuli at expenses of 
irrelevant ones and allows filtering information and according it priority to processing. 
Orienting of attention is herein a basic and fundamental process, but can the orienting of 
attention be modulated by certain kind of stimuli? 
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Attending information in the environment and selection of it could be critical for 
adaptive and survival behavior as it allows to react as quickly as possible to changes 
that occur around us and consequently to adjust our behavior. This is the case of 
emotional arousing stimuli. For instance, the sudden appearance of a threat in 
environment warrants immediate attention. In this perspective, a great number of 
empirical studies  indicate that emotional or arousing images compared to neutral 
images affect performance of simple tasks, either when they are task relevant (targets) 
or task irrelevant (distracters), supporting the idea that emotional contents of stimuli 
influences mechanisms of selective attention.  
In recent years, research has focused on emotional processing in general and on 
understanding how emotion and attention are related one to another in particular. 
Behavioral observations indicate that people more readily pay attention to emotional 
than neutral stimuli and that this happens in a reflexive and involuntary way. The 
preferential attention for emotional arousing stimuli has been widely demonstrated (for 
review see Vuilleumier,  2005), by means of many traditional paradigms already used in 
the study of selective attention. Some examples include the dot probe task (Armony & 
Dolan, 2002), the Eriksen flanker tasks (Fenske & Eastwood, 2003), the inhibition of 
return (Rutheford & Raymond,2010) and the spatial visual search (Eastwood et al., 
2001; Fox et al., 2001; Öhman et al., 2001).  
Richards and colleagues (2011) tested participants in an emotional variant of the Stroop 
task and showed that they were slower in naming the color of a word or picture  when 
the stimulus has an emotional relevance, even though emotion is irrelevant to the task. 
Similar findings come from visual search tasks, where a unique target must be found 
among other distracters. In a classic visual search, the time to detect a specified target 
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typically increases in direct proportion to the number of irrelevant distracters, indicating 
serial attentive processing of every stimulus in the display. It has been shown that 
participants are faster in detection when the target has some emotional meaning, such as 
faces with positive or negative emotional expressions compared to neutral (Eastwood et 
al., 2001; Fox et al., 2001) or such as snake or spiders among flowers (Öhman et al., 
2001). Interestingly, Eastwood and colleagues (2001) reported no such effect when 
emotional faces were presented inverted, ruling out the criticism that this emotional bias 
is due to differences in basic visual features, such as contrast or luminance.  
Other studies have investigated the effects of emotional stimuli on temporal attention. 
For example, facilitation effect of emotion was found in attentional blink paradigms 
(AB, Raymond et al., 1992), where multiple stimuli are presented in rapid succession. 
Usually, when two targets are presented within about half second of one other, the 
second target is not detected. This impairment in detecting the second target of a stream 
of rapidly presented stimuli is reduced, when the second target is emotionally arousing 
(Anderson, 2005).  However, in another study by Fox and colleagues (2005) the same 
effect was reported only in high anxious individuals. Phelps and colleagues (2006) 
focused on transient covert attention, automatically triggered by the sudden appearance 
of peripheral stimulus and investigated the possibility that emotion interacts with 
attention to further enhance even the earliest level of visual perception. In a rapid serial 
visual presentation paradigm (RSVP), they observed that the mere presence of a fearful 
face heightened contrast sensitivity and that the highest sensitivity was induced by 
manipulating emotion in conjunction with attention rather than separately. They 
concluded that people actually see better in the presence of emotional stimuli.  
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Although in a less extent, there is evidence that not only negative or threat-related 
emotions, like fear and anger, arise emotional bias but also pleasant and arousing 
stimuli can have similar effect, suggesting that arousal value rather than valence 
(negative or positive) plays a crucial role. Consistently, high level of arousal has been 
interpreted as indicative for relevant events in general (Lang et al., 1997). 
In summary, a common conclusion of all these studies is that emotional visual stimuli 
automatically attract and hold attention more than neutral or novel stimuli and that this 
could be due to the fact that emotional value of stimuli is perceived by some rapid pre-
attentive route that facilitate focal attention to the location of an emotional target more 
efficiently than to neutral target.  
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2.2 Emotion and attention: neural perspective 
 Researchers have started to investigate the effect of emotion on sensory processing and 
to wonder whether neural mechanisms may somehow explain the strict relationship 
between attention and emotion. Converging data indicate that selective attention 
mechanisms depend on a complex neural circuit that involves predominantly parietal, 
frontal and cingulate cortices with links to subcortical regions (Corbetta & Shulman, 
2002; Posner & Petersen, 1990). Even if anatomically distinct, regions implicated in 
emotional processing show great overlaps with those implicated in attentional 
mechanisms. It has been shown, for instance, that fear, which is a crucial emotion for 
adaptive and survival behavior, it is likely to have links with neural networks of 
attention, guiding perception and action (Armony & Dolan, 2000).  
Three are the important candidate structures involved in the relationship between 
emotion and attention.  The anterior cingulate cortex is known to be related in selective 
attention, emotion evaluation and error monitoring (Bush et al., 2000; Yamasaki et al., 
2002) and has numerous connections to visual processing regions of the brain. The 
orbitofrontal cortex is also a good candidate as it has been shown to play a vital role in 
affective evaluation (O’Doherty et al., 2003; Kawabata & Zeki, 2004) and value 
learning (Knutson et al., 2001) and it also sends and receives input from the primary 
visual areas of the brain (Rolls, 2000). Finally, because it sends large efferent pathway 
to primary visual cortex and receives signals from many cortical regions including OFC, 
amygdala has been designed as the most critical substrate of the modulation of activity 
evoked by emotional stimuli.  This region has been shown to be involved in enhanced 
perception of emotional events (Anderson & Phelps, 2001) as well as in rapid response 
to emotional content of an event (LeDoux, 2002). It has been suggested that (LeDoux, 
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2002) amygdala facilitates perception of this stimuli by altering sensory cortical 
processing via feedback connections to visual cortex. Consistently, Morris and 
colleagues (1999) found a positive correlation between activity in amygdala and visual 
cortex, while participants viewed fearful faces compared to happy ones. Similarly, 
Pessoa and co-workers (2002) observed same kind of correlation between activity in 
amygdala and visual areas, such as superior temporal sulcus, middle occipital and 
fusyform gyrus. More evidence on the direction of the modulatory role of the amygdala 
come from neuropsychological studies (Anderson & Phelps, 2001), which showed that 
patients presenting bilateral amygdala damage, relative to normal subjects, were 
impaired in the usual advantage in detecting aversive word stimuli. This view suggests 
that in emotional contexts the amygdala may affect attentional processing by 
modulating early visual regions. On the other hand, Pessoa and colleagues (2004) 
propose a second way through which emotional modulation can be implemented, via 
amygdala projections to frontal regions, involved in control of attentional resources, 
such as anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). In 
this latter case, emotional modulation would correspond to a sort of attentional 
modulation, in which the valence of a stimulus aims at informing cognitive regions of a 
potentially relevant event (Pessoa et al., 2004). Thus, responses to visual stimuli of 
amygdala would be modulated by attention.  
In spite of the emphasis on the role of amygdala in the modulation of attentional 
processes evoked by emotional stimuli, it is worthwhile to repeat that also other brain 
regions, such as orbitofrontal cortex, play a role in responding to emotional contents and 
that together with amygdala could determine behavioral and social relevance of stimuli. 
In conclusion, it is interesting to note that all these regions that show enhanced neural 
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responses for different emotional events compared to neutral are also implicated in 
attentional and cognitive processes. 
 
 
2.3 Emotion and attention: the problem of awareness 
As reported above, the relationship between emotion and attention raised great interest 
in research. There is good evidence that the processing of emotional information is 
prioritized relative to other kind of information and interferes with ongoing processing 
of other information. In particular, a question that raised considerable attention is 
whether the processing of emotional stimuli is automatic or requires attentional 
resources. Many behavioral and neurophysiologic observations suggest that the 
advantageous processing of emotion-laden stimuli occurs in an automatic manner, 
outside of attention (Öhman, 2002; Vuilleumier et al., 2001a) and awareness (Öhman et 
al., 1995). Nevertheless there is evidence both for and against automaticity and the 
debate is still open. Findings in favor of automatic emotional processing derive from 
fMRI studies, which showed that amygdala responds to fearful stimuli even when they 
are masked and participants are unaware of their occurrence (Whalen et al., 1998). In a 
famous fMRI study, Vuilleumier and colleagues (2001a) tested participants instructed to 
fixating a central cue and matching either two faces (fearful and neutral) or two houses 
presented eccentrically. Results showed no evidence that attention modulated responses 
in the amygdala, regardless of the stimulus valence.  
On the other hand, Pessoa and colleagues (2002) argue that processing of emotional 
contents is not automatic but instead requires attention, at least at a certain extent. 
Moreover, they conjecture that attentional failure in modulation of emotional stimuli 
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processing, showed by previous literature, is imputable to an insufficient engagement of 
attentional resources by competing tasks. In their fMRI paradigm, participants were 
presented with neutral and emotional faces expressions while attention was focused on 
them (attended) and while it was directed to a sufficiently demanding bars orientation 
task (unattended). Results presented that attended stimuli evoked enhanced activity in 
amygdala for facial emotional expressions but that only in the attended stimuli 
condition responses to stimulus valence was significantly different. Contrarily to the 
previous results, these ones demonstrate that expression of a valence effect is not 
automatic but requires attention instead. Consistent with this view, interesting findings 
are presented in other studies that used techniques such as magnetoencephalography 
(MEG, Luo et al., 2010) and intracranial recording (Pourtois et al., 2010), that compared 
to fMRI are considered more sensitive in terms of time and spatial resolution. Recently, 
Luo and colleagues (2010) showed that the degree of automaticity in processing of 
emotional facial expressions is a matter of time. Their results demonstrated an early 
(40-140 ms) amygdala response to visual emotional information independent of 
attention modulation but also a later (290-410 ms) amygdala response to emotional 
information that on the contrary was modulated by attention. Similarly, Pourtois and 
colleagues (2010), recording intracranial focal field potential from amygdala in fearful 
faces presentation, found both an early emotional effect in the amygdala arising prior to, 
and independently of attentional modulation and, a significant modulation of attention 
on differential emotional responses at a later latency. Taken together these results 
suggest separate influences of emotion and attention on amygdala responses as function 
of time and they could be considered as an explanation of the discrepancy in previous 
literature. Nevertheless, other possibilities could be taken into account. One of these 
24 
 
possibilities concerns individual differences as important predictors of neural and 
behavioral sensitivity to emotional stimuli. Indeed, previous literature reported that 
personality traits have a great impact in detection and recognition of emotions. 
 
 
2.4 Emotion and attention: the role of personality 
As previously reported the ability to recognize an emotion has a critical adaptive 
function and may affect our social relationships. Recognizing emotions as quickly as 
possible allows reacting to incoming events from the environment. Consistently, 
emotional stimuli summon preferential attention compared to neutral stimuli 
(Vuilleumier et al., 2004), and evoke fast and involuntary autonomic responses (Globish 
et al., 1999). An issue that generated considerable interest is whether and how 
individual differences, such as personality or dispositional affect, may modulate 
emotional attention. For instance, people usually differ from each others in the amount 
of anxiety they experience, or in the degree of extraversion they exhibit. These 
individual differences may influence behaviors and sensitivity to emotional stimuli. 
Findings in favor of this claim come from behavioral and neuroimaging studies on both 
clinical and non clinical populations (for review see Calder et al., 2011), indicating that 
negative mood (Hepworth et al., 2010), anxiety (Fox et al., 2002), personality disorders 
(Domes et al., 2009) or simply personality traits (Hamann & Canli, 2004) all constitute 
possible explanation for the modulation of neural bases of emotional processing and 
consequent behavior. The relationship between anxiety and emotional stimuli 
processing has been extensively investigated by means of different paradigms as visual 
search task, dot-probe task or backward masking procedure. A number of studies, that 
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used a visual probe task, where threat-related and neutral stimuli are replaced by a probe 
and participants are instructed to respond as quickly as possible to the probe, have 
shown that anxious individuals are relatively faster to respond to probe replaced threat 
compared to non-threat ones (McLeod et al., 1986; Bradley et al., 1998, Bar-Haim et al., 
2007). Similar evidence is provided by a modified version of spatial cuing paradigm 
used by Fox and colleagues (2001). This work showed that participants with higher 
level of anxiety were slower in shifting attention from the spatial location of the threat 
cues. Another study by Georgiou and co-workers (2005) indicated that high-trait 
anxious individuals, compared to low-trait anxious individuals, needed longer to 
classify peripheral targets when fearful faces were presented at fixation relative to other 
emotional expressions such as happy, sad or neutral ones. Converging data on the 
important role of individual differences in emotional processing concerns also 
personality disorders, such as Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD). Enhanced 
emotional sensitivity and increased emotional reactivity are thought to be characteristics 
of BPD patients (Linehan, 1993). Thus, it has been assumed that these patients should 
show a lower detection threshold and increased accuracy in the detection of emotion. 
Although there is evidence showing BDP patients to exhibit improved facial recognition 
and greater sensitivity for fearful faces (Wagner & Linehan, 1999; Lynch et al., 2006), 
there are also contrasting findings, indicating less accuracy of BDP patients and no 
enhanced sensitivity in recognizing expressions of emotions, such as anger, disgust and 
fear (Bland et al., 2004; Domes et al., 2008). However, as suggested by Domes, 
divergence in results of these studies could be attributed to differences in the paradigms 
that have been used.  
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In spite of the controversial results in this domain, there is general agreement that a 
given emotional stimulus can evoke a wide range of emotional responses across 
individuals and that this variability can elucidate the neural bases of emotional 
processing in general. It has been observed previously that amygdala is a key region for 
emotional processing but that its activity exhibits also a certain degree of variability, for 
example for happy faces (Canli et al., 2002). However, this variability was shown to be 
strongly correlated to participants’ extraversion traits, resulting in the more extraverted 
the subject was, the more their amygdala responded to happy faces.  Recent studies 
have investigated the extent to which amygdala responds to threat-related distracters, 
depending on individual anxiety levels (Bishop et al., 2004). Low-anxious individuals 
only showed increased amygdala responses to attended fearful faces, while high-
anxious individuals showed increased amygdala responses to both attended and 
unattended threat-related stimuli. Likewise, in men with elevated trait anxiety scores, 
trait anger was demonstrated to correlate positively with bilateral amygdala reactivity to 
angry facial expressions (Carré et al., 2010). Moreover, by presenting emotional (faces 
expressions) and neutral (houses) stimuli to a non clinical population of individuals and 
asking participants to attend or not to the stimuli, higher anxiety level produced 
increased activity in right amygdala to attend direct angry facial expressions, compared 
to neutral or fearful ones, whereas increased activity in left amygdala was associated to 
unattended fearful faces (Ewbank et al., 2009). 
In conclusion, these findings suggest that, although emotional attention is important in 
general, it is also possible that the salience and the value of stimuli vary as function of 
personality, mood or other individuals characteristics (Fox et al., 2005; Vuilleumier, 
2005; Bishop et al., 2007).  
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2.5. Emotion and attention: the motivation value of stimuli  
Stimuli incoming from the environment can be considered as affective also depending 
on what impact they have on the perceiver’s eye. A scary image, for instance, can be 
considered as negative by virtue of its ability to make the perceiver feel momentarily 
unpleasant. In this perspective, we can argue that visual selection processes are 
accompanied by affective evaluation and value prediction based on the current and 
future goals of the individual and that this might affect allocation of attention. Indeed, 
attention can be defined as a set of neural mechanisms aimed at facilitating perceptual 
processing of relevant stimuli and at inhibiting processing of stimuli that could interfere 
with the achievement of our goals. Another critical system that acts in interaction with 
attention is called motivation and it has the task to specify current goals for an 
individual, to direct attention consequently. This system monitors internal emotional 
states as well as external conditions and appraises possible outcomes of actions. It 
strictly relies on previous learning and it is widely guided by our idea of what we 
consider as rewards or punishments (Raymond, 2009). Attention and motivation are 
heavily connected. Indeed, it is often assumed that pursuing a goal leads to the 
voluntary allocation of attention to goals–relevant stimuli and places (Yantis, 2000).  
We have already reviewed the strong literature about the automatic attentional orienting 
to certain classes of stimuli, such as emotional stimuli that have potentially important 
adaptive and evolutionary functions. Nevertheless, there are not solely stimuli relevant 
to our evolutionary motives but also stimuli that are relevant because they fit with our 
temporary goals or because they acquire a certain value with experience. There is 
evidence supporting the possibility that motivational drives contribute to visual 
selection and enhances selective attention (Della Libera & Chelazzi, 2006).  
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In a spatial cuing task, Vogt and colleagues (2010) examined whether words relevant to 
a person current goal influence orienting of attention even when there is no intention to 
attend to these goal-relevant stimuli, and found that goal-relevant stimuli delayed 
disengagement of attention more than other types of stimuli. These results are similar to 
previous ones showing difficulties in disengaging attention from threat-related stimuli 
(Fox et al., 2001). As suggested by previous literature (Lang et al., 1997), attentive 
orienting is not a response confined only to emotional stimuli but is also prompted by 
stimuli that are motivationally relevant – either appetitive or defensive. Thus, as human 
behavior widely relies upon people’s goals and motivations, it is essential that automatic 
allocation of attention is guided by people’s goals and motivation to relevant stimuli. 
This hypothesis is perfectly in line with results provided by studies on attentional bias 
for food-related stimuli and food deprivation. For example, using visual probe task, it 
has been found that attentional bias towards food words was associated with self-
reported hunger (Mogg et al., 1998), and that fasting increased attentional bias to high-
calorie food-related words (Placanica et al., 2002). Similarly, deprivation of food 
delayed the naming of the color of food words in a modified Stroop paradigm (Dobson 
& Dozois, 2004). In addition, neuroimaging and event-related potential studies provide 
evidence that hunger and satiety affect stimulus perception. Stockburger and co-workers 
(2009) used event related brain potentials to examine the effects of food deprivation on 
visual attention to food stimuli and observed that hunger enhances late positive 
potentials to food pictures, revealing that variations in motivational state enhances 
visual attention processes at the level of stimulus processing. Moreover, it has been 
demonstrated that food deprivation increases neural activity in higher level visual 
associative regions and amygdala when processing food pictures (LeBar et al., 2001). 
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An interesting similarity comes from studies on addiction and drug dependence, which 
showed attentional bias for cigarette-related cues in smokers and alcohol-related cues in 
drinkers (Bradley et al., 2003; Field et al., 2004). 
The value attributed to an object may fluctuate depending on our current needs and 
preferences. Indeed, research has demonstrated that alterations in the participants’ 
internal state or needs (e.g., hunger-satiety) can influence the deployment of visual 
attention to motivationally significant stimuli (i.e., food). For example it has been 
observed that affective state of the perceiver may influence visual processes and 
attention orienting (for review see Barrett & Bar, 2009).  
Research has started to explain how the brain codes and stores information about the 
value of visual stimuli acquired through association with reward and punishments 
(O’Doherty, 2004). The evidence suggests that value prediction is coded using 
dopaminergic circuit involving orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and the ventral striatum 
(Knutson, 2001, O’Doherty et al., 2002; O’Doherty, 2004). In addiction Amygdala 
conduces to coding and updating value prediction (Paton et al., 2006). In line, animal 
and human studies on food devaluation indicate that the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) may 
be critical for signaling changes in the reward value of food stimuli (for review see 
Murray et al.,  2007). From the OFC, signals indicating the current reward value of 
foods may be conveyed to attention regions of the brain, such as the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex and the posterior parietal cortex (Cavada & Goldman-Rakic, 1989), 
thereby directing visual attention selectively to food targets that can best satisfy current 
needs (Mohanty et al., 2008). These findings suggest that value coding system could 
have important modulatory effects on visual cognitive processes such as selective 
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attention. To summarize, recent studies on humans showed that the attention and 
emotional evaluation interact to determine visual selection. 
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Introduction to experiments One, Two and Three  
This chapter reviewed the state of art regarding the relationship between attention and 
emotion. Taken together, results from behavioral and neuroimaging studies showed that 
emotional processing is prioritized and it may affect cognitive processing as perception 
and selective attention. Because of their importance for adaptive and survival functions, 
emotional stimuli such as facial expressions of anger and fear were shown to 
preferentially draw attention even in a automatic way, when compared to neutral 
stimuli. These findings come from diverse paradigms, including those employing 
peripheral emotional stimuli and those in which affective and neutral stimuli are 
spatially separated. Thus, emotion and attention are strictly related as explained also by 
the overlaps of neural regions implicated in both processes. The crucial neural regions 
involved in this relationship are the amygdala, because of its role in emotion perception 
and its links to the primary visual cortex; the anterior cingulate cortex, related to 
selective attention and emotion evaluation and, the orbitofrontal cortex, related to 
affective evaluation and value learning. Although the importance attributed to 
processing of emotions, there is discrepancy between studies suggesting that emotional 
perception is automatic and those indicating that, on the contrary, emotional perception 
is not immune to the effects of cognitive processes and it depends on the availability of 
attentional resources.  
Expanding about the relationship between emotion and perceptual and attentional 
processes, in the next three chapters, three studies will be reported that investigate some 
aspects, such as personality, motivational value of stimuli and social context that may 
influence perception of and attention towards emotions.  
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To date, some aspects of personality have received more attention than others. While 
anxiety is one of the most studied traits of personality in relation to attention to and 
discrimination of emotion, the influence of aggression traits still remains unclear. 
Moreover, the few studies to have investigated aggression concern mainly clinical 
populations. Behavioral evidence on whether aggression personality traits in normal 
subjects affect the ability of discriminate emotion is still lacking. Thus, this will be the 
focus of the study presented in chapter 3. 
Chapter 4 and 5 will be more specifically dedicated to attentional processes.   
Motivation may be considered critical for the relationship between emotion and 
attention. It has been suggested that attentive orienting does not preferentially respond 
only to emotional stimuli but rather to stimuli that are motivationally relevant for 
individuals. The experiment in chapter 4 aimed at investigating whether modulation of 
motivational value and pleasantness of a stimulus may influence visual selective 
attention. Finally, it should be noted that emotional enhancement of attention has often 
been investigated in isolated contexts with no consideration for the social nature of 
human beings. The study reported in chapter 5 examines whether and how the 
phenomenon of enhanced attention for emotional pictures is modulated by the presence 
of others. 
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CHAPTER 3 - EXPERIMENT ONE 
Personality affects how we discriminate facial emotional expressions 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Emotions play an adaptive function and are critical in influencing our social interactions 
(Hext & Lunsky, 1997). Recognizing an emotion allows us to react promptly to external 
stimuli and to modulate our behavior accordingly. Each emotion or group of emotions 
can influence behavior in different ways, and have a different impact on our state and 
on how we organize perception, cognition and action (Izard, 1992). 
It has been reported that individuals recognize emotions in others not only by using 
clues from facial expressions but also from the posture of the body, language and tone 
of voice (Loveland, 1997). However, the majority of studies on emotion recognition 
used facial expressions as stimuli, because the face is considered to be the primary 
reservoir of information about biological and other social characteristics (gender, 
identity, age and emotional state, Fox et al., 2007). 
 Some emotions, such as joy, fear or anger emerge during the earliest stages of life. 
They have their own distinct characteristics and serve specific functions. Fear, for 
example, has been described as a stimulus that allows to quickly communicating to co-
specifics the presence of a negative or dangerous stimulus that should be avoided 
(Mineka & Cook, 1993). Anger plays a similar adaptive role, by providing clear 
information on the source of the threat. Moreover, we can consider anger as a negative 
signal that discourages socially inappropriate and unexpected behavior (Averill, 1983).  
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The expression of joy, on the contrary, provides a positive sign of cooperation and 
affiliation during social interactions (Schmidt & Cohn, 2001) and has been shown to be 
the most easily recognized emotion, followed by sadness and anger (Walz & Benson, 
1996; Matheson et al., 2005). This result, however, is in contrast with other studies 
showing that facial expression of anger were more easily recognized compared to 
expressions of joy and neutral expressions (Eastwood et al., 2001, Ohman et al., 2001). 
In spite of these divergences, all available literature agrees in sustaining the critical 
importance of emotions in life, from the adaptive role they hold, to their influence in 
development of personality, and in shaping cognitive processes and social interactions. 
There is proof that the processing of emotions is influenced by several aspects, 
including personality. A large number of studies have shown that personality 
differences can influence the processing of emotions (for review see Calder et al., 
2011). Studies that have used threat-related stimuli in individuals diagnosed with 
anxiety disorders (Mogg et al., 2004) and in non-clinical populations of individuals with 
low and high levels of anxiety (Bar-Him et al., 2007) concluded that anxiety may 
influence the behavioral responses to cues that communicate threat. Similarly, Fox and 
colleagues (2001, 2005) have investigated the role of anxiety, measured by using self-
reported questionnaires, as determinant factor in the selective processing of emotional 
expressions. Their results showed that attention was biased towards expressions of fear 
only in subjects with high levels of anxiety. Accordingly, Mogg and Bradley (1999) 
showed that participants with high levels of anxiety had a greater propensity to direct 
their attention to expressions of fear and anger. 
Evidence regarding the influence of personality in the processing of emotions also 
comes from brain imaging studies (fMRI), which show that some personality 
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dimensions may explain differences in neural responses to emotional stimuli. For 
instance, Canli and colleagues (2001) found that, in response to positive and negative 
emotional facial expressions, extroversion and nervousness traits correlated with the 
variability in activity of the amygdala, a key region for the processing of emotions, 
especially negative ones.  
Aggression, defined as overt behavior with the intention of inflicting physical damage 
to another individual (Nelson & Trainor, 2007), is another important trait of personality, 
the influence of which has been less investigated compared to anxiety. Indeed, many 
studies concerning processing of emotions have investigated mainly anxiety and 
depression (Williams, 1997), omitting the fact that aggression might be associated with 
a greater sensitivity to negative stimuli as threat-related ones. In this regard, one must 
note that traits of aggression in personality may lead to respond differently to 
threatening stimuli, according to personal interpretation (Beck, 1976). Van Honk and 
colleagues (2001) tested subjects with low and high levels of aggression/anger in a 
version of a masked and unmasked emotional Stroop task and found that individuals 
with low levels of aggression/anger were facilitated in the task while subjects with a 
higher level of anger suffered an interference effect. They found no difference between 
the masked and unmasked conditions. In another study in which authors used a pictorial 
emotional Stroop task, an attentional bias to masked angry faces only in individuals 
with traits of high aggression was shown (Van Honk et al., 2000). Further findings on 
the link between aggression traits and personality come from clinical populations. For 
instance, Matheson and colleagues (2005) have investigated the ability to identify 
emotions in frequently aggressive and non-aggressive individuals with intellectual 
disability. Their results demonstrated that more aggressive participants had more 
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difficulties, compared to less aggressive ones, in labeling emotions. Another study on 
the same type of patients has found that aggressive individuals with intellectual 
disabilities had a tendency to interpret facial expressions more negatively when 
compared to non-aggressive individuals with the same disability (Walz & Benson, 
1996). 
The interaction between anxiety and aggression traits of personality in the reactivity to 
emotional facial expressions has also being investigated at the neural level through 
imaging techniques. Carré and colleagues (2010) have shown that features of aggression 
are correlated with the activation of the amygdala but only in men with high levels of 
aggression and not in women. Consistently, other evidence shows that individuals with 
high levels in expression of aggression showed an amplification of amygdala activity in 
response to crude representations of expressions of fear (Carlson et al., 2010). 
The current study tested healthy subjects with high and low levels of aggression in two 
different tasks of recognition of basic emotions such as anger, fear and joy. The aim of 
the study was to investigate whether and how personality differences in the level of 
aggression may affect the ability to process distinct types of emotions. Two hypotheses 
are equally plausible: the first is that people that are more aggressive are also more used 
to experiencing anger, so they could be facilitated in recognizing negative emotions, 
such as anger, in others.  In this case, we would expect participants with more 
aggressive personalities to be faster and more accurate in recognizing facial expressions 
of anger compared to other emotions. On the contrary, a second possibility is that 
people that are more prompted to aggression develop a form of insensitivity to emotions 
and to the expression of anger in particular. In this latter case we would expect 
impairment in recognition of facial expressions, in particular for angry faces. 
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Most of the literature on emotion recognition based its findings on a static presentation 
of emotions such as photographs of emotional facial expressions (e.g. Ekman & Friesen, 
1976). However this has attracted criticism, because static stimuli are considered to be 
too simple type of stimuli, lacking the dynamic and contextual cues of natural stimuli 
(Moore et al., 1997). In addition, some studies have found that dynamic facial 
expressions of emotion have a facilitating effect on perceptual/cognitive processing 
(Sato et al., 2004, Sato et al., 2008). To avoid this problem, here we used two different 
tasks, a backward masking task (Williams et al., 2004; Phillips et al., 2003, 2004), 
featuring static images of emotional facial expressions followed by a neutral mask, and 
a morphing task, presenting emotional expressions that changed dynamically.  
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3.2 Materials and Methods 
 
Participants 
34 subjects (14 females; mean age = 25.15, range: 19-32; mean years of education = 
15.2, range: 8-18), recruited through posted advertisements, participated in the 
experiment. None of the participants reported neurological or psychiatric disorders. 
They had normal vision or corrected to normal vision. Participants remained naïve as to 
the purpose of the study until debriefing. All procedure conformed to national and 
institutional guidelines and to the Declaration of Helsinki. 
In order to assess the social level of each participant, we used the French self-report 
version of the NEO PI-R created in 1990, branching off the NEO PI (Costa & McCrae, 
1985). Indeed the NEO PI-R is a well-established and standardized instrument to assess 
personality traits. The NEO PI-R (also called Big Five) features five broad dimensions 
of personality, each one composed of six facets:  
Neuroticism (N), including anxiety, angry, hostility, depression, self-consciousness, 
impulsiveness, vulnerability; Extraversion (E),  including gregariousness, assertiveness, 
activity, excitement-seeking, positive emotion, warmth; Openness (O), including ideas, 
fantasy, aesthetics, actions, feelings, values; Agreeableness (A), including trust, 
straightforwardness, altruism, compliance, modesty, tender-mindedness; 
Conscientiousness (C), including competence, order, dutifulness, achievement striving, 
self-discipline, deliberation. 
Each facet score is obtained by adding the scores (0, 1, 2, 3 or 4) on eight items. Thus, 
the NEO PI-R is composed of 240 items, and the scores on its six facets compose each 
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dimension score. Thus, the possible range of scores for each facet is 0-32, whereas the 
possible score range for each dimension is 0-192. 
In order to assess the level of aggression of participants, we used the 34-item 
Aggression Questionnaire (AQ) by Buss and Perry (1992). This is a validated measure 
of aggression, divided into four scales: Physical aggression, a measure of the tendency 
to use physical force when expressing anger or aggression; Verbal aggression, a 
measure of the tendency to be verbally argumentative; Anger, a measure of anger-
related arousal and sense of control and Hostility, a measure of feelings of resentment, 
suspicion and alienation. The total score is the sum of the overall level of anger and 
aggression reported by the subject. Participants responded to each item by indicating on 
a scale from 0 (not at all like me) to 5 (completely like me) how much the sentence 
corresponded to her/him. Before starting the experiment, the tests were explained to 
participants. Indeed they were informed that they had to give an answer to each item, 
that there was no right nor wrong answer, and finally that there was no time limit for 
filling in the questionnaire.   
 
Tasks  
Morphing task - The stimuli used in the experiment were standardized color digital 
photographs of 16 faces (8 females and 8 males) selected from the NimStim Stimulus 
Set (Tottenham et al., 2009). Images included the following expressions, displayed by a 
variety of models: anger, happy, fear and neutral. For each expression, images were 
manipulated with Fantamorph5 software in order to create 30 intermediate images 
starting from neutral and progressively changing to a given emotional expression. This 
allowed us to create the morphing task in which participants were initially presented 
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with a neutral face and each click of the subject corresponded to a slight change in the 
expression of the face. Participants were instructed to stop clicking as soon as they 
thought they could recognize an emotion, and were instructed to choose (forced-choice) 
among six possible alternatives: anger, fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise. Each of 
these emotions corresponded to a number on the keyboard. Stimuli were displayed one 
at a time on a computer screen using Presentation software that also recorded the 
responses provided by participants. As dependent variables, the number of clicks that 
each emotion needed to be recognized (click %), and the number of correct responses 
(accuracy %) were recorded.  
 
Backward Masking task – Stimuli were standardized photographs of six different 
individuals (three men and three women) depicting fear, anger, happiness and neutral 
expressions (Ekman & Friesen, 1976). In this procedure, participants were presented 
with target-mask pairs of images, depicting different emotional and neutral facial 
expressions. Fearful, angry, happy targets and neutral control expressions were 
presented followed by a mask neutral expression. Following each target/mask trial, 
subjects made a forced-choice decision about the target face expression (choosing 
among fear, anger, happy and neutral) by pressing a button, and a corresponding 
confidence rating (1–9 scale; 1 = ‘not at all confident’ to 9 = ‘extremely confident’). 
The latter served as a strict criterion for confirming the target face duration necessary 
for fully conscious (overt) perception of facial expressions. Time of target duration 
varied, while mask duration was stable during the experiment. We determined the point 
at which participants did not perform significantly differently from chance in 
discriminating fear from neutral, anger from neutral and happy from neutral. 
41 
 
Each experimental session comprised 9 blocks of 24 target/mask pairs, randomized 
within subjects. Thus, the emotional target-mask pairs included fear-neutral, anger-
neutral, and happy-neutral pairs. Moreover, a neutral-neutral pair was added as a control 
pair. Emotional targets and neutral controls appeared with equal frequency. The time 
interval between onset of the target and mask (SOA) was manipulated between blocks 
(23, 36, 50, 63, 76, 90, 103, 116 or 130 ms) with an inter-stimulus interval between 
target and mask of 0 ms, so that mask onset was immediate. The duration of mask 
stimuli was fixed and lasted 220 ms and each trial was preceded by a fixation cross. The 
interval between successive target– mask pairs was 1sec. Dependent variables recorded 
in this task were response time (ms) and accuracy (%) for emotion recognition.  
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3.3 Results 
 
Morphing task 
Percentage of clicks - First a general one-way ANOVA on percentage of clicks 
necessary to recognize each emotion was conducted. We found a strongly significant 
difference between emotions [F (3, 99) = 9. 85, p < .001]. Post hoc analysis showed that 
the easiest expression to be recognized was the happy facial expression (41%), followed 
by angry ones (47%). Fearful facial expressions resulted to be the most difficult with 
57% of clicks necessary for recognition.  
 
                                                            
Figure 3.2 Percentage of clicks necessary to discriminate anger, fear, happy and neutral facial 
expressions. 
 
Successively, we explored the possibility that response patterns varied among 
participants, based on their traits of aggression. Therefore, we divided participants in 
high and low traits of aggression based on their score in the Aggression Questionnaire 
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(Buss & Perry, 1992). Thus, we calculated the median score (70): all of the participants 
who obtained a score higher than median value were assigned to the high AQ group and 
those who had a score lower than the median value were assigned to the Low AQ group. 
Participants who obtained a score equal to the median value were excluded from this 
analysis. A 2 (Group: Low vs. High) x 3 (Emotion: Anger vs. Fear vs. Happy) ANOVA 
on percentage of clicks showed a significant main effect of Group [F (1, 29) = 7. 60, p = 
.01], a significant main effect of Emotion [F (2, 58) = 33.55, p< .0001] but no 
significant interaction Group x Emotion (p=.09).  
 
 
                               
 
Figure 3.3 This figure shows that High AQ compared to Low AQ participants need more morphological 
features to recognize emotional facial expressions (p < .01). 
 
Post hoc analyses showed that participants in the Low AQ group needed significantly 
less morphological features to recognize emotions compared to participants in the High 
AQ group (40% vs. 52% of clicks, p = .01). Moreover, as in the general analysis, 
Newman-Keuls test on the main effect of emotion showed that fear required more facial 
characteristics (53%) to be recognized compared to anger (47%) and happiness (40%) 
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expressions (p < .001 in both cases). Angry and happy facial expressions also differed 
from each other (p < .01). These results indicate that aggression traits of personality 
make people less sensitive to discriminating emotional expressions.  
 
Percentage of Correct responses (Accuracy) - We performed the same pattern of 
analyses as above for the participants’ performance accuracy. The general one way 
ANOVA on Emotion (Anger vs. Fear vs. Happy vs. Neutral) showed a significant 
difference [F (3, 99) = 42. 78, p< .00001] in accuracy in detecting the three emotions. 
Specifically, the Newman-Keuls test found that the highest accuracy concerned happy 
facial expressions (91%), followed by expressions of Anger (82%), and Fear (65%). All 
of the expressions showed significant differences from each other (all p<.01) and from 
neutral.  
                       
                         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4 Percentage of accuracy in discriminating facial emotional expressions. 
 
As before, we conducted an analysis that compared accuracy in the Low and High AQ 
groups. Results showed a main effect of emotion according to which participants had 
the highest accuracy in detecting happy faces followed by anger and fear expressions. 
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Accuracy for fear expressions showed to be significantly lower compared to anger and 
happy expression (p<. 01), while anger and happiness did not differ from each other. 
There was a marginally significant main effect of group (p = .05). Participants in the 
High AQ group resulted to be slightly more accurate in recognizing emotions compared 
to those in the Low AQ group (84 % vs. 77 %). Interestingly, the analysis showed a 
strongly significant Emotion x Group interaction [F (2, 58) = 6.95, p = .001]. Post hoc 
comparisons indicated that Low and High AQ groups differed only in detecting fear 
facial expressions with significantly lower accuracy for fear recognition in Low AQ 
participants compared to all other conditions (p< .001 in all cases).  
 
                                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5 This figure illustrates the significant interaction Emotion X Group (p = 0.001). Post hoc 
analysis showed that low and high AQ participants were significantly different only when identifying 
facial expressions of fear.   
 
In addition, the five scales of the NEO-PR and the score of AQ were entered in a 
multiple regression as predictors with percentage of clicks and accuracy for recognition 
of each emotional expression as dependent variables. We found only a positive 
correlation between AQ score and percentage of clicks in recognizing happy faces (β = 
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.46, p <. 01), indicating that the more individual are aggressive, the more happy 
morphological features they need. No others significant correlations were found.  
 
 
Backward Masking Task (BM task) 
Because of some technical problems in the recording of responses during the BM task, 
one subject was discarded from the analysis, so the analysis was performed on 33 
subjects. 
 
Percentage of correct responses (Accuracy) - We observed that target expression 
recognition accuracy was not significantly above chance at 36–ms SOA (p = .13) for 
anger and at 50 – ms SOA (p = .17) for fear discrimination. The mean correct detection 
percentage for anger expressions at 36 ms was 55 % (SD= 0.27), while the mean correct 
detection percentage for fear expressions at 50 – ms SOA was 56% (SD= 0.35). 
Performance was clearly above chance level (p < .0001) for SOAs 76-130 ms for both 
anger and fear discrimination. Participants’ performance for happy expressions and 
neutral control expressions showed a ceiling effect as accuracy for recognition of both 
these expressions resulted to be significantly above chance for all SOAs ( <.0001). The 
mean correct percentage discrimination for happy expressions at 23-ms SOA was 79% 
(SD= 0, 22). The corresponding value for neutral control expressions was 94%.  
A general ANOVA on accuracy in recognizing emotions revealed that participants had  
significantly lower correct response percentage in discriminating negative emotional 
expressions compared to positive and neutral expressions [F(3, 96) = 34.40, p < .0001]. 
In particular, no significant difference between anger (67%) and fear (67%) and 
47 
 
between happy and neutral expressions emerged, while discrimination of happiness 
(92%) significantly differed from anger (p<.0001) and fear (p<.0001). A general 9 
(SOA: 23, 36, 50, 63, 76, 90, 103, 116, 130 ms) x 4 (Emotion: Anger vs. Fear vs. Happy 
vs. Neutral) ANOVA comparing discrimination of different emotional expressions as 
function of SOA resulted in significant main effects of both Emotion (p<.00001) and 
SOA (p<.00001) and a significant interaction SOA x Emotion [(F= 3, 118) =, p< .0001]. 
Results showed that only accuracy for discrimination of negative emotional expressions 
varies as function of time presentation of the target stimulus. This variation is clearly 
explained in the Figure below. 
 
                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6 Percentage of accuracy in BM task as function of SOA. Interaction SOA x Emotion p < .0001. 
 
As for the morphing task, we conducted an ANOVA 2 (Group: Low AQ vs. High AQ) 
X 3 (Emotion: Anger vs. Fear vs. Happy) comparing accuracy in recognition of facial 
expressions of emotions in the Low and High AQ participants. The analysis showed a 
main effect of emotion [F (2, 56) = 39.14, p < .0001] reflecting, as in the general 
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ANOVA, higher accuracy for happy facial expressions (93%) compared to fear and 
anger (respectively 68% and 69%). No main effect of group appeared. Interestingly, the 
analysis revealed a significant Emotion X Group interaction [F (2, 56) = 3.605, p < .05]. 
Planned comparisons showed significant difference between Low and High AQ groups 
only in detection of fearful facial expressions (p < .05). High AQ participants were 
significantly more accurate than Low AQ participants in detection of fear expressions. 
Accuracy for happy and angry expressions was not affected by the aggression level of 
participants.   
 
                                     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.7 Significant interaction Emotion x Group. The Low and High AQ groups differ only in 
recognition of fear with significantly less accuracy in the Low AQ group compared to the High AQ 
group. 
 
Response times (RT) - A one way ANOVA on response time (RT) showed significant 
differences in recognizing anger, fear and happy emotional expressions [F (3,96)= 
54.23, p < .00001]. Post hoc comparisons showed that participants were significantly 
slower in recognizing Anger (2415 ms) compared to fear (2191 ms, p< .01) and happy 
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(1684 ms, p< .001) emotional expressions.  Fear and happiness also resulted to be 
significantly different from each other (p < .001).  
 
                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.8 Response time in discrimination of emotional facial expressions 
 
Aiming to investigate whether time responses for each emotion varied as function of 
SOA, we performed a general 9 (SOA) x 4 (Emotion) repeated measures ANOVA. The 
analysis reported significant main effects of Emotion (p< .0001), with slower response 
time for negative expressions compared to positive (anger and fear did not differ each 
other) and a main effect of SOA (p<.0001), with slower response time for unconscious 
(23, 36, 50, 63 ms) compared to conscious (76, 90, 103, 116 ms) SOA. Nevertheless, no 
significant SOA x Emotion interaction was found.  
Importantly, we investigated the relationship between personality traits and time 
response for recognition of emotional expressions. Again, we performed an ANOVA 2 
(Group: Low AQ vs. High AQ) X 3 (Emotion: Anger vs. Fear vs. Happy) on response 
times. This analysis showed only a main effect of emotion, indicating significantly 
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longer response times to recognize anger facial expressions (2291 ms) compared to fear 
(2090 ms) and happy (1614 ms, ps < .01 in all cases). 
In addition, the five scales of NEO-PR and the score of AQ were entered in a multiple 
regression as predictors with RT and accuracy for each emotional expression as 
dependent variable. The analysis yielded no significant results.  
 
 
3.4 Discussion 
A relationship between personality and emotion has been previously demonstrated in 
many ways. For instance, studies on emotional attention showed that traits of anxiety 
correlate with a bias toward fear and anger expressions (Mogg & Bradley, 1999); 
evidence from neuroimaging studies reported correlation between personality traits and 
activity in amygdala, when participants were exposed to positive and negative 
emotional facial expressions (Canli et al., 2001). 
Facial expressions typically contain cues that allow to quickly understanding others’ 
emotional states (Fox et al., 2007). This makes the ability to recognize emotions from 
facial expressions critical in processing socially relevant information (Heuer et al., 
2010). Nevertheless, there are no as yet clear behavioral evidence regarding the 
influence of specific personality traits, such as aggression, on identification of facial 
expressions and, which are the individual characteristics that may influence this 
important ability is still a matter of concern. The aim of the current study was to 
investigate the role of traits of personality, in particular aggressive traits, in modulating 
how people recognize facial emotional expressions. We tested participants in two 
different tasks of emotion recognition that used both static and dynamic stimuli, 
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expressing fear, anger or happiness. Measures of personality by self-report 
questionnaires were collected. 
For what concerns recognition of emotion in general, using dynamic stimuli paradigm 
(morphing task), we showed that happiness was the easiest emotional facial expression 
to be recognized, followed by anger and fear, as the most difficult. Indeed, less 
morphological characteristics were needed to identify happy facial expressions and 
participants were significantly more accurate in recognizing this emotion compared to 
others, such as fear and anger. Results from the static stimuli paradigm (BM task) 
confirmed these results, showing that happy faces were still the easiest to be recognized 
even at a level of unawareness. Indeed recognition of happy faces seemed not to be 
influenced by the time of presentation. On the contrary, only recognition of facial 
expressions of negative emotions such as fear and anger resulted to vary as function of 
the time presentation. Moreover, recognition of happy faces required shorter response 
time, followed by fear and anger.   
These findings are in line with previous results indicating happiness to be the easiest 
emotion to be identified (Waltz & Benson, 1996; Matheson et al., 2005), whilst fear the 
most difficult (for review see Adolphs, 2002). Early studies on universality of emotion 
facial expression (Izard, 1971; Ekman, 1972, Ekman et al., 1987) showed that happy 
faces reached the highest score in recognition across cultures. Neuropsychological 
studies also reported interesting evidence: Adolphs and colleagues (2003) observed that 
after extended bilateral temporal damage only recognition of happy static faces was 
preserved, suggesting that recognition of positive and negative emotions draw upon 
anatomically separable brain regions. In our study, negative and positive facial 
expressions of emotions significantly differed in response time and accuracy. This, 
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however, is not necessarily consistent with the hypothesis of dissociable anatomical and 
functional processes for pleasant and unpleasant emotional facial expressions (Adolphs, 
2002), but rather may suggest that negative emotions are more difficult to recognize, as 
compared to positive emotions, and therefore are more easily disrupted after brain 
damage. 
In an interpersonal perspective, the expression of joy has been interpreted as a sign of 
cooperation and affiliation (Schimdt & Cohn, 2011) and provides important information 
to interact with others, which is indispensable for human well-being (Insel & Fernald, 
2004). Moreover, it is noteworthy that, developmentally, happiness is the first emotion 
to be recognized, followed by sadness (Izard, 1971).  
Expressions of fear and anger were shown to be more difficult to be recognized, in both 
tasks, as they required more morphological features and longer time. We can find an 
explanation of this data in how conceptual knowledge of emotions might be organized. 
Russel (2003) proposes a continuum of emotional valence that stretches from “happy” 
to “unhappy”, where happiness and sadness are the two extremes of the line. These two 
emotions should be therefore categorized as basic emotions and should be easily 
detectable. On the other hand, fear and anger should fall in between of the continuum, 
requiring more information to be identified. Thus, valence should be the main 
dimension along which facial expression are evaluated (Russel, 2003). Nevertheless 
recognition of sadness was not included in this work, so this remains only a pure 
speculation that would require further empirical evidence to be demonstrated. 
More important for the purpose of the present study, we found that different level of 
aggression in personality may affect individuals’ ability to recognize emotional facial 
expressions. We focused on the influence of aggression traits as it has been less 
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investigated in the past compared to other personality traits such as anxiety. The overall 
effects of experiencing anger are enormous. While anger is an emotional, physiological 
and cognitive internal state, aggression is considered as the tendency to action. 
Traditionally, aggression has been defined as overt behavior with the intention of 
inflicting physical damage to another individual (Nelson & Trainor, 2007). It is a 
complex social behavior that evolved in the adaptive context of defending or 
competition for resources (Berkovitz, 1993) but when expressed out of these contexts 
may have disastrous consequences such as uncontrolled impulsivity and impaired 
recognition of social cues. Accordingly, our results showed that higher traits of 
aggression impair recognition of emotional facial expressions in general. Indeed 
individuals with aggressive tendencies exhibited less sensitivity to dynamic stimuli and 
need more morphological features in order to recognize facial expressions of emotions. 
This is also consistent with previous studies indicating that patients diagnosed with 
intermittent explosive disorder (IED ) which are characterized by aggressive impulsivity 
(Best et al., 2002), perform poorly on facial emotion recognition tasks as well as 
aggressive patients with mental disability (Matheson et al., 2005; Walts & Benzon, 
2006). Nevertheless, accuracy was not influenced. Interestingly, our results on accuracy 
showed that individuals with greater tendency to aggression were significantly more 
accurate in labeling fear facial expressions compared to individuals with lower tendency 
to aggression. This result is in some way in accordance with previous studies that found 
aggressive individuals to be equal, or better than, non-aggressive peers at labeling anger 
emotional expressions (McKenzie et al., 2000). Indeed, it is likely that people that often 
experience negative emotion such anger (which is also strictly related to fear), are 
biased towards this kind of expressions, despite their general impairment in recognition 
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of emotions. Consistent with this latter hypothesis, we found that more aggressive 
individuals had difficulty in identifying happy facial expressions. The results from the 
backward masking task strongly confirmed the facilitation in recognition of fearful 
expressions in more aggressive individuals. Interestingly, the results from accuracy in 
the backward masking task mirrored exactly those from accuracy in morphing task, 
indicating that, despite a general impairment in discrimination of emotions, aggressive 
people were more accurate in recognizing fear facial expressions compared to non 
aggressive people. This result may be explained by the complementarities between fear 
and aggression.  It is likely indeed that aggressive people, which have the tendency to 
dominate and to attack, are also more used to detect fear in the others during their social 
interactions. This hypothesis is in line with previous neuroimaging observations that 
showed individuals high in anger expression to have amplified left amygdala response 
to representations of fearful faces (Carlson et al., 2010) and suggested this to be a 
trigger for aggressive behavior. Previous studies specifically implicate amygdala and 
prefrontal cortex in aggression (Davidson et al., 2000): for instance, it has been shown 
that amygdalar dysfunction lead to impulsive aggressive behavior (Van Elst et al., 
2000), and that specific damage of OFC is also associated with aggression, impulsivity 
and scant control of emotions (Damasio et al., 1994; Anderson et al., 1999).  One 
possibility is that aggressive individuals suffer from a lack of prefrontal control on 
subcortical regions. This hypothesis is in line with theoretical models proposing that 
humans possess a cognitive mechanism that mediates suppression of aggression and 
predispose to withdraw in distress contexts (Blair, 1995). Absence or impairment of this 
mechanism would lead to aggressive behavior and to a dysfunctional development of 
morality. Accordingly, additional studies showed that psychopats, which are usually 
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marked by aggressive reactivity, are also impaired in inhibitory control and have 
impaired functioning of prefrontal cortex (Blair, 2001; 2010).  
In sum, we showed that personality and tendency to aggression in particular may affect 
recognition of emotions ability. Since facial expression of emotion is an important cue 
of social relevant information, we confirmed and expanded on the idea that individual 
differences in personality are critical aspects for good functioning of social and 
interpersonal behavior.   
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CHAPTER 4 – EXPERIMENT TWO 
Food pleasantness affects visual selective attention 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Visual selective attention is an adaptive mechanism that allows fast and accurate 
perception of the environment by focusing processing resources on relevant objects 
(e.g., Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; for review see Yantis, 1997). In recent years, 
abundant research has suggested that the emotional significance of sensory events can 
determine how visual attention is allocated (see Lang et al., 1997; Vuilleumier, 2005). 
Convergent studies in social cognition, cognitive and clinical psychology (e.g., Bradley 
et al., 1997; Fox et al., 2002; Pratto & John, 1991; Öhman et al., 2001; Williams et al., 
1997) have shown that people more readily pay attention to emotional stimuli such as 
snakes, spiders, and angry faces than neutral stimuli, suggesting that emotional 
information has a special propensity to attract and/or hold visual attentive processing. 
Consistent with this, brain imaging studies in human subjects have revealed enhanced 
responses to emotional stimuli relative to neutral stimuli in several brain regions 
(Sabatinelli et al., 2005; Vuilleumier et al., 2001), thus providing a plausible substrate 
for their greater competitive strength in attracting attention, as observed behaviourally. 
Furthermore, emotional effects in visual attention are greatly enhanced in individuals 
with high levels of trait- and state-anxiety (Bradley et al., 1998; Fox, 1993; Fox et al., 
2001; Williams et al., 1996), which may play a role in the development and/or 
maintenance of clinical anxiety disorders (Mogg & Bradley, 1999;). 
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Although much of the past research on emotional attention has concentrated on negative 
or threat-related emotions (e.g. fear or anger), also pleasant or rewarding stimuli (e.g. 
food, addictive drugs) can sometimes show similar advantage in the competition for 
attentional resources. Hunger-satiety manipulation has provided a model system to 
explore the influence of motivationally significant stimuli (i.e., food) on the deployment 
of visual selective attention. For example, Channon and Hayward (1990) found, using 
the modified Stroop task, that fasting subjects were slower in naming the colours of 
food-related words than control stimuli, in comparison with non-fasting subjects, which 
was consistent with a hunger-related processing bias. Piech and colleagues (2010) 
reported that food pictures were more powerful distractors when participants detecting 
targets within a continuous stream of images were hungry, than when they were sated. 
Likewise, studies with the visual probe task (see below) in a non-clinical sample 
revealed that food deprivation is associated with increased attentional bias for food-
related words (Mogg et al., 1998; Placanica et al., 2002), compared to satiated state. 
More direct evidence that hunger increases selective attention to food pictures has also 
been obtained using neuroimaging measures (Mohanty et al., 2008), and event-related 
brain potentials (Stockburger et al., 2009). Finally, recent research has shown that 
attentional bias to food-related cues is exacerbated in people who report a predisposition 
to eat in response to external food cues (Brignell et al., 2009), and in obese individuals 
(Nijs et al., 2009), who retain an enduring tendency to orient to food stimuli despite 
feeding and decreased self -report of hunger (Castellanos et al., 2009).  
Thus, ample evidence suggests that food-related attention is modulated by transient 
motivational states of hunger and satiety both in normal and clinical samples. Crucially, 
however, previous studies assessed the effects of hunger and satiety on visual selective 
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attention in different groups or sessions (held days or weeks apart), without addressing 
how attention is allocated to different foods as their relative motivational/hedonic value 
transiently changes during the course of a meal. 
To examine this issue, we exploited the fact that the pleasantness of the sight and of the 
taste of a food eaten to satiety decreases temporarily relative to other foods not eaten in 
the meal (Rolls et al., 1981). In this case, one is still motivated to eat other unconsumed 
foods, particular those with different orosensory characteristics. This phenomenon has 
been termed sensory-specific, or selective satiety (Rolls et al., 1981), and provides a 
useful technique to manipulate the pleasantness and reward value of a stimulus, without 
modifying its physical characteristics (Kringelbach et al., 2003). Accordingly, any 
differences observed between behavioural responses to a particular food stimulus before 
and after satiety can be attributed to the change in the motivational/hedonic value of that 
food. Furthermore, by measuring responses to another food that is not eaten in the meal, 
it is possible to control for nonspecific confounds, such as increases in thirst, gastric 
distension and levels of glucose and lipids after feeding. This technique has been used 
in functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies to determine brain regions 
involved in representing the reward value of olfactory stimuli (Gottfried et al., 2003), 
and the subjective pleasantness of food (Kringelbach et al., 2003). However, this 
technique has never been used before to examine incentive-based control of visual 
selective attention.  
In the present study, one of two palatable foods was devalued by feeding participants to 
satiety on that food. Both before and after the selective satiety procedure, participants 
tasted and rated the pleasantness of the two foods and then viewed the same as stimuli 
on a computer screen while attentional selection was assessed by means of a visual 
59 
 
probe detection paradigm, a common test of attentional bias (MacLeod et al., 1986; see 
also Bradley et al., 1997; Mogg et al., 1995). In this task, two pictures were presented 
simultaneously on the computer screen, one on each side of a central fixation point. One 
of these pictures depicted one of the tasted foods, and the other a control stimulus 
unrelated to food or eating. Each picture pair was presented for either a relatively brief 
(200 ms) or long (700 ms) duration, and was followed by a probe which appeared in the 
location of one of the preceding pictures. Participants were required to detect the 
location of the probe by pressing one of two response keys. An attention bias for food 
images would be indicated by faster response times to probes replacing food rather than 
control pictures, as response times are typically faster to probes which appear in 
attended, rather than unattended, locations.  
To sum up, we examined attentional bias towards food stimuli before and after subjects 
were fed to satiety on one of those foods (selective devaluation). Our main hypothesis 
was that attentional bias for food eaten (devalued) would decrease significantly from 
pre- to post-satiety, parallel to the subjective pleasantness for the consumed food. By 
contrast, we expected that attentional bias for food not eaten (valued) would not show 
any such decrease.  
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4.2 Methods and Materials  
 
Participants 
Twenty-six healthy right-handed volunteers (15 females, 11 males) participated in the 
experiment. The average age of the subjects was 25.1 (range 19-34). All participants 
were free of current or past psychiatric or neurological illness as determined by history. 
The eating attitudes test (EAT-26) (Garner et al., 1982) was administered and indicated 
no eating disorders in any of the subjects (mean score, 3.6; range, 0 –14; all scores were 
under the 20 point cut off). 
Participants were instructed to fast for at least 6 h prior to arriving in the laboratory, but 
were permitted to drink water. Prior to participation in the experiment, subjects were 
pre-screened to ensure that they found both solid foods (i.e., Ritz crackers and 
Canestrelli cookies) to be pleasant, and to ensure that they were not overweight, on a 
diet, or planning to go on a diet. Participants remained naïve as to the purpose of the 
study until debriefing. 
The experiment was performed in accordance with the ethical standards laid down in 
the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki (International Committee of Medical Journal Editors, 
1991), and was approved by the Ethical Committee of the Department of Psychology, 
University of Bologna. 
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Stimuli 
Solid food stimuli included Ritz crackers (Kraft, Italy) and Canestrelli cookies (La 
Sassellese, Italy). These foods were selected because they are consistently identified as 
appetizing and are distinguishable in their flavour (one is savoury and the other is 
sweet) and texture, thereby facilitating sensory-specific satiety and minimize the 
likelihood of the subjects developing a generalized satiety to all solid foods. To assess 
possible order (i.e., practice or fatigue) effects across sessions (since the post-satiety 
session was always completed after the pre-satiety session), we also included oat bran 
biscuits (Molino Chiavazza, Italy) as hedonically neutral food stimuli.  
Visual stimuli were 4 digitized colour photographs depicting the three foods and a 
telephone token, used as a distracter stimulus. The images were approximately 4.5 cm 
wide by 4.5 cm tall. The mean luminance and contrast levels of the 4 photographs were 
slightly adjusted with the Adobe Photoshop™ 7.0 program to achieve uniform values 
for the different pictures. 
 
 
Procedure 
All testing took place between 11 a.m. and 2 p.m. The experiment consisted of two 
sessions: pre-satiety and post-satiety. There was a break between sessions during which 
participants were fed to satiety on one of the two palatable foods (selective satiety 
treatment). More specifically, subjects were presented with a tray containing three 
transparent bowls, each containing one kind of food (Ritz crackers, Canestrelli cookies 
and oat bran biscuits, respectively), and were invited to eat either Ritz crackers or 
Canestrelli cookies for their lunch, and to stop eating when they felt pleasantly satiated. 
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The subjects were not informed in advance which solid food they would be invited to 
consume. The specific food used for devaluation was fully counterbalanced across 
subjects, such that thirteen subjects were fed to satiety on Ritz crackers, and thirteen 
subjects were fed to satiety on the Canestrelli cookies. This selective food devaluation 
procedure served to devalue one of the food stimuli, although leaving the motivational 
value of the other stimulus relatively intact. Note that subjects viewed all three types of 
foods (valued, devalued and neutral) during feeding, thereby minimizing the possibility 
that attentional effects were simply due to overexposure to one type of food (rather than 
to change in the subjective pleasantness) during the selective satiety procedure. 
At the beginning of each session, we collected behavioural ratings, including hunger 
level (0, full; +10, starving), pleasantness (-5, very unpleasant; +5 very pleasant), and 
intensity (-5, very weak; +5, very intense) of the taste of the three foods (Ritz crackers, 
Canestrelli cookies, and oat bran biscuits) presented in random order. In each session, 
participants completed first the hunger rating task, followed by pleasantness and 
intensity rating tasks, which were administered in counterbalanced order across 
participants. 
After the behavioural rating tasks, participants performed a computer-based visual 
probe task similar to that used by Bradley and colleagues (1998, 2003). The trial 
sequence is illustrated in Figure 1. Participants initiated each trial by pressing the space 
bar. A fixation point appeared at the center of the screen for 800 ms. Next, two colour 
pictures were presented side by side, flanking the central fixation point. The pictures 
were separated by approximately 14 cm from center to center. One photograph depicted 
one of the three foods, and the other a telephone token of comparable size and 
luminosity. These task-irrelevant images were presented for either 200 or 700 ms and 
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then removed. Next, the probe (@ sign) was presented for 100 ms at the location 
previously occupied by one of the two images. Participants were told to respond 
immediately to the left or right location of the probe by pressing one of two response 
keys (left and right arrow keys of the keyboard). They were instructed to look at the 
fixation point at the start of each trial. The duration of the inter-trial interval (ITI) varied 
randomly between 1000 and 1500 ms. 
 
                      
 
Figure 4.1. Schematic illustration of the experimental paradigm. 
  
Participants completed 24 practice trials and one block of 144 trials in each session. 
Each block was composed of six repetitions of 24 randomly intermixed unique trials, 
resulting from the factorial combination of 3 food types (devalued, valued or neutral), X 
2 food locations (left or right), X 2 exposure duration (200 or 700 ms), X 2 probe 
positions (left or right). Thus, nothing about the design of the experiment allowed 
subjects to predict which image would be probed.  
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4.3 Results 
Effects of selective satiety on behavioural ratings - Participants showed a significant 
reduction in experienced hunger ratings after the selective satiation procedure, t (25) = 
20.01, p < .0001). Mean hunger ratings were 7.46 (SD = 1.47) before satiety, but 
dropped to 1.85 (SD = 0.73) after satiety.  
Subjective pleasantness and intensity ratings for the three different food rewards before 
and after feeding to satiety with one of the foods are plotted in Figure 2. Mean 
subjective ratings were analysed by a 3 (food: devalued, valued or neutral) X 2 (session: 
pre- or post-satiety) X 2 (rating type: pleasantness or intensity) repeated-measure 
analysis of variance (ANOVA). The analysis showed main effects of food, F(2,50) = 
85.27, MSE = 2.06, p <.001, p
2  
= .77, session, F(1,25) = 37.38, MSE = 1.7, p <.001, 
p
2  
= .47, and rating type, F(1,25) = 31.15, MSE = 2.07, p <.001, p
2  
= .55, which 
were qualified by a significant food X session X rating type interaction, F(2,50) = 
11.14, MSE = 0.82, p <.001, p
2  
= .31. Post hoc Newman-Keuls tests showed that the 
subjective pleasantness of the foods eaten (devalued) decreased markedly from pre- to 
post-satiety, t (25) = 9.23, p < .0001, whereas the pleasantness of the foods not eaten 
(valued) and the neutral foods did not show any such changes (both ps > .05), reflecting 
the efficacy of the selective satiation procedure in lessening the value of the food eaten. 
On the other hand, no significant changes were observed for the subjective intensity of 
taste of the food stimuli when comparing pre- to post-satiety ratings (all ps >.05), 
confirming that it is the perceived pleasantness and not the perceived intensity of taste 
of the devalued food that decreases following satiation (Rolls et al., 1981). 
 
65 
 
                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Upper panel: Subjective pleasantness ratings on a scale of -5 (very unpleasant) to +5 (very 
pleasant) for the food eaten (devalued), the food not eaten (valued) and the neutral food, before and after 
the selective satiety procedure. Lower panel: Subjective intensity ratings on a scale of -5 (very weak) to 
+5 (very intense) for the food eaten (devalued), the food not eaten (valued) and the neutral food, before 
and after the selective satiety procedure. 
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Effects of selective satiety on response times in the visual probe task - Response 
latency above 1,500 ms or below 200 ms were deleted from the data set, as were all 
incorrect responses, resulting in the removal of 1% of the data. Table 4.1 presents mean 
probe detection latencies for each experimental condition.  
 
 Devalued  Valued  Neutral 
Session and 
exposure 
duration 
Probe 
replacing 
food 
stimulus 
Probe 
replacing 
control 
stimulus 
 
Probe 
replacing 
food 
stimulus 
Probe 
replacing 
control 
stimulus 
 
Probe 
replacing 
food 
stimulus 
Probe 
replacing 
control 
stimulus 
Pre-satiety  
session 
        
Short duration 
(200 ms) 
347 (31) 375 (43)  345 (28) 373 (40)  353 (24) 371 (52) 
Long duration 
(700 ms) 
342 (20) 364 (31)  345 (20) 366 (42)  352 (40) 360 (36) 
         
Post-satiety 
session 
        
Short duration 
(200 ms) 
359 (54) 365 (39)  339 (41) 373 (39)  347 (37) 354 (45) 
Long duration 
(700 ms) 
 
363 (30) 357 (37)  335 (25) 361 (34)  349 (37) 351 (41) 
 
Table 4.1 Mean response times (and standard deviations) to probes for each experimental condition of the 
present study. Response time is in milliseconds (ms). 
 
To examine our prediction directly, however, attentional bias scores were calculated for 
each participant by subtracting the mean response time to probes replacing food images 
from the mean response time to probes replacing control images. Greater bias scores 
indicate greater attention to food stimuli, relative to control stimuli (i.e., an attentional 
bias towards food images). Bias scores were calculated separately for each type of food 
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picture (valued, devalued and neutral) and exposure duration (200 and 700 ms), in the 
pre- and post-satiety session. 
Attentional bias scores were subjected to a 3 (food: devalued, valued or neutral) X 2 
(session: pre- or post-satiety) X 2 (exposure duration: 200 or 700 ms) repeated-measure 
ANOVA. The analysis revealed a significant main effect of food, F(2,50) = 10.05, MSE 
= 992, p <.001, p
2  
= .29, indicating that attentional bias was greater overall for probes 
on valued food than for probes on devalued and neutral food (both ps < .05), while bias 
scores between these two latter conditions were not different from each other (p > .05). 
There was also a marginally significant main effect of session, F (1, 25) = 3.84, p = .06, 
MSE = 1793, p
2 
=.13. More critically, there was a significant two-way interaction 
between food and session, F (2, 50) = 7.32, p < .01, MSE = 866, p
2 
=.23, which is 
summarized in Figure 3. Post hoc Newman-Keuls tests showed that the attentional bias 
for probes at the location of the devalued food was significantly reduced in the post-
satiety relative to the pre-satiety session (p < .001), whereas there was no such decrease 
for probes at the location of the valued food, (p = .6). No significant difference was also 
found between attentional bias for probes replacing neutral foods in the pre- vs. post-
satiety session (p = .16), indicating no significant order effect. Furthermore, attentional 
bias was greater for probes on valued food than for probes on devalued food in the post-
satiety session (p = .001), whereas there was no significant difference between these 
conditions in the pre-satiety session (p = .8). There were no other significant results. 
Next, we conducted post hoc one-sample t-tests to assess whether or not the attentional 
bias was significant within each condition (Bonferroni corrected alpha level for these 
post hoc tests was .008). Results showed that mean bias score (averaged across 
exposure durations) for valued food was significantly greater than zero in the pre-satiety 
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(t (25) = 3.62, p = .002), and post-satiety session (t (25) = 4.97, p = .001). In contrast, 
bias score for devalued food was significantly greater than zero in the-pre-satiety (t (25) 
= 4.61, p = .001), but not in the post-satiety-session (t (25) = .03, p = .9). There were no 
other significant results. 
 
                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Mean attentional bias (collapsed across delays) for probes presented at the location of the 
devalued, valued and neutral food, in the pre- and post-satiety session. Error bars indicate standard errors.  
 
Finally, to explore the relationship between attentional effects and subjective reports of 
the pleasantness of food, changes in attentional bias scores were calculated by 
subtracting the attentional bias score in the pre-satiety session from the attentional bias 
scores in the post-satiety session, separately for each type of food (data averaged across 
exposure durations). Negative values of these scores indicate reduced attentional bias 
for food pictures after the satiation procedure. Pearson correlations were calculated 
between changes in bias scores and changes in rated pleasantness (calculated by 
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subtracting the pre-feeding rating of the pleasantness of the taste of a food from the 
post-feeding rating of the pleasantness of the same food) for each type of food. These 
analyses revealed that changes in bias scores for devalued food were significantly 
associated with changes in the pleasantness ratings, r(24) = .67, p < .001, indicating 
greater decrease in attentional bias for consumed food in those participants who 
reported greater change in the pleasantness of that food. There was no other significant 
result. 
 
 
4.4 Discussion 
This study provides behavioural evidence that a transitory decline in the pleasantness of 
the taste of a food plays an important role in modulating the functioning of covert 
mental processes, such as visual selective attention. Using a visual probe task as an 
index of attentional bias, we found that a food-specific devaluation treatment induced a 
considerable reduction in the attentional bias for devalued foods, parallel to the 
perceived pleasantness of those foods, whereas visual selective attention to valued foods 
did not change significantly. In the protocol employed in the present study, the relative 
pleasantness of two palatable foods was varied during the course of the experiment by 
allowing hungry subjects to feed to satiety on one of those foods (Kringelbach et al., 
2003; Rolls et al., 1981). Indeed, rated pleasantness for the consumed food showed a 
marked decrease after the selective satiety procedure, in the absence of relevant changes 
for the unconsumed food. As such, these effects are distinct from alliesthesia, a change 
in the hedonic evaluation of food and food related stimuli produced by fluctuations in 
homeostatic needs (Berridge, 1991; Cabanac, 1971), which, unlike selective satiety, is 
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not specific to the external sensory stimulation received (such as the taste of a particular 
food eaten during satiation). In this regard, it is unlikely that the selective decrease in 
attentional bias for the consumed food is simply a result of extensive exposure or 
familiarity with that food during the selective satiety procedure because participants 
viewed all food stimuli during feeding (see Method). Furthermore, the significant 
correlation between change in attentional bias and subjective pleasantness of the food 
eaten also supports the contention that the attentional effects seen here were indeed 
modulated by the hedonic value of stimuli rather than by their degrees of familiarity.  
Another result of the present study is that the attentional bias for food pictures did not 
exhibit a significant degree of variation over the two picture durations examined here, 
namely, 200 and 700 ms. This finding therefore suggests that a bias for food pictures 
operates in both initial orienting and the maintenance of attention. This observation is 
consistent with evidence from previous visual probe studies of attentional biases for 
food (Brignell et al., 2009), and drug-related cues (e.g., biases for cigarette-related cues 
in smokers, and alcohol-related cues in heavy drinkers, e.g. Bradley et al., 2003; Field et 
al., 2004), which have used relatively longer exposure durations (2000 ms) than those 
used here. Finally, the present findings were observed while participants were required 
to make a speeded discrimination judgment on the probes, and there was no advantage 
gained from paying more attention to food than control stimuli, since food cues were 
unpredictive as to the location of impending probes. These results, then, support the 
conclusion that the motivational regulation of visual attention is to a certain degree a 
spontaneous and involuntary process (Bargh, 1997; Piech et al., 2009 Stockburger et al., 
2009), operating even when people are not explicitly required to assess the affective 
value of stimuli, and these are completely task-irrelevant. More generally, our findings 
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suggest that mechanisms of visual selective attention are flexibly regulated to optimize 
interaction of the individual with the environment, depending on current motivational 
state (Lang et al., 1997). Such a feature may be fundamental in providing attentive 
processes with both flexibility and self-regulation properties (Della Libera & Chelazzi, 
2006). 
Previous evidence revealed that the deployment of visual attention in humans can be 
modulated by external financial reinforcers, such as monetary rewards (Della Libera & 
Chelazzi, 2006; Small et al., 2005). Here, we report that short-term changes in the 
hedonic evaluation of the food’s taste during a meal may also influence visual selective 
attention. The present findings are perfectly consistent with several earlier studies 
(Channon & Hayward, 1990; Mogg et al, 1998; Mohanty et al., 2008; Piech et al., 2009; 
Placanica et al., 2002; Stockburger et al., 2009) showing that selective attention to food 
stimuli is sensitive to hunger-related motivation. However, unlike the present study, a 
selective satiety design was not used in previous research so that attention effects could 
reflect the subjects’ overall level of satiety (or other nonspecific confounds) rather than 
hedonic and motivational changes that occur to different foods when one is eaten to 
satiety. Critically, the present study provides clear evidence that the motivational 
guidance of attentional resources is not an all-or-none mechanism (Vuilleumier & 
Huang, 2009) but rather reflects accurate on-line assessment of the hedonic value of the 
various stimuli present in the environment. 
Animal and human studies of food devaluation indicate that the orbitofrontal cortex 
(OFC) may be critical for signalling changes in the reward value of food stimuli (see 
Murray et al., 2008). For instance, monkeys with OFC lesions fail to alter learned 
responding after reinforcer devaluation (Murray et al., 2008). Moreover, fMRI evidence 
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reveals a significant correlation between OFC activity and decrease in subjective 
pleasantness when a food is eaten to satiety (Kringelbach et al, 2003). From the OFC, 
signals indicating the current reward value of foods may be conveyed to attention 
regions of the brain, such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the posterior parietal 
cortex (Cavada & Goldman-Rakic, 1989), thereby directing visual attention selectively 
to food targets that can best satisfy current needs (Mohanty et al., 2008). Importantly, 
the present findings raise the possibility that signals that have been attributed 
exclusively to representation of reward in the OFC and other reward-related brain areas 
might be, at least in part, signals of motivation-related modulation of attention 
(Maunsell, 2004). 
Two potential limitations of this study deserve mention. First, the current study 
examined the effect of only changes in subjective palatability on visual selective 
attention to food cues. We found that changes in food liking scores related closely to 
attentional effects. However, Berridge and Robinson (1998) have suggested that reward 
representation entails distinguishable psychological and functional dimensions –“liking” 
(pleasure/palatability) and “wanting” (appetitive/incentive salience). Thus, we cannot 
rule out the possibility that incentive motivation (i.e., the non-hedonic process of 
wanting) may also play a role in guiding visual selective attention to food pictures. It 
must be said, however, that explicit, self-report measures of liking and wanting are 
highly correlated, and that subjects often find difficult to make this distinction explicitly 
(Finlayson et al., 2009). Furthermore, both animal and human studies (Havermans et al., 
2009; Rolls et al, 1981) indicate that food-specific satiety reflects a selective reduction 
in both food liking and food wanting. Nonetheless, additional studies are needed to 
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examine whether liking and wanting contribute differently to visual attention to food 
stimuli.  
Second, the visual probe task permits evaluation of attentional bias to food cues, relative 
to control cues, but it seems less effective in distinguishing whether such bias reflects 
the orienting component of attention (e.g., a food stimuli attracts attention to its 
location), or the hold or disengage component of attention (e.g., once a food stimulus 
has been detected attention tends to dwell in that location; e.g., Fox et al, 2001). This is 
relevant because several studies (Compton, 2000; Fox et al, 2001, 2002; Yiend,, 2001) 
indicate that negative emotions, such as fear and threat-related emotion, specifically 
affect the disengage component of visual attention in anxious individuals. Notably, 
these studies have commonly used exogenous cuing tasks, which allow a more direct 
assessment of the attentional disengagement mechanism by examining delay to re-orient 
from invalid emotional cues compared to invalid neutral cues. Recently, however, 
Koster and colleagues (2004) have proposed that a visual probe task may be used to 
examine orienting and disengagement components of attention by comparing responses 
to probes in emotional-control pairs to probes in control-control pairs. The present study 
did not include control-control pairs and used a small set of food stimuli, thereby 
precluding a detailed analysis of the critical components of attention that are influenced 
by motivational cues. Additional research is needed to uncover the cognitive 
mechanisms of motivated attention, and to identify exactly which of these mechanisms 
are common (or distinct) across different kinds of emotional (e.g., fear) and 
motivational (e.g., food) stimuli.  
Finally, the findings of this study have potential clinical implications. Research has 
found attentional biases in patients with eating disorders (Nijs et al, 2009; Lee & 
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Shafran, 2004; Shafran et al, 2007), and has suggested that such biases may play a role 
in causing and/or maintaining dysfunctional eating (Lee & Shafran, 2004). Interestingly, 
a recent study (Castellanos et al, 2009) found that obese adults maintain an increased 
attention to food images regardless of reported hunger/satiety, indicating disregulated 
responses to food cues in obesity. It would be important to clarify whether transitory 
changes in the subjective pleasantness of food (after selective satiety) affect attentional 
bias to food cues in overweight individuals, as reported here in normal-weight people. 
To conclude, the control of food intake requires the coordination of motivational and 
higher cognitive processes. The present findings suggest that the allocation of visual 
attention is flexibly and rapidly adjusted to reflect temporary shift in relative preference 
for different foods. Shifting the balance of attention away from consumed may serve to 
optimize exploitation of available food resources and to increase the variety of food 
consumed. 
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CHAPTER 5 - EXPERIMENT THREE 
Presence of others affects how we look at emotional scenes 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
A primary adaptive function of emotion is to influence our interaction with 
environmental events that are potentially harmful, threatening, or beneficial to our well-
being under certain conditions (Lang et al., 1997). One means of achieving this is by 
emotion enhancing attention, leading to increased detection of emotional stimuli. 
Several behavioral studies indicate that people more readily detect emotional than 
neutral stimuli, suggesting that emotion exerts a powerful influence on attention 
(Vuilleumier & Huang, 2009). Typically, emotional enhancement of attention has been 
investigated in single individuals performing their task in isolated settings. Humans, 
however, are intensely social beings. In everyday life, most of our thoughts, feelings, 
and behaviors are deeply influenced by the presence of other people. Moreover, beyond 
their function at the individual level, emotion reactions evolved to serve social functions 
and have interpersonal consequences (Van Kleef, 2009). Therefore, our aim in the 
present study was to examine whether and how the phenomenon of enhanced attention 
to emotional pictures is modulated by the presence of others. To this end, we used eye-
movement recordings to assess overt attention to pleasant (sexual) and unpleasant 
(threat/injury) emotional visual scenes and compared participants’ performance when 
they act in the presence of others and when each individual is alone. 
Previous research has established that the emotional significance of sensory events can 
determine how visual attention is allocated. For instance, in visual search tasks, in 
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which a unique target must be found among distracters, detection times are faster when 
the target has emotional value, such as an angry or happy face among neutral faces (Fox 
et al., 2000; Öhman et al., 2001; Tipples et al., 2002), or a snake or spider among 
flowers (Öhman et al 2001). Similarly, in the visual probe paradigm, viewers are faster 
at detecting probes replacing either pleasant or aversive than neutral stimuli, suggesting 
an attentional bias toward emotional stimuli (Mogg et al., 1998; Mogg & Bradley 1999; 
di Pellegrino et al., 2010). Consistent with this, brain imaging studies in human subjects 
have revealed enhanced responses to emotional stimuli relative to neutral stimuli in 
several brain regions (Sabatinelli et al., 2005; Veulliemier et al., 2001), thus providing a 
plausible substrate for their greater competitive strength in attracting attention, as 
observed behaviorally. Particularly important for the present purposes, eye-movements 
recordings, used as an index of overt behavioral manifestation of allocation of attention 
(Henderson, 2003), have been recently applied to study preferential attention to 
emotional pictures. The eye-tracking method is particularly valuable in that it provides 
an online record of the time course of the initial orienting and the subsequent 
maintenance of attention (Calvo & Lang, 2004). When unpleasant, neutral, and pleasant 
photographic scenes were presented simultaneously with neutral control pictures under 
free viewing conditions, the probability of first fixating the unpleasant and pleasant 
picture, and the frequency of subsequent fixations, were greater than those for the 
neutral picture (Calvo & Lang, 2004; Nummenmaa et al., 2006). This suggests that an 
emotional bias to emotional pictures is seen both in initial orienting and subsequent 
engagement of attention. Moreover, there is also evidence indicating that such 
attentional capture might operate in a reflexive or involuntary manner. In a task in 
which emotional and neutral pictures are presented concurrently, emotional pictures are 
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more likely to be fixated first, even though participants are explicitly instructed to 
attend to the neutral pictures (Nummenmaa et al., 2006). Thus, several observations 
indicate that the emotional salience of stimuli affects the allocation of attention. Here, 
we hypothesized that such an effect is susceptible to social influences. Previous research 
provided several line of evidence for this possibility. One category of studies has 
documented that the social presence of others has strong impact on the expression of 
emotion, even though the direction in terms of social facilitation versus inhibition and 
the interpretation thereof is still intensely debated. For example, Brightman and 
colleagues   (1977) demonstrated great differences in expression to sweet versus salty 
sandwiches when with others but not when alone; also, Dale and co-workers (1991) 
found greater emotional expressiveness to humorous videotapes in women who were in 
dyads than in women who viewed the videotapes alone. There is, however, also 
compelling evidence indicating social inhibition of emotional reactions. Yarczower and 
Daruns (1982) showed that children were more expressive when they viewed a series of 
affective slides alone than in the presence of others; Kraut (1982) found that people 
presented with pleasant versus unpleasant smells showed less emotional expressiveness 
when with another subject than when alone; finally, Kleck and colleagues (1976) 
reported that subjects who knew they were being observed showed reduced levels of 
expression to painful stimuli.  
A second kind of evidence reveals that performing a task in the presence of others can 
lead to changes in arousal, autonomic activity (e.g., cardiovascular, electrodermal) and 
cortisol responses. For instance, Zajonc’s (1965) theory of social facilitation maintains 
that the mere presence of social others can increase physiological activity, and this, in 
turn, could facilitate dominant responses (e.g., enhanced performance on easy tasks, 
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impaired performance on difficult ones). More recent evidence indicates that emotional 
and physiological responses are stronger when participants believe that others are 
evaluating them, namely in situations in which the social self is or could be negatively 
judged by others (i.e., social-evaluative threat; Bond et al., 1983; Dickerson & Kemeny, 
2004; Dickerson et al., 2008; Mullen et al., 1997). 
Finally, a third line of evidence from cognitive neuroscience has documented a close 
relationship between neural mechanisms underlying social and emotional information 
processing (Adolphs et al., 2002; Norris et al., 2004). For instance, when participants 
process socially inappropriate embarrassing events, activations in brain areas associated 
with emotion (e.g., amygdala, medial prefrontal cortex)  are strongly modulated by the 
presence of others (Finger et al., 2006). 
In sum, several observations appear consistent with the idea that emotional and 
physiological responses are influenced by social context. However, previous research 
did not specifically address whether the presence of other individuals affect preferential 
attention to emotional pictures. To test this hypothesis, pictures of either pleasant (nude 
and erotic content), unpleasant (threat and injury) or emotionally neutral scenes were 
paired with neutral control pictures and presented simultaneously, while eye fixations 
and pupil diameter were monitored. Participants were asked to freely look at the 
pictures and instructed to choose the most interesting image of a pair, either when they 
were alone or in the presence of a confederate, of same or opposite gender. Preferential 
attention was determined by the probability of first fixation, the frequency of 
subsequent fixations, and viewing time on the emotional stimulus in comparison with 
the neutral stimulus, whereas the level of arousal and autonomic activation was 
determined by pupil diameter (Bradley et al., 2008).  
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The following predictions can be derived for the two different conditions. For the 
Alone condition, we expected to replicate previous findings of preferential attention to 
both pleasant and unpleasant, relative to neutral, pictures. Likewise, we predicted 
greater arousal, as indexed by pupil diameter, when viewing emotional than neutral 
stimuli (Bradley et al., 2008). For the Confederate condition, there are three possible 
outcomes. First, according to the distraction hypothesis (Klauer et al., 2008; Wühr & 
Huestegge, 2010), the presence of another person only disturbs performance on 
cognitively demanding tasks, probably due to a competition for limited attentional 
resources. Because emotional pictures appear to capture attention in a reflexive and 
automatic manner (Nummenmaa et al., 2006), we would expect them to be unaffected 
by the presence of a person in the environment. Second, the social facilitation 
hypothesis, advocated by Zajonc (1965), argues that the presence of others increases 
arousal and enhances the habitual, dominant response to a stimulus. As a consequence, 
since preferential attention to emotional stimuli is the dominant response, social 
presence might facilitate this habitual tendency, thereby increasing preferential attention 
to emotional pictures, regardless of their hedonic valence. Finally, according to the 
social evaluation hypothesis (Dickerson et al., 2004), conditions that threaten to demean 
the social self (e.g., one’s social image, acceptance or standing) may engender 
psychological, physiological, and behavioral changes necessary to coordinate an 
appropriate response to the situation. On this perspective, only attention to erotic stimuli 
should be affected by social presence, particularly when subjects viewed stimuli in 
presence of an opposite –gender confederate. Indeed, erotic images can be deemed as 
high arousing, attention-grabbing and pleasant stimuli, when viewed in isolation 
(Bradley et al., 2001; Buodo et al., 2002) or with a romantic partner. However, in our 
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culture, erotic stimuli can also be embarrassing and shame-inducing, when viewed in 
the presence of an unfamiliar other. Emotions like shame and embarrassment are 
usually considered as self-conscious emotions, evoked by self reflection and self 
evaluation. They usually arise from public exposure or disapproval of some 
transgression, when individuals fail to behave in accordance with social norms and rules 
(Tangney, 1996). Costa and colleagues (2001) collected self-report data and assessed 
non-verbal behaviors during erotic and neutral pictures viewing, either when 
participants were alone or in company of two unfamiliar individuals. They found that 
erotic stimuli were effective in inducing feelings of embarrassment and shame, with 
greater responses in the presence of others. Therefore, in the current study only viewing 
erotic stimuli entails violation and transgression of social rules, thereby meeting the 
requirement for a situation of social-evaluative threat. Accordingly, we expected to find 
modulatory effects of social presence on visual attention to erotic scenes only, and 
particularly when audience involved peers of opposite-gender to the observer. 
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5.2 Methods and Materials  
 
Participants 
Thirty two male subjects, aged between 22 and 36 years (mean age = 26.8 years, S.D. = 
3.6), took part in the experiment. All of them were right-handed, and were pre-screened 
to verify that they were heterosexual (self-reported as having only opposite-sex sexual 
desire and sexual experiences). They had normal vision or corrected to normal vision. 
None of the participants reported neurological or psychiatric disorders. Participants 
remained naïve as to the purpose of the study until debriefing. For ethical reasons, the 
participants had been informed prior to the experiment that they would be presented 
with photographs of which some could be pleasant or unpleasant in content, and that 
they could refuse to participate in or withdraw from the experiment at any time if they 
wished. Because previous research (Codispoti et al., 2008; Hamann et al., 2004; Lykins 
et al., 2008) has documented gender differences in processing visual sexually arousing 
stimuli, we restricted our study to male participants to maintain homogeneity of the 
subject sample. All experimental procedures were approved by the Bologna Department 
of Psychology ethics board and conformed to national and institutional guidelines and 
to the Declaration of Helsinki. 
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Stimuli  
The stimuli used in the experiments were 160 digitized color photographs selected from 
the International Affective Picture System (IAPS, Lang et al., 2005, reported in 
Appendix A). They included three categories of target pictures, classified as a function 
of their emotional or affective valence: pleasant (n = 20), neutral (n = 20), or unpleasant 
(n = 20), and one category of control neutral pictures (n = 100). All target pictures 
depicted people. Specifically, pleasant (erotic) pictures portrayed women positioned 
provocatively with facial expression communicating high sexual receptivity and 
heterosexual couples in sexual behavior; neutral pictures portrayed people in daily, non 
emotional activities; unpleasant pictures depicted threatening people or people suffering 
from a serious threat or harm (violent attacks or dead people and expressions of pain, 
crying, and despair). Control pictures represented various inanimate scenes and objects 
and were neutral in affective valence.  
Means (M) and standard errors (SE) of emotional valence and arousal ratings, 
luminance level, contrast level, complexity value, and color saturation for the red, green 
and blue channels of the four picture categories are reported in Table 5.1. Valence 
ratings, ranging from 1 (most pleasant) to 9 (most unpleasant), and arousal ratings, from 
1 (most calm/relaxed) to 9 (most agitated/aroused), for each picture were obtained from 
previous norming studies (Lang et al., 2005). Valence (pleasantness vs. unpleasantness) 
reflects the dominant motive system activated (avoidance or approach). Arousal reflects 
the intensity of the motive system activation, from calm to tension. The luminance and 
color saturation (red, green, and blue) values were derived from the 
histogram/luminance function of Adobe Photoshop™ in RGB-mode (mean luminance 
in RGB-mode ranges from 0 for completely black pictures to 255 for completely white 
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pictures). Average luminance levels and of the pictures were slightly adjusted with the 
Adobe Photoshop™ program to achieve uniform values for the different picture 
categories. In addition to average luminance values, we analyzed standard deviation 
values, as an index of contrast (Calvo & Lang, 2005). The complexity of the pictures 
was assessed in terms of the number of Mbytes of the image file size in BMP format, 
with the assumption that the more complex the image is, the larger the file (Buodo et al., 
2002).  
Table 5.1. Means and (standard errors) of stimulus characteristics of the unpleasant, neutral, pleasant, 
and control stimuli used in the study. 
 
  Unpleasant  Neutral  Pleasant  Control 
Valence  2.48 (0.17)  5.37 (0.16)  6.33 (0.14)  5.60 (0.10) 
Arousal  6.12 (0.16)  3.30 (0.13)  6.07 (0.14)  3.26 (0.09) 
Luminance   101.06 (7.28)  102.52 (6.26)  106.07 (4.21)  108.94 (2.85) 
Contrast  73.74 (2.40)  75.15 (1.77)  72.01 (2.38)  68.09 (1.55) 
Red channel 
saturation 
 113.18 (7.69)  111.76 (5.64)  124.70 (3.85)  118.58 (2.76) 
Green channel 
saturation 
 97.23 (7.56)  100.09 (6.79)  101.68 (4.75)  107.49 (3.06) 
Blue channel 
saturation 
 88.59 (6.88)  89.84 (7.28)  86.14 (5.41)  90.47(3.86) 
Complexity   2.25 (0.10)  2.05 (0.11)  2,28 (0.15)  2.29 (0.14) 
Valence and arousal ratings (1-9), stimulus luminance (0 –255), stimulus contrast (0-255), color saturation for the 
red, green and blue channels (0-255), stimulus complexity value (image size in Mbytes). 
 
 
The stimulus characteristics of the four picture sets were compared using a series of 
one-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs). These analyses revealed significant 
differences in arousal (p < .0001), and valence ratings (p < .0005). Post hoc analysis 
(Newman-Keuls test) showed no significant differences between mean arousal rating 
scores of pleasant and unpleasant pictures, and between neutral and control pictures (all 
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ps > .05). However, arousal ratings were significantly higher for pleasant and 
unpleasant images than for neutral and control images (p < .0001 in both cases). 
Regarding valence, the mean rating was higher for pleasant than for neutral, control and 
unpleasant pictures (p < .0005), whereas the mean rating for control and neutral pictures 
was higher than for unpleasant pictures (ps < .0001). Mean valence rating score for 
neutral and control pictures did not differ from each other (p > .05). As for the low-level 
properties of the images, the analyses revealed no significant differences in mean 
luminance level, contrast level, red, blue and green saturation, and complexity value 
between the all four categories of pictures (p >.05 in all cases). Thus, the analysis of the 
stimulus properties demonstrates that we were reasonably successful in selecting 
stimulus pictures that differ only with respect to arousal and valence but not with 
respect to low-level visual features.  
In each trial, two pictures were presented on the screen: a target picture (involving 
pleasant, unpleasant or neutral stimuli) and a control picture. The target and control 
pictures were randomly paired, thus producing three groups of experimental trials: 20 
pleasant-control trials, 20 unpleasant-control trials, and 20 neutral-control trials. 
Additionally, there were 20 filler trials (pairs of control images), which were included to 
balance the number of emotional and neutral displays (Nummenmaa et al., 2006). The 
size of the pictures was 140 mm wide x 100 mm high when displayed on the screen, 
which equals to 12.3° x 8.8° of visual angle at a viewing distance of 73 cm. The pictures 
in each trial were presented side by side, flanking a central fixation point, over a dark 
gray background. The distance between their inner edges of the two pictures 
corresponded to a minimum visual angle of 2° (at least one visual degree between the 
central fixation cross and inner edge of the picture). The left and right locations of the 
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target pictures were balanced across trials. The randomization of stimulus pairs and 
picture locations ensured that participants were not able to successfully use any preset 
scanning strategy. 
 
Apparatus 
The experiment was performed in a windowless and dimly lit room. Stimuli were 
displayed on a 15-inch (38 cm) computer screen at a resolution of 1024 x 768 pixels. 
The viewing distance from the participants’ eyes to the screen on which stimuli were 
displayed was 73 cm. Stimuli were delivered and controlled via a PC running E-Prime 
(Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA, 2002) stimulus presentation software. Eye 
position and pupil diameter were recorded using a table-mounted infrared video–based 
eye-tracker (Eye-Track ASL-6000) at a 60-Hz sampling rate. Viewing was binocular, 
although only the subject’s right eye was illuminated by an invisible infrared light, and 
the reflections were recorded by a video-camera positioned 63 cm from the eye. The 
eye-tracker was connected to a second PC, positioned in a separate room. Event markers 
transmitted to the eye-tracking computer by the stimulus presentation computer allowed 
coordination between behavioral events and eye data for analysis. Moreover, the 
experimenter monitored on-line the position of the subject’s eye gaze that was projected 
on a second screen. 
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Procedure 
Participants were tested individually. Upon arrival at the laboratory, they received 
general information about the experiment and gave written consent. Next, they were 
seated in front a computer screen with their chins positioned in an adjustable chinrest, 
and their forehead rested against a rounded bar to allow minimal movement and keep 
the distance from the stimuli constant.  
One armchair was positioned behind the participants’ chair, at the approximate distance 
of 1.5 m. For half of the participants, the chair was located to the right in the back of the 
participant, approximately 220° with regard to the participants’ line of sight; for the 
other half of the participants, the chair was located to the left in the back of the 
participant, approximately 140° with regard to the participants’ line of sight.  
Prior to the actual experimental task, participants were asked to perform a color 
discrimination task; actually this was the eye calibration session. Eye calibration 
consisted of having the participant fixate and verbally report the color of nine markers 
arranged on the display area, whilst their position of gaze was recorded for each marker. 
Once the eye-tracker was successfully calibrated, subjects were acquainted with the 
experimental procedure and the practice session began. They were told that they were 
going to see pairs of pictures, and their task was to indicate, by pressing the left or the 
right button of a mouse, which image of each pair was the most interesting. In the 
practice session, the participant was presented simultaneously with two images 
depicting landscapes, and was instructed to look at the pictures as he normally would, 
and then report the most interesting image by pressing the mouse button correspondent 
to the image’s side. Once the practice session was completed (5 trials), the experimental 
session began. 
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At the beginning of each trial, a central fixation cross (0.5° x 0.5° of visual angle) was 
displayed on the screen, and the participant had to focus his gaze at the centre of the 
cross. When the participant’s eye was fixated on the cross, the trial started. After a 
variable delay of 200-600 ms, introduced to prevent anticipatory saccades, a pair of 
pictures positioned to the left and right side of the fixation cross appeared, remaining on 
the screen for 3500 ms. Successively, the pictures and the fixation cross were replaced 
by a question (“Which picture was the most interesting?”). Subjects had to answer this 
question by pressing the mouse button correspondent to the preferred image’s side 
within a time window of 3000 ms. Thus, the task involved an interest judgment which 
ensured that participants had to look at both images at least once in order to indicate 
which of the two they found more interesting. Finally, after a blank short interval, a new 
trial began. 
 
Experimental Design 
Each subject performed the experimental task in two separate conditions: alone (Alone 
condition) and with another unfamiliar individual in the room (Confederate condition). 
In both conditions, exactly the same procedure was followed and subjects viewed the 
same set of 160 images, randomly paired. The only difference was the presence/absence 
of a stranger, during one of those conditions. Half of the participants were paired with a 
same-sex (male) confederate, henceforth referred to as the Same-sex group (N = 16, 
mean age=26.6 ± 4.35; mean years of schooling = 15 ±.39), while the other half were 
paired with a opposite-sex (female) confederate, henceforth referred to as the Opposite-
sex group (N = 16, mean age = 27.25 ± 2.69; mean years of schooling=14.81, ±.39). 
There was no difference among the 2 groups with respect to age (p =.59), and education 
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(p=.74). Participants were told this person to be a student, doing her/his project thesis in 
the lab and getting acquainted with the task. When the confederate was present, she/he 
was asked to sit on the chair behind and outside the field of view of the participant, to 
look at the computer screen where pictures were presented, and to pay attention to the 
participant’s performance for the whole duration of the session without making verbal 
comments. The experimenter was never present during the task.  
In each condition, participants performed 80 trials (20 erotic-control trials, 20 
unpleasant-control trials, 20 neutral-control trials and 20 control-control trials) 
administered in a random order. Target and control stimuli appeared once in each 
condition. In order to minimize habituation effects, the two conditions were separated 
by two weeks from one another. After completion of both experimental conditions, 
participants were probed for suspicion, and debriefed. No participants guessed the 
hypotheses of the study or reported attempts to control their emotion during the 
experiment. 
 
Measures and data preparation 
Eye-movements - Eye movement data were analyzed using the Eyenal Data Analysis 
Program (Applied Science Group 2000). If eye movements were stable within 1° of 
visual angle for 100 ms or more, this was classified as a fixation to that position, the 
duration of which was recorded. Fixations were classified as being directed at the left or 
right pictures if they were 1° wide of the central position on the horizontal plane (this 
visual angle corresponds to the distance between the fixation cross position and the 
inner edge of each picture). Three types of eye-movement measures were collected: a) 
direction of first fixation, b) total number of fixations, and c) total viewing time. The 
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direction of first fixation following the onset of the two pictures display on each trial 
was determined as the first location of the eyes after leaving the fixation point. First 
fixation proportion was calculated for each participant by expressing the number of 
trials when initial fixations were directed to the target picture as a proportion of the total 
number of trials in which an initial eye movement was made to either the target or 
control picture. Proportion scores > 0.5 means that first fixations landed more 
frequently on the target than on the control picture. This measure was assumed to assess 
initial orienting of attention and attentional capture (Calvo & Lang, 2004; Nummenmaa 
et al., 2006). Total number of fixations was a count of the different times the eye landed 
on any given image, with each new fixation requiring that the eye gaze moves from 
outside the picture in the preceding fixation. Total fixation proportion was calculated for 
each participant by expressing the number of gaze fixations directed to the target picture 
as a proportion of the total number of fixations made to either the target or control 
picture on each trial. Proportion scores > 0.5 reflect a tendency to look more frequently 
at target than control images. Finally, total viewing time examined how long, rather 
than how likely, a given image was fixated during each trial. It was calculated by 
summing up the duration of fixations made to target and control pictures during the 
whole 3.5-s exposure period. Total viewing time proportion was obtained by computing 
the time spent gazing at target pictures as a percentage of the total amount of time 
looking at either image recorded per trial. Proportion scores > 0.5 reflect a tendency to 
look longer at target than control images. Total fixation and viewing time proportions 
were assumed to index maintenance of attention on a particular image (Calvo & Lang, 
2004; Lykins et al., 2008). Note that although each trial lasted 3500 ms, due to tracker 
loss and the exclusion of blinks, only some of this time was recorded for some trials. 
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Since a partial recording may not be representative, trials with excessive missing data 
(where fixations to the pictures accounted for less than 20% of the total picture 
presentation time, e.g., less than 700 ms) were excluded from the analysis. This resulted 
in the exclusion of 5% of all trials. After trials with missing data had been excluded, 
gaze fixations accounted for 81% of the time when pictures were presented, with no 
fixations recorded during the remaining 19% of the time due to eye movements 
(saccades), eye blinks, and failures of the eye-tracker to record data. These percentages 
did not differ as a function of target type (neutral, pleasant, or unpleasant), or condition 
(Alone or Confederate), or their interaction, (F < 1 in all cases). 
 
Pupil responses - A single measure in pixels of pupil diameter was computed by 
averaging the horizontal and vertical diameters of the pupil ellipse, and then converting 
the obtained value in millimeters. Pupil responses during picture viewing were baseline 
corrected with a 200-msec pre-stimulus baseline; those containing eye-blinks or for 
which data were missing were discarded. Two measures of pupil responses were 
gathered: a) mean pupil diameter change of first fixation on the target picture, following 
the onset of the two-picture display on each trial (first pupil diameter change), and b) 
mean pupil diameter change during the whole viewing of a target picture in each trial 
(mean pupil diameter change). Previous studies support the view that considers pupil 
diameter as a valid measure of emotional arousal, and they indicate that pupil changes 
are significantly affected by pictures emotionality (Bradley et al., 2008).  
 
Interest score - Finally, in order to gather an explicit measure of interest and ensure that 
participants looked at both images at least once, we asked them to indicate, in each trial, 
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the picture that they felt was the most interesting to them personally. An interest score 
was computed by calculating the percentage of trials in which the participant selected 
the target picture as the most interesting of a stimulus pair. This score was considered 
an explicit measure of the participants’ interest. Proportion scores > 0.5 reflect a 
tendency to find more interesting target than control pictures. 
 
Subjective Measures - Subjective feelings of embarrassment, shame, anxiety, surprise, 
sadness, and disgust were informally assessed at the end of each experimental 
condition. 
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5.3 Results 
Data from practice and filler trials were discarded. Means and standard errors of the eye 
movement measures, interest scores and pupil responses for the three different target 
types in two task conditions, for both Same-sex and Opposite-sex groups, are presented 
in Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2. Because observed variables were normally distributed 
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for normality), data analyses were conducted using repeated 
measurement ANOVAs, with target type (three levels: neutral, pleasant and unpleasant) 
and condition (two levels: alone and confederate) as within-subject factors, and group 
(two levels: same-sex and opposite-sex) as between subject factor. Post hoc 
examination of significant interaction effects was conducted using Newman-Keuls tests. 
A α-level of 0.05 was used for determining statistical significance. 
  
First fixation proportion - Analysis yielded a statistically significant main effect of 
target type on first fixation proportion, F (2, 60) = 16.18, p < .001. Planned comparisons 
showed that, overall, the probability of first fixating a pleasant picture (.76), or an 
unpleasant picture (.74) was greater than that of first fixating a neutral picture (.64), p < 
.05 in both cases; whereas first fixation proportions were not significantly different for 
the pleasant and unpleasant pictures, p = 0.3. These results are in line with prior studies 
(Nummenmaa et al., 2006), indicating that initial orienting of overt attention is biased 
towards emotional stimuli (both pleasant and unpleasant) compared to neutral stimuli. 
The analysis also showed a significant interaction between target type and condition, F 
(2, 60) = 6.50, p < .01. 
More important for the present purposes, the three–way interaction between target type, 
condition, and group proved significant, F (2,30) = 3.13, p< .05. In order to identify the 
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source of this interaction, we conducted two separate ANOVAs, one for each group, 
with the factors target type and condition. In the Opposite-sex group, there was a 
significant main effect of target type, F (2, 30) = 5.42, p< .01, as in the main ANOVA. 
Critically, the interaction between target type and condition was significant, F (2, 30) = 
8.46, p< .01. The interaction reflects the fact that the proportion of first fixations on 
pleasant pictures decreased significantly in the Confederate (.67) relative to the Alone 
condition (.79), whereas presence of female peer had no effect on the probability of first 
fixating an unpleasant picture (means were .72 and .74 in the Alone and Confederate 
condition, respectively) or a neutral picture (.61 and .65 in the Alone and Confederate 
condition, respectively). Moreover, pleasant (sexual) pictures were more likely to be 
fixated first than neutral pictures when participants were alone (p = .002). Also, the 
proportion of first fixation was similar for both pleasant and unpleasant images (and 
higher than neutral images) in the Alone condition, whereas, in the Confederate 
condition, pleasant pictures attracted marginally less first fixations than unpleasant 
pictures (p = .053). 
A rather different pattern of results was found for the Same-sex group. There was a 
main effect of target type, F (2, 30) = 14.53, p< .001, again revealing that first fixation 
probability was higher for erotic (.78) and unpleasant pictures (.74) that neutral pictures 
(.66). However, neither the main effect of condition F (1, 15) = 0.64, p = .43, nor the 
interaction between target type and condition, F (2,30) = .33, p = .71, were significant. 
This clearly indicates that the presence of a same-sex (male) confederate had no effects 
on the pattern of first fixations on emotional and neutral pictures.  
 
94 
 
Total fixation proportion - There was a significant main effect of target type on total 
fixation proportion, F (2, 60) = 21.76, p = .0001, with higher gaze fixation probability 
on pleasant (.66) and unpleasant pictures (.65) than on neutral pictures (.56), and no 
significant difference between pleasant and unpleasant pictures. However, neither the 
main effect of condition, nor other interactions involving this factor were significant, ps 
< 1, thereby indicating that the proportion of total fixations on pleasant, unpleasant and 
neutral pictures were independent of the presence of a confederate, either female or 
male, in the room.  
 
Total viewing time proportion - The analysis showed that target type significantly 
affected total duration proportion, F (2, 60) = 16.23, p < .001. Post hoc analyses showed 
that pleasant (.63), and unpleasant (.62) pictures were gazed longer than neutral (.54) 
pictures, p <.05 in all cases, with no significant differences between pleasant and 
unpleasant images. There were no other significant results.  
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Figure 5.1 Eye movement data, interest scores and pupil diameter. Proportion of first fixations (a), 
total fixations (b), total viewing time (c) interest scores (d) first pupil diameter (e) and mean pupil 
diameter (f) for pleasant (sexual), unpleasant (threat/injury) and neutral  target pictures, in Alone and 
Confederate – same sex condition.  
 
96 
 
  
 
 
Figure 5.2 Eye movement data, interest scores and pupil diameter. Proportion of first fixations (a), 
total fixations (b), total viewing time (c) interest scores (d) first pupil diameter (e) and mean pupil 
diameter (f) for pleasant (sexual), unpleasant (threat/injury) and neutral  target pictures, in Alone and 
Confederate – opposite sex conditions.  
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Pupil responses - Change of pupil diameter of first fixation (first pupil response) was 
affected by target type, F (2, 60) = 10.49, p <.001 such that highly arousing erotic 
targets and unpleasant targets prompted equivalent pupillary changes (M = 0.60 mm and 
0.64 mm, respectively, p = .72), with both types of picture eliciting larger changes than 
when participants gazed first at neutral pictures (M = 0.25 mm), both ps < .01. The 
three-way interaction between target type, condition and group approached significance, 
F (2, 60) = 2.82, p < .07. This marginally significant three-way interaction was tested by 
running two separate ANOVAs on the Opposite-sex and Same-sex groups. In the 
Opposite-sex group, the relationship between target type and condition just missed 
statistical significance, F (2, 30) = 3.09, p < .06. Planned contrasts revealed that mean 
pupil changes when viewing pleasant pictures were significantly smaller in the 
Confederate (M = 0.35 mm) than in the Alone (M = 0.84 mm) condition, p = .012, 
whereas there was no difference between conditions for unpleasant (M = 0.52 mm and 
0.61 mm, for the Confederate and Alone condition, respectively, p = .53) and neutral 
target pictures (M = 0.16 mm and 0.16 mm, p = .99).  
In the Same-sex group, the main effect of target type was significant, F (2, 30) = 3.98, p 
< .03. However, neither the main effect of condition nor the condition X target type 
interaction was significant, Fs < 1, suggesting that pupil responses to emotional pictures 
were independent of the presence of a same-gender confederate. 
Similarly, change of pupil size averaged across the whole exposure period (mean pupil 
response) was significantly modulated by target type, F (2,60) = 10.49, p <.001, due to 
the fact that pupil dilation proved greater for both pleasant and unpleasant than neutral 
pictures, p < .01 in both cases, with no overall difference between pleasant and 
unpleasant target pictures, p = .41. More critically, a statistically significant three-way 
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interaction between target type, condition, and group was found, F (2, 30) = 3.28, p 
<.05. To uncover the source of the significant three-way interaction, two separate 
ANOVAs, one for each group, with the factors target type and condition, were 
conducted. In the Opposite-sex group, a significant two-way interaction between target 
type and condition was found, F (2, 30) = 3.48, p <.05. This interaction reflected the 
fact that pleasant (erotic) pictures elicited larger pupil dilation in the Alone relative to 
the Confederate condition, p < .01, whereas such difference between conditions was 
immaterial for unpleasant and neutral target pictures, all ps > .05. Furthermore, erotic 
pictures showed larger pupil changes compared to neutral pictures when participants 
viewed them alone, p < .001, but not when they gazed at erotic pictures in the presence 
of a female confederate, p = .44. In stark contrast, in the Same-sex group, the interaction 
between  target type and condition was not significant, F<1, thereby revealing that 
viewing emotional pictures with a same-sex confederate did not affect mean pupil 
response. 
 
Interest scores - Interest scores were analyzed in a separate ANOVA. The results 
showed a main effect of target type, F (2, 60) = 13.81, p = .001. Pairwise comparisons 
indicated that the interest score for pleasant (erotic) (.77) and unpleasant (.70) images 
was significantly greater than for neutral (.57) images, both ps < .05, whereas interest 
scores for pleasant and unpleasant pictures were not different from each other, p = .08. 
Both the main effect of condition, and the interactions involving this factor were not 
significant, Fs < 1. Thus, results revealed that participants found both pleasant and 
unpleasant pictures more interesting than neutral stimuli, and that such explicit interest 
was unaffected by the presence of a peer.  
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Finally, participants reported more embarrassment in the Confederate than in the Alone 
condition, particularly when paired with an opposite-gender confederate than a same-
gender confederate. 
 
5.4 Discussion 
Behavioral studies provide strong evidence that emotional pictures are more likely to 
draw and hold visual attention that neutral pictures (Vuilleumier & Huang, 2009). The 
current study empirically tested whether such emotional enhancement of attention is 
modulated by social presence. Participants freely inspected two (one emotional – one 
neutral) simultaneous pictures under instruction to indicate the most interesting image 
of the pair, either alone or in the presence of a stranger of same or opposite gender. Eye-
movements monitoring was used to assess overt attentional orienting to, and 
maintenance on, emotional visual pictures, whereas pupil size was included as an 
indicator of autonomic arousal. As predicted, participants performing the task alone 
were not only more likely to attend first to the emotional pictures, but these were also 
attended to for longer time and with more fixations than neutral pictures. Initial 
orienting and maintenance of attention were similarly biased toward both unpleasant 
and pleasant target pictures. Furthermore, pupil changes were larger when participants 
viewed pleasant or unpleasant pictures, compared to neutral pictures, indicating 
increased physiological activity for emotional scenes (Bradley et al., 2008). Overall, the 
present data converge with earlier results (Calvo & Lang, 2004; Nummenmaa et al., 
2006) in supporting the hypothesis that both initial orienting and subsequent 
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maintenance of attention are biased toward highly arousing emotional pictures of both 
pleasant and unpleasant valence.  
More importantly, the pattern of eye movements and autonomic responses to emotional 
pictures was affected by the presence of another person in the environment, even though 
this person remained outside the field of view of the participant. This effect, however, 
crucially depended on the specific content of pictorial stimuli as well as on the nature of 
the social-evaluative context. The probability of making the first fixation on pictures 
conveying sexual information was reduced in the presence of an unfamiliar peer of 
opposite gender. However, being watched by an unfamiliar individual of the same 
gender had no effect on first fixations to erotic images. Also, first fixations to 
unpleasant or neutral pictures were not influenced by the presence of an invisible 
audience, regardless of gender. Moreover, autonomic physiology data showed that pupil 
diameter in response to erotic, but not unpleasant and neutral, pictures was smaller in 
the Confederate than in the Alone condition, provided that an opposite-gender peer was 
present in the environment. Interestingly, the maintenance of attention on emotional 
pictures, as measured by total viewing time and frequency of fixations, were unaffected 
by the presence or absence of a stranger in the room. Finally, social context of the 
viewing situation did not alter self-reported interest.  
Taken together, our findings indicate that social presence selectively decreases early 
attentional capture and emotional arousal prompted by pleasant erotic stimuli, while it 
leaves unaltered behavioral and physiological responses to equally arousing (salient) 
unpleasant pictures. To unfold its effects, however, social presence must possibly be 
threatening to one’s social self-evaluation, for only the presence of a female peer 
selectively impairs male’ performance on erotic pictures. Thus, potentially negative 
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social evaluation, but not mere social presence, is responsible for determining the 
attentional changes observed. 
Overall, the pattern of our results is neither compatible with the distraction hypothesis 
(Klauer et al., 2008; Wühr & Huestegge, 2010), nor with the social facilitation 
hypothesis (Zajonc, 1965), which predicted that the presence of another person 
modulates the processing of highly emotional stimuli, regardless of their valence or 
content, at least when there are no arousal or salience difference between pleasant and 
unpleasant stimuli, as was the case in the present study. The present evidence for a 
selective effect of social presence on the allocation of attention to pleasant (erotic), but 
not unpleasant stimuli, is not in line with either account. Furthermore, the classical 
social facilitation framework (Zajonc, 1965) assumes that the presence of others should 
increase arousal, thereby facilitating the dominant response to a stimulus. In fact, our 
results point the other way, showing an attenuation of arousal when male participants 
viewed erotic pictures in the presence of a female stranger.  
The current findings quite nicely fit with the social evaluation hypothesis (Dickerson et 
al., 2004) that predicted specific behavioral and physiological responses to specific 
conditions in which an aspect of the self is, or could be, negatively judged by others. In 
our study, the crucial difference between processing erotic images and threat/injury 
images in social context is that only the former provides the potential for negative social 
evaluation and rejection (social-evaluative threat). In Western culture, indeed, watching 
erotic material in public, especially in a formal setting, it is deemed highly inappropriate 
and shameful. Shame and related negative emotions are preferentially elicited when 
one’s social image is threatened, namely when a disapproving other, either real or 
imagined, negatively evaluates the self (Lewis, 1971). Consistent with this, earlier 
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research (Costa et al., 2001) has demonstrated that watching erotic pictures in the 
company of an unfamiliar person increases the subjective experience of embarrassment 
and shame. Although assessed informally, our participants experienced increased 
feelings of embarrassment during the presentation of erotic picture in the presence of 
another individual of opposite gender.  
An interesting question is through which mechanism social-evaluative threat reduced 
overt attention to erotic pictures. One first possibility is that the social-evaluative threat 
depletes participants’ cognitive resources, which in turn limits the amount of attention 
paid to erotic pictures in social context (Dreisbach & Böttcher, 2010). It is important to 
note, however, that social presence only disrupted initial orienting of attention to erotic 
pictures, while had no consequences on maintained attention. If social-evaluative threat 
reduces attentional capacity and increases distractibility, then one would expect equal or 
stronger effects on maintained attention (i.e., proportion of total fixation and viewing 
time), which relies more on (limited) attentional resources than initial orienting 
(Nummenmaa et al., 2006). 
An alternative explanation of our findings is that, in social context, individuals 
automatically regulate their reactivity to emotionally evocative, but socially 
inappropriate, sexual stimuli, to conform to socio-cultural norms, and avoid social 
exclusion and unfavorable evaluation of others (Mesquita & Albert, 2007). Emotion 
regulation refers to a set of processes that dampen, intensify or simply maintain 
emotion, depending on an individual’s goals and contexts (Gross & Thompson, 2007). 
Although typical examples of emotion regulation are conscious and deliberate (Ochsner 
& Gross, 2005) , such as when subjects are instructed to voluntarily decrease the 
intensity of the sexual arousal felt in reaction to erotic stimuli (Beauregard et al., 2001), 
103 
 
recent empirical work indicates that unconscious regulatory processes may be crucial in 
controlling physiological reactions and emotional impulses incompatible with one’s 
current goals (Fujita & Han, 2009; Mauss et al., 2007; Williams et al., 2009). 
Unconscious emotion control can occur without subjective awareness and thus consume 
little or no attentional resources (Bargh & Williams, 2007). Moreover, unconscious 
emotion regulation processes may be activated efficiently and quickly, that is they can 
operate before full-blown emotional and physiological responses are generated (i.e., 
antecedent-focused). In the present study, neither subjects reported making conscious 
attempts to control their emotions in the Confederate condition, nor were they instructed 
to do so, thus making unlikely the possibility of deliberate emotion regulation in the 
social presence condition. The fact that pupil diameter was reduced in the Confederate 
condition further distinguishes this type of emotion regulation from deliberate or willful 
type of emotion control, which has been associated with larger pupil diameter (Urry et 
al., 2009), reflecting the effortful nature of conscious control of emotion. Thus, we 
suggest that social presence implicitly activated unconscious emotion regulation 
processes, effectively dampening the emotional salience and autonomic arousal of erotic 
pictures and thus their propensity to capture visual attention in the presence of others.  
Why would social-evaluative threat affect initial orienting but not maintained attention 
to erotic scenes? Several evidence suggest that initial orienting toward an emotional 
stimulus is to a significantly degree driven by the affective properties of a stimulus, 
whereas maintained attention is more susceptible to voluntary control (Corbetta & 
Shulman, 2002; Egeth &Yantis, 1997), reflecting the participant’s conscious 
motivations, interests and desires. On this perspective, our findings suggest that social 
presence exerts a subtle impact on attention to erotic images, blunting the incentive 
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salience and attention-grabbing characteristic of sexual pictures, without changing the 
controlled, elaborative processes that subserve the maintenance of attention on them. 
Presumably, once emotional impulses and physiological responses towards sexual 
pictures had been cooled down by the social-self threat, participants could look and 
explore the content of sexual images from a detached and non-emotional perspective. 
Of course, this is a currently speculative interpretation that will need to be confirmed in 
future studies. 
Several limitations that characterize the present study warrant comments. First, all the 
participants were males. It will be important for future investigations to examine the 
extent to which these findings generalize to women, and, further, if there are gender 
differences in attentional responses to sexual and non-sexual images in social contexts. 
Second, the present studies featured just one index of physiological reactivity (changes 
in pupil size across experimental stimuli and conditions), and the use of other 
autonomic (skin conductance, heart rate), and subjective (self-report) measures could 
shed additional light on the role of social presence in modulating emotional reactivity. 
In conclusion, the present study provides evidence that social context can modulate the 
physiological and attentional responses to emotional stimuli, depending on their specific 
content. The presence of an unfamiliar and invisible other reduced early attentional 
capture and emotional arousal elicited by pleasant erotic stimuli but did not affect 
behavioral and physiological responses to equally arousing, but unpleasant pictures. We 
suggested that the social evaluative context implicitly instigates unconscious emotional 
regulation processes, lessening the emotional salience and autonomic arousal elicited by 
erotic pictures and, in turn, their propensity to capture visual attention in the presence of 
others. Above all, our findings indicate that the reactivity to emotional stimuli reflect 
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not only intra-individual psychological tendencies but is also flexibly shaped by the 
interpersonal, sociocultural environment. 
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CHAPTER 6 - Cognitive processes affect emotion 
 
 
In the past two decades, research has witnessed a shift from a separated view of emotion 
and cognition toward a more interactive and integrated view of these two domains. 
There is great increasing interest on how emotion and cognition interact and on what are 
the mechanisms underlying this interaction. The idea of a bidirectional relationship 
between affective and cognitive processes has developed, also supported by 
neuroimaging and neurophysiologic data. The previous chapters of this thesis report 
evidence that emotion influences cognitive processes. In an evolutionary frame, it has 
been shown that certain kind of stimuli, emotionally and motivationally valenced, may 
automatically drawn attention compared to neutral ones.  Attention is not the only 
domain that has been investigated to highlight the importance of emotion in cognition. 
Further examples come also from studies on memory and reasoning (for review see 
Dolan, 2002). For instance, the benefit of emotion on autobiographical or explicit 
memory is extensively reported in studies that showed enhanced memory for events that 
are emotionally charged or for material that include personal information (Phelps et al., 
1997) as well as in studies with amnesic patients, which show spared mnemonic 
abilities for emotional materials, despite memory deficits (Hamman et al., 1997). 
Furthermore, the emotional influence on reasoning and decision-making is reported in 
studies on patients with VMPFC damage (Bechara et al., 2000) and is explained by the 
somatic-marker hypothesis, according to which evocation of past feeling states biases 
decision-making processes toward or away from a particular behavior (Damasio et al., 
1996).  
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If on the one hand the contribution of affective processes on cognition domain is well 
documented, there is as much evidence of the influence of cognitive processes on 
emotion domain. A critical example is the fundamental adaptive ability of individuals to 
override automatic, “irrational”, emotional responses when they are not consistent with 
current intentions (Cohen, 2005). But how does this happen? What are the neural 
mechanisms involved in this kind of control?   
The general idea is that behavior might be determined by a competition between brain 
systems that lead to different evaluations of the same circumstances. Neuroimaging 
findings indicate the prefrontal cortex, in its anterior and dorsolateral regions, to be a 
crucial area for the resolution of this competition. Studies on emotion regulation and 
decision-making could provide a great example of how high-level cognitive processes 
compete and interact with emotion in the brain to produce behavior. This chapter will 
delve into this topic.  
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6.1 Cognitive control of emotion 
A fundamental question about the relationship between cognition and emotion concerns 
the neural substrate underlying emotional self-regulation. One of the primary functions 
attributed to emotion is providing individuals with important information coming from 
the environment and preparing them to quickly respond to external opportunities and 
challenges (Frijda, 1986). Nevertheless, sometimes the emotional responses are not 
appropriate to the situations people face, and often they are not appropriate to achieve 
long terms purposes (Gross, 1998). Sometimes emotional responses need to be 
modulated and overridden by means of higher-order cognitive functions. Emotion 
regulation serves this important role. Usually, we refer to emotion regulation as a set of 
strategies by which individuals influence their emotions, when and how they experience 
and express these emotions (Gross, 1998). These strategies may be automatic or 
controlled, unconscious or conscious and may affect emotion generative processes at 
early or later stages.  Given the increasing hint of complex interdependency of cognitive 
and affective processes, lately cognitive psychology and neuroscience committed to 
elucidate behavioral and neural substrates of emotion regulation. On the basis of various 
evidence from experimental lesion studies in animals and clinical neuropsychological, 
psychophysiological, and functional brain mapping studies in humans, Davidson and 
colleagues (2000) have proposed that emotional regulation may be normally 
implemented by a neural circuit consisting of several regions of the prefrontal cortex 
(orbitofrontal, dorsolateral and anterior cingulate cortex), and of subcortical limbic 
structures, such as the amygdala and the hypothalamus. Functional neuroimaging 
studies have been used to investigate neural systems implicated in different type of 
regulative strategies. Two in particular have been examined: controlling attention to, 
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and cognitively changing the meaning of, emotionally evocative stimuli. Cognitive 
change is used to regulate an existing or an ongoing emotional response and, consistent 
to Davidson hypothesis, has been shown to rely on interaction between prefrontal and 
cingulate control networks and cortical and subcortical emotion generative system (for 
review see Ochnser & Gross, 2008) with differences in the time occurrence (Goldin et 
al., 2008).  
Among cognitive change strategies, reappraisal has received particular attention. It 
consists of cognitively transforming a situation so as to alter its emotional impact. 
Experimental evidence previously confirmed reappraisal to be effective. For example, it 
has been shown that reappraisal of negative valence films led to a decrease in 
experience of negative emotion (for review see Gross, 1998). Neuroimaging results 
suggested that processing dynamics similar to those implicated in other forms of 
cognitive control are recruited in cognitive control of emotion. Using fMRI, Ochsner 
and colleagues (2002) presented participants with aversive photos and instructed them 
to increase, maintain, or decrease (post experimental debriefing suggested that 
participants reappraised) their emotional reactions. Two conditions were employed: 
‘‘Attend trials,’’ where participants were asked to let themselves respond emotionally to 
each photo by being aware of their feelings without trying to alter them and, 
‘‘Reappraise trials’’, where participants were asked to interpret photos so that they no 
longer felt negative in response to them. Results showed that reappraisal implicated 
activation in the regions of lateral PFC and medial PFC, essential for working memory 
and cognitive control (Knight et al., 1999; Miller & Cohen, 2001), and decreased 
activation in medial OFC and amygdala, two regions involved in emotion processing 
(Bechara et al., 1999; Davidson & Irwin, 1999). In addition, the magnitude of ventral 
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LPFC activity during effective reappraisal was inversely correlated with activation in 
both emotion-processing regions.  
 
                    
 
Figure 6.1: Group averaged brain activation when reappraising or attending to feelings in response to the 
most negative photos. The “modulation by reappraisal” in red shows regions important for emotion 
processes that are modulated by reappraisal. The “activation by reappraisal” in green shows regions 
exerting cognitive control over emotion activated by reappraisal. (Adapted from Ochsner et al., 2002)   
 
 
Moreover, additional experiments found the same patterns of activity for both up- and 
down- regulation of emotion (Ochsner et al., 2004). The authors concluded that 
reappraisal recruits lateral PFC to maintain the selection and application of the 
regulative strategy and, in accordance with the current goal, modulate emotion 
processes implemented in cortical and subcortical regions involved in evaluating the 
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affective salience and contextual relevance of a stimulus (Ochsner & Barrett, 2001; 
Phelps et al., 2001; Rolls, 1999).   
In another study by Beauregard and co-workers (2001) brain activation was measured in 
normal male subjects while they either responded in a normal manner to erotic film 
excerpts or voluntarily attempted to inhibit the sexual arousal induced by viewing erotic 
stimuli. Results demonstrated that the sexual arousal experienced in response to the 
erotic film excerpts was associated with activation in limbic and paralimbic structures, 
such as the right amygdala, right anterior temporal pole, and hypothalamus. On the 
contrary, the attempted inhibition of the sexual arousal generated by viewing the erotic 
stimuli was associated with activation peaks in the right dorsolateral PFC (superior 
frontal gyrus) and the right ACC. Contrary to the pattern of brain activity seen in the 
sexual arousal condition, no significant loci of activation were noted in the limbic 
regions in attempted inhibition condition. These findings reinforce the view that 
emotional regulation is normally implemented by a neural circuit comprising various 
prefrontal regions, implicated in top-down processes that monitor and control the 
information processing necessary to produce voluntary action and, subcortical limbic 
structures, implicated in the evaluative processing of the stimuli. Importantly, these 
findings report that cognitive control of emotion implicates the same neural network 
involved in other forms of control, useful to resolve cognitive conflict between two 
simultaneous responses that compete for limited resources. Indeed, in cognitive 
demanding tasks ACC has been shown to correlate with level of conflict and to predict 
subsequent increases in prefrontal cortex and execution of control in lateral PFC 
(Botvinick et al., 2001, 2004).To better understand this mechanism and how it might fit 
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to emotion-cognition competition, in the next paradigm a classic example of “cold” 
cognitive conflict will be explained. 
 
 
6.2 An example of Cognitive Conflict  
We can talk about cognitive conflict every times cognitive processes go in competition 
with each other. The Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) and its many variants can be considered 
as the experimental task most extensively used to study competition between processes. 
In its traditional form, it consists of presenting a visual display of a word (e.g. the name 
of a color) and asking either to read the word or to name the color in which the word is 
displayed.          
 
                                                                   
 
Figure 6.2: Example of incongruent trial in the Stroop Task (Stroop, 1935) 
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Typically, neither accuracy nor speed is affected by the color in which the word is 
presented when the subjects are required to simply read the word, for example saying 
“Red” to the word red presented in green. Contrarily, when subjects are required to 
name the color, response is not always equally simple. If the word itself and the color of 
the word disagree, as in the example above (incongruent trials: the word red presented 
in green) the response times significantly decrease, compared to if the color of the word 
and the word itself agree (congruent trials: the word red presented in red). This effect 
has been explained as a consequence of the competition between the strong automatic 
process of word reading and the process of color naming (Kahneman & Treisman, 
1984; MacLeod & Dunbar, 1988). Neural network models have been proposed to 
clarify the dynamics of this competition and its relationship to behavior. The existence 
of two pathways has been suggested (Cohen et al 1990). The word reading pathway 
would serve encoding the orthographic form of visual stimulus into its corresponding 
verbal representation, whereas the color naming pathway would serve encoding the 
color of stimuli into the same set of verbal representation. Each pathway consists of a 
set of input units, intermediate units, and output units. Conflict is defined as the product 
of the activity of competing processing units and can be reduced by increasing activity 
of the unit that provide top down control (e.g. Color naming unit). This will augment 
activity in the task-relevant unit and inhibit activity in the other unit, reducing conflict. 
This model of the Stroop task suggest that differences in practice lead to differences in 
the strength of processing, so that the much more considerable experience that adults 
have in reading words than in naming colors makes connections in the word reading 
pathway stronger than those in the color naming pathway. This clarify why when 
presented with a word and asked to respond, usually people tend to invariably read the 
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word and not to name the color in which the word is displayed. However, even if the 
reading word is easier and more automatic, people are ever able to respond correctly in 
incongruent trials when they are asked to name the color.  According to the Stroop 
model, this is possible because there are units that represent the knowledge about the 
two dimension of the stimulus and about the two different task demands (color naming 
and word reading). In the case of naming the color, top down processes are necessary to 
activate the correct task demand unit and to proceed in the corresponding pathway. This 
top down support strengthen information in the color naming pathway to make it 
competitive against the usually stronger information coming from word reading 
pathway and allows producing a correct response, consistent with the demand of the 
task. The Stroop task is variously described as exploiting the cognitive functions of 
selective attention, behavioral inhibition, working memory or goal-directed behavior. 
Miller and Cohen (2001) proposed that all these functions rely on representation of 
goals and rules in the form of patterns of activity in PFC, which configure processing in 
other parts of the brain in accordance with current task demands. According to the 
theory of cognitive control the PFC serves the function of active maintenance of 
patterns of activity that represent goals and the means to achieve those (Miller & Cohen, 
2001). These representations bias signals throughout the rest of the brain and guide the 
flow of neural activity along pathways that establish the proper mapping between 
inputs, internal states and outputs needed to perform a given task. This is especially 
important whenever stimuli are ambiguous or when multiple responses are possible.   
Thus, cognitive control has been frequently conceptualized as the top-down flow that 
supports the task-relevant processes and resolve cognitive conflict.                                 
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Figure 6.3: Response conflict and Stroop task (1935). This figure shows a model developed to capture 
the notion of response conflict and to adaptively adjust cognitive control to improve performance. The 
input layer reflects sensory input in the form of the ink color (color stimuli, either Red (R) or Green (G) 
and word meaning (word stimuli). These two inputs then bias responding with greater strength given to 
the word meaning to reflect the greater automaticity of this process. Cognitive control, derived from PFC 
activity helps to improve performance by selectively biasing sensory inputs based on whether the task is 
to do color-naming (C) and word-reading (W). Control is gated by the detection of response conflict in 
ACC. (Adapted from Cohen, 1994). 
 
 
Neuroimaging studies provided contribution in specifying neural correlates of cognitive 
conflict and execution of control. Anterior cingulate cortex (Brodmann’s areas 24 and 
32) and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Brodmann’s area 9 and 46) seem to be two 
regions closely related to cognitive conflict and executive control. For instance, studies 
on working memory (Cohen et al., 1997) increased activity in these prefrontal regions 
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during tasks that required holding long sequences of items or while performing two 
tasks at the same time. However, functional dissociation of these two regions has been 
reported. For instance, Fletcher and colleagues (1998) found DLPFC activity in absence 
of ACC activity when participants were engaged in maintaining and manipulating 
information in working memory. On the contrary more activity in ACC was shown in 
tasks of divided attention, as the traditional Stroop task (Pardo et al., 1990), in 
monitoring performance and in errors detections (Carter et al., 1998).  MacDonald and 
colleagues (2000) suggested that DLPFC may be involved in representing and 
maintaining the attentional demands of the task and implementation of control, while 
ACC may be involved in evaluative processes and detection of conflict. Consistently, 
these authors showed that only activity in DLPFC, during a modified version of the 
Stroop task, increased in response to instructions to name the color but not to read the 
word, while no-instructions related activity was observed in ACC. Moreover, they 
showed that the most activation in left DLPFC after color-naming instruction showed 
the smallest Stroop interference effect. These findings contribute to the idea that 
DLPFC exerts a top-down control function and that more activity in this region 
corresponds to conflict decrease. Furthermore, consistent with the role of ACC in 
conflict monitoring, greater activity of this region was more related to response period 
for color-naming incongruent trials than for congruent ones and was associated with 
greater Stroop interference.  
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6.3 Emotion and cognition in decision making  
Conflict has been well studied in contexts where cognitive control is necessary to avoid 
erroneous or prepotent responses within cognitive tasks. It has been previously shown 
that increase in anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) activity is related to level of conflict 
and can predict subsequent increase in lateral prefrontal cortex activity and exertion of 
control (Botvinick et al., 2001). Although the mechanisms described above concern the 
competition between different cognitive processes, it is possible that similar 
mechanisms can be applied to other circumstances where the competition is not 
between two different cognitive processes but between simultaneous emotional and 
cognitive processes that conflict with each other and that have opposing effects on 
behavior. Decision-making is a good field to investigate this possibility.  
Sometimes we find ourselves in situations where strong emotional responses are place 
in competition with the outcome supported by cognition. In these cases, conflict may 
serves as a neural measure indicating whether emotion regulation is necessary to 
override emotional responses and cognitive control processes should be recruited to 
guide behavior in favor of long-term intentions. A variety of decision-making tasks, 
such as moral judgments (Greene et al., 2004), economic decision-making (Sanfey et 
al., 2003) or inter-temporal choices (McClure et al., 2004), have been explored in this 
direction, suggesting that decision-making may include both emotional and cognitive 
aspects and that our choices may be the product of the competition between these two 
processes.  
Furthermore, sometimes behavior can create, not only reflect, people’s attitude. Indeed 
several studies have shown that decisions can alter our preferences (Izuma et al., 2010). 
Difficult decisions which occur when we are forced to choose between equally 
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attractive options may generate a negative emotional states and conflict may serve to 
indicate inconsistency between our attitudes and behavior. In this case cognitive control 
might be recruited to justify and provide coherence to behavior. An example of this can 
be found in studies that investigate changes of preferences and attitudes.  Most of these 
contexts reflect situations that we easily meet in our everyday life. In the next 
paragraphs neural systems that underlie these competitive and regulative mechanisms 
will be discussed.  
 
 
6.3.1 Cognitive control in moral judgment 
Historically, the debate concerning moral decision process was dominated by the 
assumption that maximization of the self-interest is the main force driving human 
behavior. Economists have used this assumption to identify conditions under which 
self-interest leads to the common good. However, it is evident that everyday decisions 
not always follow rational and utilitarian principles but instead present many 
inconsistencies. The two versions of the trolley problem (Thomson, 1986) are good 
instance to highlight this inconsistency:  
 
“A runaway trolley is headed for five people who will be killed if it proceeds on its 
present course. The only way to save them is to hit a switch that will turn the trolley 
onto an alternate set of tracks where it will kill one person instead of five. Should you 
turn the trolley in order to save five people at the expense of one?” 
 
Most people say yes (Greene et al., 2001). 
 
 
 
“A trolley threatens to kill five people. You are standing next to a large stranger on a 
footbridge spanning the tracks, in-between the oncoming trolley and the hapless five. 
This time, the only way to save them is to push this stranger off the bridge and onto the 
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tracks below. He will die if you do this, but his body will stop the trolley from reaching 
the others. Should you save the five others by pushing this stranger to his death?” 
 
Most people say no (Greene et al., 2001). 
 
What is the difference between these two scenarios? Why people are willing to accept 
one action but not the other even if they both bring to the same outcome? Philosophers 
and ethicists have struggled to solve this issue. A possibility to answer these questions is 
considering that often people take decisions not only relying on universal rational 
principles but rather on their intuitions. In many everyday life situations, human 
behavior reflects separate emotional and cognitive aspects. Indeed, recently the role of 
intuitive and emotional processes in human decision making (Damasio, 1994) and 
sociality (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Devine, 1989) has been emphasized, fanning the 
debate about the bases of morally relevant decisions. The inconsistency of human 
decision-making may be the mirror of the existence of separated affective and cognitive 
aspects, and our behavior could be the result of the interaction and the competition 
between these aspects. The investigation of the situations in which cognitive and 
emotional processes countervail may help to understand if and how affective and 
cognitive processes, and their neural substrates, separately influence our behavior. fMRI 
works on moral decision-making provided an attempt to unveil these mechanisms and 
solve out a longstanding debate.  
An account suggested by Greene and Haidt (2002) is that some circumstances, such as 
those presented in the dilemmas above, elicit stronger emotional responses compared to 
others. Flipping a switch can be less emotionally engaging that pushing a worker off a 
bridge to his death. The negative emotional response aroused by this latter action may 
elicit an automatic feeling of wrongness and consequently lead to condemn the action 
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itself. Greene and his colleagues tested this hypothesis using fMRI (Greene et al., 2001) 
while participants were presented with different types of moral dilemmas, with the 
prediction that dilemma requiring the infliction of direct and serious body harm on 
another individual to achieve some good (Personal) compared to dilemma including the 
infliction of harm in a less direct fashion (Impersonal), would evoke greater emotional 
response that influences participant’s moral intuitions. Consistently, contemplation of 
personal moral dilemmas was shown to activate brain regions, such as medial prefrontal 
cortex, previously and strongly associated with emotional processing and social 
cognition (Damasio, 1994; Davidson & Irwin, 1999). On the contrary, activation of the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) consistently associated with cognitive processes 
such as abstract reasoning, working memory and problem solving (Cohen et al., 1997), 
was found while participants were contemplating impersonal dilemmas. Moreover, 
behavioral results showed longer reaction times for “incongruent” trials in which 
participants, contrasted emotional automatic response and accepted moral violations of 
personal dilemmas. Interestingly, these findings suggest a pattern of interference similar 
to that observed in cognitive tasks, such as Stroop task, in which automatic processes 
compete with higher order processes and can influence responses (MacLeod, 1991).    
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Figure 6.4: Mean reaction time by condition and response. Reaction times differed significantly between 
response of “appropriate” and “inappropriate” in the moral-personal condition but not in the moral-
impersonal condition and in non-moral condition (Adapted from Greene et al., 2001). 
 
These findings can find an explanation from an evolutionary point of view. While our 
common ancestors used to live mainly guided by emotions such as anger, jealousy, 
empathy, joy, love and sense of fairness (De Waal, 1996), in apparent absence of 
reasoning, humans developed also abilities of abstract reasoning and problem solving 
that may contrast emotions in order to guide behavior and achieve long term goals. 
Accordingly, the work by Greene and colleagues suggest that in order to accept moral 
violations eliciting strong emotional and automatic response, humans must engage 
higher order cognitive processes, such as cognitive control that lead to the resolution of 
the conflict. To support this hypothesis, Greene and colleagues (2004) tested 
participants with a class of dilemmas that require longer time to answer because the 
negative social-emotional response strongly conflicts with a more abstract, cognitive 
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reasoning. In this kind of dilemmas (e.g., Crying baby dilemma) emotional and 
cognitive factors are in more balanced tension and the answer is more difficult, like in 
the example below: 
 
“Enemy soldiers have taken over your village. They have orders to kill all remaining 
civilians. You and some of your townspeople have sought refuge in the cellar of a large 
house. Outside, you hear the voices of soldiers who have come to search the house for 
valuables. Your baby begins to cry loudly. You cover his mouth to block the sound. If 
you remove your hand from his mouth, his crying will summon the attention of the 
soldiers who will kill you, your child, and the others hiding out in the cellar. To save 
yourself and the others, you must smother your child to death. 
Is it appropriate for you to smother your child in order to save yourself and the other 
people?” 
 
Providing more direct evidence for the emotion-cognition competition, results showed 
that difficult dilemmas elicit activity in both emotional and cognitive brain areas. 
Moreover, the contemplation of difficult compared to easy moral dilemma exhibited 
greater activation of anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), previously associated with 
detection of cognitive conflict (Botvinick et al., 2001; Carter et al., 1998) as well as 
greater activation of anterior DLPFC, confirming that processes that compete with 
social-emotional responses rely on abstract reasoning and cognitive control. These 
findings are consistent with a model in which a combination of intuitive/affective and 
conscious/rational mechanisms operates to produce moral judgment.  
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Figure 6.5: Difficult vs. easy personal moral judgments. Here are indicated the selected brain regions 
exhibiting significantly greater activation for difficult as compared to easy moral-personal dilemmas: 
Anterior and posterior ACC (BA 32, BA 23/31), precuneus (BA 7), right and left middle frontal gyrus 
(BA 10/46). (Adapted from Greene et al., 2004) 
 
In addition, it has been proposed that within the context of moral reasoning task, 
cognitive processes are associated with a certain kind of behavioral outcomes that favor 
utilitarian decisions in order to achieve the greater goods, in terms of costs-benefits 
analysis. Accordingly, authors provided further evidence that different type of moral 
judgment engage functionally distinct brain systems. Activity in brain regions 
associated to cognitive control, particularly DLPFC was found to precede and to be 
directly related to utilitarian judgments compared to non-utilitarian, even when this 
competes with a strong negative response to the prospect of harming another individual. 
These data reveal that neural activity in classically cognitive brain regions predicts a 
particular type of moral judgment behavior, thus providing strong support for the view 
that both cognitive and emotional processes play crucial and sometimes mutually 
competitive roles in moral decision-making.  
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Rather than a totally rationalist (Kohlberg, 1969) or a totally emotive (Haidt, 2001) 
view, these findings support the conclusion that moral judgment come from the 
interaction of both emotion and cognition (Greene & Haidt, 2002) and is the by-product 
of the resolution of the conflict between these two crucial processes. This model has 
been extended also to other field of decision-making in which emotion and cognition 
are important aspects. Works from neuro-economics and inter-temporal choices 
provided parallel findings, supporting the idea of a dual-process model of decision-
making. Indeed, competition between emotional and cognitive processes has also been 
proposed to explain behavior deviating from the usual idea of economic rationality. 
There is evidence that, also in an ultimatum game (Thaler, 1988) context, behavior is 
guided by emotional as well as cognitive processes that come into conflict. In this kind 
of task people are provided of an amount of money. The proposer must make an offer 
and the responder may either accept or reject. If the offer is accepted the two players 
split the money, if the offer is rejected nobody take the money.  According to economic 
rationality accepting any offer and earning money should be always the best option. 
Nevertheless people not always do so and when the offer is unfair they tend to reject it 
(Güth et al., 1982, Thaler, 1988). Results from fMRI investigations (Sanfey et al., 2003) 
showed that unfair offers evoke activity in the insula, a limbic brain region associated to 
negative emotions (Calder et al., 2001). Moreover, similar to the work of Greene in 
moral judgment, unfair offers were also tied to activity in prefrontal regions such as 
ACC and DLPFC and, when activity in emotional regions was greater, responders 
tended to reject unfair offers significantly more than when activity was greater in 
DLPFC. Other example of the same mechanisms is provided by fMRI studies in inter-
temporal choices (McClure et al., 2004), where people choose between different 
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rewards delivered at different time delays. In this kind of task impulsive processes and 
cognitive appraisal processes go into competition with each other.  According to the 
dual-process theory, it has been shown that cognitive regions such as lateral prefrontal 
cortex are implicated in deciding in any inter-temporal choices, whereas the emotional 
system and regions such as ventromedial prefrontal cortex and posterior cingulate 
cortex are preferentially implicated by the immediately available rewards. Moreover, 
relative activity in the emotional and cognitive system correlated with participants 
behaviors.  
In summary, parallel findings from different instances of decision-making are consistent 
with the view that a variety of human behaviors and decisions are determined by the 
interaction and sometimes the competition between emotional and cognitive systems. 
Neuroimaging techniques have been demonstrated to be very useful in tracking the 
neural activity of specific brain area in normal human subject while they are performing 
cognitive tasks. fMRI for instance provides crucial information on the location and the 
timing of brain activity, nevertheless it has also important limitations. The most 
important of these limitations is that it is only correlative and does not allow 
establishing the causality of the relationship between a pattern of brain activity and a 
particular psychological function of behavior. Even though the neuroimaging findings 
reported above shed light on and support the engagement of emotional and cognitive 
processes in decision-making, many questions remain unanswered.  It is still not clear 
for example how the competition is regulated and evidence of a causal relationship 
between dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and exertion, regulative control is still lacking.  
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6.3.2 Cognitive control and rationalization in change of preferences  
It has been previously shown that emotion and cognition interact in shaping our 
decisions and behaviors. On the contrary, it is also possible that sometimes behavior can 
create and not only reflect people’s attitudes and emotional and cognitive aspects 
interact at later stages. Indeed, several studies highlight how decisions can alter, not 
only follow, individuals’ preferences (Izuma et al., 2010). Changing preferences and 
opinions is characteristic of human behavior. In everyday life people often do or say 
things that contradict their prior belief (Aronson et al., 1995). How and why this happen 
has fascinated psychologists for years. Typically individuals change their attitude a 
posteriori to conform to contradicting behavior they were engaged in. Adjusting 
preferences to support prior decisions is a phenomenon that has been deeply explained 
by the Cognitive Dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957). Following this theory, cognitive 
dissonance is a psychological discomfort caused by holding simultaneously conflicting 
cognitions, such as ideas, beliefs, values or emotional reactions. Accordingly, 
experimental evidence showed that cognitive dissonance is associated to negative affect 
and autonomic arousal (Critchley, 2005). It is noteworthy that coherence is an important 
aspect of human well-being and it may constitute for people a motivational drive to 
reduce dissonance. Thus, change of preferences serves to specifically reduce a negative 
affect generated by the inconsistency between what we think and what we do and is 
crucial to restore consonance (Elliot & Devine, 1983; Losch & Cacioppo, 1990). 
Furthermore, this intriguing effect has been demonstrated not only in adults but also in 
children and monkey (Egan et al., 2007), suggesting that cognitive dissonance and 
reduction processes find their bases in developmentally and evolutionary constrained 
systems.  
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A typical example of dissonance is the conflict felt by a smoker person that keeps on 
smoking although he/she knows that is unhealthy. Engaging in dissonance reduction 
processes, this person may change his/her feelings about cigarettes to justify behavior. 
In this perspective, cognitive dissonance is an important concept that can be applied in a 
wide range of circumstances, such as decision-making, prejudice, deception and politics 
to explain and predict human behavior.  
Consequences of such a behavior have been examined in the past by means of different 
paradigm like the induce-compliance paradigm (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959) or the 
free-choice paradigm (Brehm, 1956) and their variants. In the induced-compliance 
paradigm used in experimental setting usually participants are required to write counter-
attitudinal essay and they are paid varying amounts of money for writing essay 
expressing opinions contrary to their own. People paid only a small amount of money 
have less external justification for their inconsistency and must produce internal 
justification in order to reduce the high degree of dissonance that they are experiencing.  
In the free-choice paradigm individuals rate the attractiveness of a variety of items. 
They are given a choice between two items that they have rated as equally attractive. 
Thus, both options have positive and negative aspects. This choice is thought to induce 
a negative affect because decision to avoid the rejected alternative conflicts with the 
many positive aspects the alternative has. After making the choice subjects are asked to 
re rank all items. Typically, items that they have chosen are judged as more attractive 
and items they have rejected as less attractive: subjects have changed their attitudes to 
fit with their choice. Consistently, Sharot and colleagues (2009) used a free-choice 
paradigm in an fMRI study demonstrating that after making a choice, activity in caudate 
nucleus, brain regions associated to reward processing, expectation and learning 
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(Delgado,  2007), changes to reflect the new evaluation of the alternatives, by 
increasing for the chosen alternative and decreasing for the rejected one. Similarly, 
another experiment by Izuma and colleagues (2010) found that the mere act of making a 
choice can modulate self report preferences as well as its neural representation in 
striatum activity. Thus, recently interest in the neural substrates of cognitive dissonance 
has been increasing.   Neuroimaging and neurophysiologic techniques have been used to 
investigate the neural processes implicated in attitude changes, confirming the original 
idea of Festinger (1957) according to which attitude change is driven by the conflict. 
Accordingly, the action – based model (Harmon-Jones et al., 1996) of cognitive 
dissonance posits that conflict between cognitions evokes an aversive state because it 
potentially interferes with unconflicted, effective, goal-driven action and explicitly 
predicts involvement of dACC in cognitive dissonance. Following this model, 
dissonance should evoke activity in ACC as it is a structure strongly associated to 
detection of a variety of cognitive conflicts. Indeed ACC has been found to be involved 
in conflict between active but incompatible streams of information processing 
(VanVeen & Carter, 2006), in monitoring the occurrence of errors or the presence of 
response conflict (Carter et al., 1998), conflict in moral decision making (Greene et al., 
2001, 2004) and when behavior conflicts with self-concept (Amodio & Frith , 2006). 
fMRI studies support the link between ACC and cognitive dissonance. For instance, 
Van Veen and colleagues (2009) scanned participants in fMRI while they argued that 
the uncomfortable scanner environment was nevertheless a pleasant experience. Results 
showed that cognitive dissonance engaged the dorsal ACC and anterior insula, 
previously associated with negative affect and autonomic arousal (Critchley 2005; 
Eisenberger et al., 2003), suggesting these regions to be responsible for representing or 
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triggering the negative affect and related autonomic arousal associated with the 
dissonance. Interestingly, their results also showed that magnitude of conflict was 
related to dACC activity and that this was predictive of subsequent attitude change. 
Activation of dACC was also found in another similar experiment by Izuma and 
colleagues (2010), while participants were engaged in an induce-compliance paradigm. 
These results confirm the importance of this region in cognitive dissonance and expand 
on those findings concerning ACC as candidate region in conflict monitoring. 
 
            
 
Figure 6.6: This figure shows the significant correlation between activity in ACC and the degree of 
cognitive dissonance, during preference task. (Adapted from Izuma et al., 2010) 
 
One dissonance is aroused and conflict is detected inconsistency reduction processes 
should occur in order to restore consonance and regulate negative affective state. 
Consistently, lateral prefrontal cortex activity has been reported to contribute to changes 
in preferences. In addition to ACC, the work of Izuma and colleagues reported 
increased activity of DLPFC, regions previously associated to implementation of 
cognitive control (MacDonald et al 2000) and conflict resolution (Van Veen & Carter, 
2006), especially in reduction of dissonance. Interestingly, in another study (Harmon-
Jones et al., 2008) EEG biofeedback training was used to manipulate lateral prefrontal 
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activity after subjects made difficult decisions. Afterwards change of attitudes was 
measured. Results indicated that lateral prefrontal cortex was causally involved in 
change of preferences and that the activation of this region affected the extent of this 
change.  Taken together all these data suggest that cognitive dissonance and subsequent 
reduction recruit the same neural network underlying conflict monitoring and 
implementation of control, already shown in difficult decisions such as moral judgment. 
Moreover they provide further evidence of the existence of top-down cognitive 
mechanisms that modulate regulate emotional aspects and values in our choices.  
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Introduction to experiments Four and Five  
In this chapter we reported evidence of that cognitive and emotional processes work in 
interactive relationship. Taken together previous studies suggest that cognition is 
necessary to regulate affective processes. Indeed, if the ability to automatically respond 
to emotional relevant stimuli is evolutionary crucial, equally important is the ability to 
control these emotional responses, thereby moderating their influence on behavior. 
Cooperation between reason and emotion contributes to form behavior and brings our 
actions into line with enduring concerns, motivating and sustaining actions in order to 
achieve long terms goals. Instances of these mechanisms derive from emotion 
regulation as well as decision-making studies. Of particular interest is the parallel 
between forms of “cold” cognitive control and cognitive control of emotion that 
emerged from previous literature. Evidence of an overlap of neural networks underlying 
both these mechanisms has been reported. Studies on emotion regulation showed that 
regulative strategies such as cognitive change involve increased activation in the regions 
of lateral PFC and medial PFC, essential for working memory and cognitive control 
and, decreased activation in medial OFC and amygdala, two critical regions for emotion 
processing. Similar examples are provided by works on decision-making suggesting that 
both affective and cognitive processes are implicated in forming decisions and 
preferences. Accordingly, studies on moral judgments reported that more emotionally 
engaging moral dilemmas (Personal dilemmas) evoke greater activity of VMPFC 
whereas response to moral dilemmas that engage emotion to a lower  extent (Impersonal 
dilemmas) fail to activate this region. Moreover, fMRI studies supported the notion of 
emotion-cognition competition by indicating that difficult dilemmas elicit activity in 
ACC and DLPFC, regions related to cognitive conflict and executive control. In 
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addition, greater activation of DLPFC was necessary to accept moral violations, 
confirming a critical role of the cognitive region in regulating affective processing. 
Similar competitive mechanisms are reported also in forming preferences post 
decisions. There is evidence that change of preferences after difficult decisions is driven 
by the conflict between attitudes and behavior, as reflected by activation of ACC and 
DLPFC in cognitive dissonance paradigms.  
In the previous chapter examples have been provided for the interactive and sometimes 
competitive relationship between emotion and cognition, as critical in shaping human 
behavior. Nevertheless, although correlative evidence of lateral prefrontal cortex 
activity and regulative processes is well documented, causal evidence is still lacking. In 
the next two chapter of this thesis two experimental works aimed at filling this lack will 
be reported. In particular the issue of the role of DLPFC in resolution of conflict will be 
addressed. 
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CHAPTER 7 - EXPERIMENT FOUR  
Disrupting dorsolateral prefrontal cortex influences moral decisions 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The relationship between emotion and moral judgment has inspired philosophical 
disputes for decades, arriving to draw attention of researchers in others fields like 
cognitive psychology and neurosciences. Rationalist model has long been dominating in 
moral psychology sustaining the role of reasoning as the main source of moral judgment 
(Kohlberg, 1969). The intuitionist model, on the contrary, emphasizes the role of 
emotion, underlying the automatic, fast and effortless aspects of moral judgment 
(Harrison, 1967). According to this model, the moral intuition would come first in time 
and therefore it would constitute the key source behind morality. The first displays of 
the implication of emotion in moral judgment come from behavioral studies. Schnall 
and colleagues (2008), for instance, showed that moral opinions can be modulated by 
emotion like disgust. The findings from four experiments demonstrated that disgust 
effects increase severity of judgments and make moral violation less acceptable, even if 
the action did not raise disgust per se. These studies demonstrated the affective context 
to be important. Results from another work showed that participants reported more 
positive mood and more utilitarian responses to moral dilemmas after watching a funny 
video clip compared to a neutral one (Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006). All these studies 
proved that not only emotional response evoked by the moral stimuli but also the 
affective mood and context could be critical in guiding the judgment, nevertheless they 
fail in clarifying at which precise point emotion has a role in moral psychology (Haidt, 
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2001). Neuropsychology helped to unveil connections between (impaired) emotional 
processing and moral behavior, emphasizing the crucial role of neural regions 
implicated in affective and emotional processing, such as ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
(VMPFC), in moral decision-making. It has been reported that lesions of this area 
during childhood impair the correct development of moral sense and ethical judgment 
(Anderson et al., 1999). Moreover, patients with damage on the VMPFC usually  
exhibit abnormal moral conduct and lack of concern for moral and social rules (Bechara 
et al., 2005; Moll et al., 2005). Ciaramelli and colleagues (2007) presented patients with 
focal lesions in VMPFC and healthy controls with different types of moral dilemmas 
and with non moral dilemmas. In spite of a preserved general moral knowledge and 
ability to reason, patients revealed a selective deficit only for dilemmas that required 
high emotional engagement (e.g., personal moral dilemmas). Similarly, Koenigs and co-
workers (2007) found that VMPFC patients show an abnormally high rate of utilitarian 
judgment in moral dilemmas associated with high emotional conflict. These findings are 
in accordance with a model in which a combination of intuitive/affective and 
conscious/rational mechanisms operates to produce moral judgment. 
The first attempt to combine the involvement of both emotion and cognition in moral 
judgment is represented by the social intuitionist model (Haidt, 2001),which  proposes 
that moral judgment is mainly driven by automatic quick intuition, then followed by 
reasoning processes necessary to construct  justifications and affect other’s opinions.  
This model is also in accordance with studies on attitude change which indicated that 
brain regions implicated in cognitive control are necessary to question our own attitudes 
and believes (Harmon-Jones et al., 2008; Izuma et al., 2010).  
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Accordingly, recent neuroimaging findings provide critical clarification of the neural 
substrates underlying moral decision-making and converge toward the idea that both 
emotion and cognition are crucially relevant for moral decision-making. Affective 
regions, such as medial prefrontal cortex, have been proposed to be responsible for 
mediating strong negative emotional responses to moral violations, which prevent 
individuals from implementing such morally impermissible actions (Greene & Haidt, 
2002). Greene and co-workers (2001) tested participants in fMRI scanner, comparing 
responses of two types of moral dilemmas varying in emotional engagement (footbridge 
vs. trolley dilemma) so that, personal dilemmas, requiring the infliction of direct and 
serious body harm on another individual to achieve some good were compared to 
impersonal dilemmas, also including the infliction of harm but in a less direct fashion. 
Consistently, data showed strong activation of areas of VMPFC, previously associated 
with social and emotional processes (Damasio, 1994; Moll, 2002) during contemplation 
of personal but not impersonal moral violations. Of interest were also behavioral results, 
showing that the condemnation of moral violations occurred relatively fast, while 
acceptance of them required longer time. Moreover, participants were significantly 
slower in trials in which the response was incongruent with emotional responses (e.g., 
saying “appropriate” to a dilemma such as the footbridge dilemma) relative to trials in 
which the two were congruent. This pattern was present only within personal moral 
dilemmas, whereas there was no such difference in response time during impersonal 
moral dilemmas. These behavioral patterns have been paralleled to patterns of 
behavioral interference observed in cognitive tasks in which automatic processes can 
influence responses, such as the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935). This interference effect in 
the behavioral data strongly suggests that the increased emotional response generated by 
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the moral-personal dilemmas has an effective influence on and is not merely incidental 
to moral judgment. Authors assumed that certain kind of moral dilemmas, in which 
emotional and cognitional factors are into balanced contrast, are more difficult to 
answer compared to others. This is because they generate a conflict between two 
competitive processes that needs to be resolved in order to achieve a response. In 
particular, in order to accept a moral personal violation, individuals need to override an 
automatic and strong emotional response, which requires a cognitive control process, 
meant as the ability to guide attention, thoughts and actions along with our aims and 
intentions (Cohen et al., 1990). A number of studies on regulation of emotion showed 
that prefrontal regions such as lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) and anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC) are implicated in cognitive control but that they are dissociable at the 
level of their function. ACC has been shown to be implicated in detection and 
monitoring of conflict while DLPFC in top-down control necessary for the resolution of 
the conflict (McDonald et al., 2000; Botvinick et al., 2001; Yeung et al., 2006). 
Additional studies on emotion-cognition competition in decision-making (McClure et 
al., 2004; Sanfey et al., 2003) and emotion regulation (Ochsner et al., 2002, 2004) 
reported activation of ACC to correlate with degree of conflict between emotional and 
cognitive responses and to predict subsequent activation of DLPFC. With the 
hypothesis that moral judgment as well as other kinds of decision-making derives from 
competitive relationship between affective and cognitive processes, Greene and 
colleagues (2004) tested participants in the scanner (fMRI) while responding to a class 
of high conflict moral dilemmas like the Crying baby dilemma (High conflict, Koenigs 
et al., 2007).  
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This kind of dilemmas has a particular structure in which one must incur in a personal 
moral violation (smother the baby) in order to maximize aggregate welfare (save the 
most lives) (Greene et al., 2004). Responding to this type of dilemmas is difficult and 
requires longer time because of the competition between the negative emotional states 
automatically rose by the harmful action and the abstract and cognitive reasoning on the 
number of saved lives. Consistent with the hypothesis, the results showed increased 
activity in ACC, DLPFC (BA 10/46) and inferior parietal lobes (BA 40/39), previously 
associated with detection and resolution of cognitive conflict. In addition, a strong 
relationship between utilitarian behavior and cognitive processes was found. 
Specifically, data showed greater activity in DLPFC (BA 10) in accepting violation 
(utilitarian responses) compared to condemning it (non utilitarian responses). An 
account for this pattern of activity may be that two cognitive processes occur during 
utilitarian judgments:  abstract reasoning on the computation of costs and benefits of an 
action and cognitive control process aimed at overcoming the imminent emotional 
response. Nevertheless, since these results are only correlative they are tenuous and 
cannot account for a causative relationship between utilitarian behavior and cognitive 
processes. In this direction, Pizzarro and colleagues (2003) altered judgments on moral 
responsibility instructing participants to give “intuitive” or “rational” responses, while 
Valdesolo and DeSteno (2007) used a cognitive load paradigm to demonstrate that 
control processes are involved in rationalization of unfair behavior. More recently, 
behavioral data showed that cognitive manipulations during a moral task can selectively 
interfere with utilitarian behavior (Greene et al., 2008). These authors compared 
performance of moral judgment of participants in load and control conditions. The 
“Load” condition required to answer moral dilemmas while a stream of numbers 
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scrolled across the screen and to hit a button each time the number 5 was detected.  
Longer Reaction Times for utilitarian answers were shown only in participants in the 
load condition, but not in controls. As behavioral, these results cannot state an effective 
causative relationship between utilitarian moral decisions and cognitive processes. We 
suggest that interfering with cognitive processes during moral decision would provide 
an effective evidence of the causative link between activity in cognitive regions, such as 
DLPFC, and utilitarian behavior.  
In the current study we used Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) to disrupt 
activity in right DLPFC while participants responded to high conflict moral personal 
dilemmas and impersonal dilemmas. Previous studies showed low-frequency repetitive 
TMS on this region to be effective in modulating behavioral responses (Knoch et al., 
2006, 2009). We hypothesized that DLPFC is crucial to override emotional automatic 
response raised by personal moral dilemmas and that its activity is causally related to 
utilitarian behavior. Thus, by disrupting activity of this regions by means of TMS 
during contemplation of moral dilemmas we expected: 1) a general decrease of the 
percentage of utilitarian responses (approval of moral violations) only in personal 
dilemmas that engage emotion-cognition conflict in greater extent compared to 
impersonal ones and, 2) an increase of response times in accepting personal violations 
compared to impersonal. We suggest this increase in RT to be a further display of 
conflict between emotional and cognitive processes.  
Such an effect could be considered as a direct evidence of causality between activity of 
cognitive brain regions and utilitarian behavior. Moreover, it would allow ruling out the 
hypothesis of a mere interference of cognitive process in moral judgment and assigning 
them a specific role in forming moral behavior.  
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7.2 Methods and Materials  
 
Participants 
18 healthy volunteers (13 females; mean age = 25.7, range: 20-34; mean years of 
education = 15.2, range: 8-18), recruited through posted advertisements, participated in 
the experiment. Participants were not taking psychoactive medication, and they were 
free of current or past psychiatric or neurological illness as determined by history. None 
of the participants had contraindications to brain stimulation. All were naïves to TMS 
effects and the nature of the experiment, and they were not explicitly informed of the 
experimental variable tested. All participants gave informed written consent before 
entering the study and they were refunded of 50 euro for their participation before 
leaving the lab. The experiment was performed in accordance with the ethical standards 
laid down in the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki, and was approved by the Ethical 
Committee of the Department of Psychology, University of Bologna.  
 
Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) 
The TMS is a neurophysiologic technique that allows stimulating the nervous system in 
a non-invasive way. The generation of transient magnetic fields at a stimulator coil to 
induce electric fields produces behavioral and/or physiological reversible effects upon 
neural tissue (Pascual-Leone et al., 1999, 2000; Walsh & Cowey, 2000). 
Participants received both sham and real cTB stimulation over the right dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (Talairach coordinates x = +28, y = +49, z = +6, corresponding 
Brodmann’s Area 10). The cTBS was performed following the standard procedures: 
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burst of three TMS pulses delivered at 50 Hz, with each train repeated every 200 ms 
(5Hz) were administered. The application of trains was continuous and it lasted 40 
seconds (600 pulses total). The intensity of stimulation was at 80% of active motor 
threshold (aMT) defined as the minimum single pulse intensity required to produce a 
MEP of greater than 200 µV on more than five out of ten trials from the contralateral 
FDI muscle while the subject was maintaining a voluntary contraction of about 20% of 
maximum using visual feedback (Huang et al., 2005).  
The cTBS was administered positioning the coil tangentially to the stimulated area 
(Real-cTBS) or at 90° with no current in the brain (Sham-cTBS). After the stimulations, 
the participant remained relaxed for 6 minutes before beginning the experimental task. 
The region of stimulation was identified on each participant’s scalp with the SoftTaxic 
Navigator system (Electro Medical Systems, Bologna, Italy). Skull landmarks (nasion, 
inion and two preauricular points) and about 100 points providing a uniform 
representation of the scalp were digitized by means of a Polaris Vicra digitizer 
(Northern Digital Inc, Ontario, Canada). Talairach coordinates were automatically 
estimated by the SofTaxic Navigator from an MRI-constructed stereotaxic template.  
 
Procedure 
Once arrived at the lab, the participant was given few minutes to sit, read and sign the 
informed consent and the TMS exclusion/contraindication questionnaire. After 
receiving information about the stimulation and the task, the subject was trained on a 
practice session with an example of a moral dilemma.  
Once the active motor threshold (aMT) was defined and the region of stimulation was 
identified, the subject was ready to go through the experimental session. The 
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experiment was divided in two identical sessions, which were two hours delayed from 
each other. They consisted of receiving Real-cTBS or Sham-cTBS and performing the 
task. Before stimulations the participant relaxed about 10-15 minutes. Both sessions 
lasted approximately one hour. The order in which stimulation was delivered was 
counterbalanced across participants. The participants performed the same task twice, 
once in the first session and once in the second session, after both stimulations. 
In both sessions, the task consisted of expressing approval or disapproval for moral 
dilemmas presented on a computer screen, moving through two screens describing the 
scenarios and a third screen presenting the following question:  “Is it morally acceptable 
for Person X to perform Action Y in order to achieve goal Z? Participants indicated 
their choice by pushing one of two buttons (Yes/No) and had one minute time limit to 
read the scenario and answer the question. We used two sets of dilemmas in the 
experiment: set A and set B. In each experimental session, subjects responded to one set 
(either A or B) composed of 12 dilemmas, which included 6 personal dilemmas, 
designed as “high conflict dilemmas” by Koenigs and colleagues (2007) and 6 
impersonal dilemmas, all randomly presented. The order in which the sets were 
presented was counterbalanced across sessions. In all high-conflict dilemmas the agent 
must decide whether to actively harm one person in order to save the lives of several 
people. Within this constraint, the structure of these dilemmas varied. Thus, only the 
high conflict dilemmas are eligible for studying the difference between utilitarian and 
non-utilitarian responses and only in this kind of dilemma the affirmative answer “Yes” 
corresponds to a utilitarian response. 
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An example of high-conflict dilemmas is the Crying baby dilemma:  
Enemy soldiers have taken over your village. They have orders to kill all remaining 
civilians. You and some of your townspeople have sought refuge in the cellar of a large 
house. Outside you hear the voices of soldiers who have come to search the house for 
valuables. 
Your baby begins to cry loudly. You cover his mouth to block the sound. If you remove 
your hand from his mouth his crying will summon the attention of the soldiers who will 
kill you, your child, and the others hiding out in the cellar. To save yourself and the 
others you must smother your child to death. 
Is it morally acceptable for you to smother your child in order to save yourself and the 
other townspeople? 
 
An example of impersonal dilemmas is the Trolley dilemma (Thompson, 1986), in 
which there is only a deflection of an existing threat and the agent cannot actively harm 
anyone: 
 
You are at the wheel of a runaway trolley quickly approaching a fork in the tracks. On 
the tracks extending to the left is a group of five railway workmen. On the tracks 
extending to the right is a single railway workman. 
If you to do nothing the trolley will proceed to the left, causing the deaths of the five 
workmen. The only way to avoid the deaths of these workmen is to hit a switch on your 
dashboard that will cause the trolley to proceed to the right, causing the death of the 
single workman. 
Is it morally acceptable for you to hit the switch in order to avoid the deaths of the five 
workmen? 
 
During the task we recorded reaction times (ms) of approval and disapproval of moral 
violations, in both high conflict personal dilemmas and impersonal dilemmas, and the 
number of times the subjects accepted moral violations. This latter measure was 
expressed by percentage (%). To ensure that the stimulation did not interfere with the 
understanding of the task, all subjects read the instructions before that any stimulation 
occurred. The order of conditions was counterbalanced across participants, such that 
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subjects were randomly assigned to one of four treatments: 1) Sham with Set A, two 
hour wait, then cTBS with set B; 2) cTBS with set A, two hour wait, then Sham with 
Set B or Sham with Set B, two hour wait, then cTBS with Set A or cTBS with Set B, 
two hour wait, then Sham with Set A. 
At the end of the second session of the experiment, the participant was required to fill 
out some questionnaires and an exit form, giving his/her opinion about the task and rank 
the discomfort due to the stimulation.  Subjects were then debriefed, paid and thanked.  
 
Questionnaires 
Participants were required to complete the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 
2005) which was designed to assess the specific cognitive ability to suppress an 
intuitive and spontaneous wrong answer in favor of a reflective and deliberative right 
answer. Namely, this questionnaire gives a measure of a person’s tendency to 
effectively use his cognitive reasoning ability to override, when necessary, his brain’s 
reflexive (and usually impulsive) decision making center. Moreover, we asked the 
participant to fill out the Need for Cognition scale (NfCs, Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) 
which was designed to assess the tendency to engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive 
endeavors. This questionnaire has also been shown to predict deontological/utilitarian 
moral judgments (Bartels, 2008). Lastly, we gathered some further information about 
social and economic attitudes of the participants, his/her momentary mood and his/her 
religious belief. 
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7.3 Results 
We performed analysis on two variables: 1- Reaction time (RT) of approval (Yes) and 
disapproval (No) responses to high conflict personal moral dilemma and impersonal 
moral dilemmas and 2- Percentage of approval of moral violations in both type of 
dilemmas.  
Following our hypothesis of a causal role of DLPFC in utilitarian moral judgment, we 
expected an increase of reaction time and a decrease in the percentage of utilitarian 
responses (yes) to high conflict personal dilemmas after cTBS compared to Sham 
stimulation. Notably, only the approval (namely a “Yes” response) of violation to high 
conflict personal but not impersonal dilemmas corresponds to utilitarian judgments, thus 
only the modulation of responses to this kind of dilemmas is able to show a difference 
between utilitarian and non utilitarian responses. Analyses for high conflict personal 
and impersonal dilemmas were then conducted separately. Moreover, data were 
trimmed based on RT to within two SDs of the group mean. Analysis included all 18 
participating subjects.  
 
Response Time (RT) - A 2 (Stimulation: Sham vs. cTBS) x 2 (Response: Yes vs. No) 
repeated measure ANOVA conducted on RTs for approval (Yes), and disapproval (No) 
of high conflict personal moral dilemmas yielded only a marginally significant 
interaction between Stimulation and Response [F(1, 17) = 3, 62; p = 0.06], revealing 
that participants were  slower in approving personal moral violations (Yes) after cTBS 
compared to Sham stimulation (6989 ms vs. 5898 ms, p < .05). This pattern was not 
present for disapproval (No responses) of personal moral violations, so that response 
time for “No” did not vary significantly across cTBS and Sham stimulation (5999 ms 
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vs. 6396 ms, p = .68). No other significant main effects of stimulation and response 
emerged.  
For completeness, even though we predicted no variation of response pattern on 
impersonal moral dilemmas, we conducted the same analysis on RTs for approval and 
disapproval of impersonal moral violations. The same ANOVA as before yielded only a 
significant main effect of response [F (1, 17) = 9.43; p < .01], showing significantly 
faster response time for approval of impersonal moral violations, compared to 
disapproval (5376 ms vs. 6482 ms, p <.01). Crucially for our purpose, analysis on 
impersonal moral dilemmas showed no significant or close to significance interaction 
Stimulation x Response [F (1, 17) = 2. 85; p = .60].  
These results are consistent with the hypothesis and replicate findings reported by 
Greene and colleagues (2008), which showed that utilitarian responses under cognitive 
load were slower compared to non utilitarian responses in the same condition.  
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Figure 7.1 Upper panel: Reaction time (ms) for approval (YES) and disapproval (NO) of Personal moral 
violations after Sham and cTBS stimulation. Lower panel: Reaction time (ms) for approval (YES) and 
disapproval (NO) of Impersonal moral violations after Sham and cTBS stimulation.  
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We conducted a further analysis only on high conflict personal dilemmas to explore the 
possibility that pattern of RT varies systematically among participants based on their 
tendency to be utilitarian. We calculated the median of percentage of utilitarian 
responses to high conflict personal dilemmas in Sham condition, so that we obtained 
two equal groups of participants considered as Low- and High- utilitarian. The Low-
utilitarian participants averaged 33% of utilitarian responses and High-utilitarian 73%. 
Both groups showed the same pattern on RT of Yes responses. Namely, both low- and 
high-utilitarian participants were slower in approving personal moral violations after 
cTBS than after Sham stimulation (Low-utilitarian: 7335 vs. 6220 ms; High-utilitarian: 
6642 vs. 5576 ms, respectively), whereas they remained relatively stable in the No 
responses (Low-utilitarian: 5756 vs. 5752 ms; High-utilitarian: 6242 vs. 7041 ms). 
Nevertheless, due to the small number of subjects in each group, the interaction 
Stimulation x Response in both groups did not reach significance (p=.22). Moreover, 
data showed that low-utilitarian group had a general tendency to be slower in approval 
of the high conflict personal violations and faster in disapproval of them, compared to 
participants in the high-utilitarian group, although this  difference did not reach 
significance (Yes: 6778 ms vs. 6109 ms; No: 5754 ms vs. 6642 ms; both p=.15). 
 
Percentage of approval responses (Yes) - As before, analyses on percentage of 
approval responses (Yes) for personal and impersonal dilemma were conducted 
separately. No significant difference was shown for both type of dilemmas, even if there 
was a tendency to decrease the percentage of approvals (Yes) after cTBS stimulation, 
compared to Sham, in high conflict personal dilemmas but not in impersonal ones 
(Personal: 45% vs. 53%; p=.09, one-tailed; Impersonal: 54% vs. 57%; p=.16, one-
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tailed).Therefore, we considered the possibility that participants could be differently 
affected by the stimulation based on their tendency to give utilitarian judgments to high 
conflict personal moral dilemmas. Thus, we conducted a 2 (Stimulation: Sham vs. 
cTBS) x 2 (Group: Low- vs. High-utilitarian) ANOVA on the percentage of approval 
(Yes) of violation only in high conflict personal dilemmas. Interestingly, the analysis 
yielded a significant Stimulation x Group interaction [F (1, 17) = 5. 77; p= .02]. Post 
hoc tests showed a significant decrease of Yes responses (utilitarian) in cTBS condition 
compared to Sham only in high utilitarian participants  (72% vs. 53%, p=.01), whereas 
Low-utilitarian participants remained stable across conditions (37% vs. 32%, p= .58). 
However, we are cautious in interpreting this latter result, as it may simply reflect a 
“regression toward the mean” effect, due to the fact that high utilitarian participants 
show higher percentage of yes responses in the sham condition.  Nevertheless, it should 
be considered that Low utilitarian participants did not show any increase of yes 
responses, as one may expect for a regression toward the mean effect. 
In sum, these results are consistent with our initial hypothesis. As expected, disrupting 
activity in DLPFC by means of cTBS produced longer responses time of utilitarian but 
not non utilitarian judgments only in high conflict personal dilemmas. Moreover, a 
tendency to decrease percentage of utilitarian responses after cTBS but not after Sham 
stimulation was present. Taken together these results may be considered as a valid 
evidence of a crucial role of DLPFC in utilitarian moral judgment. 
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7.4 Discussion  
In this study we investigated the role of areas associated with cognitive control and 
reasoning in moral decision-making. We used repetitive transcranial magnetic 
stimulation (TMS) to transiently disrupt neural activity in right DLPFC immediately 
before participants responded to personal and impersonal moral dilemmas (off-line 
stimulation). As for personal dilemmas, we used "high conflict" dilemmas (Koenigs et 
al., 2007) in which the conflict between emotional engagement and total amount of 
welfare were balanced. These dilemmas are difficult to respond, because no widely 
accepted formal moral principle exists that establishes a priori what behavior is 
appropriate in these circumstances. 
We hypothesized DLPFC to be crucial in resolution of emotion-cognition conflict and 
to be causally associated with utilitarian moral judgment. Thus, we expected a decrease 
of percentage of utilitarian responses after cTBS stimulation over DLPFC compared to 
sham stimulation. Moreover, as a display of the greater cognitive effort required to 
achieve utilitarian responses, we expected increase of time responses after cTBS 
compared to sham stimulation when participants approved high conflict moral 
violations. According to our initial hypothesis, we found that after cTBS on DLPFC 
participants were slower to accept high conflict moral violation compared to sham 
stimulation. No similar pattern was found for impersonal moral dilemmas which are not 
associated with competition between emotion and cognition. We consider these results 
as a further evidence of an interaction of emotion and cognitive processes in moral 
psychology.   
The debate on the role of emotion and cognitive processes in moral psychology is still a 
very heated debate. While proponents of the rationalist view indicate the source of 
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moral judgment in cognition, the supporters of the intuition model defend the automatic 
and effortless aspects of a moral decision. Results from different disciplines have begun 
to converge on the idea that both emotions and cognition vested with an important role. 
As noted by Heubner and colleagues (2009), we cannot deny that moral judgment has 
predominant emotional aspects: violating a moral norm, for instance, is emotionally 
taxing per se. Emotions, such as guilt or embarrassment, are often evoked by moral 
violations (Rozin et al., 1999). Behavioral studies on disgust showed that emotional 
contexts are able to modulate our judgment about moral issues. Neuropsychological 
studies showed that psychopaths who lack feelings of guilt or embarrassment fail to 
refrain from violent actions (Nichols, 2002); patients with lesions in brain areas 
involved in emotion (vmPFC) show behavior not conformed to social norms (Bechara 
et al., 2005, Moll et al., 2005) and appear more inclined to accept moral violations in a 
task of moral judgment (Ciaramelli et al., 2007; Koenigs et al., 2007). Furthermore, 
neuroimaging studies demonstrated that the Amygdala is important for the affective 
response to the moral transgressions (Berthoz et al., 2006). Consistently, activation of 
the Orbitofrontal cortex and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, involved in emotion, 
were found in healthy subjects in studies concerning moral judgment (Moll et al., 2002), 
moral reasoning (Greene et al., 2001, 2004) and social emotions like guilt and 
embarrassment, which still have a close affinity with the moral violation (Takahashi, 
2004). 
In this emotional and affective context what is the role of cognition? 
Some studies emphasize that a multidimensional model of moral judgment is needed 
that takes into account the various aspects of moral psychology. Cushman (2008) for 
example emphasizes the interaction of intuition and conscious reasoning, highlighting 
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the fact that the principles guiding moral judgments of people are distinct from those 
used to justify their answers, and that only some of them are available to consciousness. 
In support of this, studies from cognitive neuroscience showed that morality is not 
represented in just one place in the brain but instead is mediated by multiple networks. 
Indeed, not only emotional neural regions but also activation of the prefrontal areas with 
executive functions has been found in moral decision-making studies (Greene et al., 
2001; 2004; Heekeren & Wartenburger, 2003; Moll et al., 2001). Moll and colleagues 
argued that the moral processes are the product of the integration of contextual social 
knowledge, represented as event knowledge in the PFC, social semantic knowledge in 
the anterior and posterior temporal cortex and motivational and basic emotional states 
relying on cortical-limbic system (Moll et al., 2005, 2007). Borg and colleagues (2006) 
have shown that different patterns of brain activity were associated with different types 
of moral scenario: cognitive areas were more active in the calculation and evaluation of 
the consequences of an action and activity of areas associated with emotion was elicited 
by moral scenarios involving intentional harm. Greene and colleagues proposed a dual 
process theory according to which cognitive processes in DLPFC and ACC are 
necessary to override emotional automatic responses in order to produce utilitarian 
moral responses (Greene et al., 2004, 2008). This theory posits a mutual competitive 
interaction between emotion and cognition in moral judgment. Our results are in line 
with this account and with subsequent neuroimaging findings indicating stronger 
activation of cognitive areas (right DLPFC) to respond to high conflict moral dilemma 
and greater cognitive effort to engage in utilitarian behavior (Greene et al., 2001, 
2004).The utilitarian responses require greater cognitive effort in order to compete with 
the overwhelming emotional response that would drive moral condemnation of the 
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violation without considering the gain of the action. Our results can be considered as 
effective display of a causative relationship between DLPFC activity and in utilitarian 
moral reasoning. In addition, the evidence reported here confirms that moral behavior 
depends on the mutual interaction of affective and cognitive processes and expands on 
the role of lateral prefrontal cortex in cognitive control and emotion regulation. 
According to this conclusion previous studies showed DLPFC to be fundamental in 
goal-directed behavior (McDonalds et al. 2000) and to be implicated in detection and 
correction of behaviors that cause different consequences from those expected (for 
review see Forbes & Grafman, 2010). In addition, many studies argued that DLPFC 
plays a key role in self-regulation (Hare et al., 2009), affective modulation (Boggio et 
al., 2008) and emotion regulation (Oschner & Gross, 2005) as well as exercising control 
in mitigating negative emotional responses to aversive situation such as risk choices 
(Rao et al., 2008).  
Some limitations of the current study should be accounted for. Indeed, in line with our 
initial hypothesis we succeed in finding longer response time to personal moral 
dilemmas after stimulation but we failed in proving significant decrease in percentage 
of utilitarian responses.  This may be due to several reasons: first and foremost the lack 
of variability. Many participants have expressed little utilitarian judgments in general, 
preventing the modulation of utilitarian behavior after stimulation. Moreover, we 
suggest that a too small number of dilemmas was used (6 Personal and 6 impersonal). 
However, the choice of the number of dilemmas was forced by the risk of losing the 
effect of stimulation after a certain period of time. To overcome this problem in future 
experiments, an on-line stimulation could be used.  
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In conclusion, despite the limitations described above, these results shed light on the 
neural basis of moral judgment and extend on the functional role of specific brain 
regions.  
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CHAPTER 8 – EXPERIMENT FIVE  
Disrupting the prefrontal cortex reduces choice-induced preference change 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
Behaviours can create, not only reflect, people’s attitudes. Several studies highlight how 
decisions can alter, not just follow, individuals’ preferences (Izuma et al., 2010). 
Making difficult choices between options that are equally attractive to us is an ever-
present part of our everyday life, like deciding between jobs offered by two different 
companies or selecting a new car among the different alternatives. Notably, after such a 
choice between equally preferred options is made, people no longer find the alternatives 
similarly desirable (Brehm, 1956; Harmon-Jones & Harmon-Jones, 2002), and they like 
the selected option more and the rejected option less than they initially did. The 
preference change serves to settle the psychological conflict due to the cognitions in 
contradiction with the choice executed: the positive attributes of the rejected alternative 
are dissonant with not having chosen it, and the negative attributes of the preferred 
alternative are dissonant with having chosen it (Aronson, 2011). Adjusting preferences 
to support prior decisions is a phenomenon that has been deeply explained by the theory 
of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957), according to which inconsistent (dissonant) 
behaviours and attitudes result in a psychologically uncomfortable state (arousal) that 
motivates people to reduce the dissonance by changing their original attitudes to be 
more consonant with the displayed behaviour.  
The effect of difficult decisions on preference change has been studied in several 
experiments in social psychology, nevertheless which are the neural substrates of 
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cognitive dissonance and dissonance reduction is still unclear. Recent functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have provided some insight and have 
shown that the detection of the cognitive conflict generated by the inconsistency 
between attitudes and actions could be associated with activity in the dorsal anterior 
cingulate cortex (dACC) (Van Veen et al., 2009; Izuma et al., 2010), and the triggering 
of the aversive autonomic arousal by anterior insula (Van Veen et al., 2009; Qin et al., 
2010). 
Once conflict is detected by the dACC and dissonance is aroused, decision-related 
attitude change may occur rapidly (Harmon-Jones et al., 2008). Several evidences 
support the involvement of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), a region known to 
be involved in implementation of control and conflict resolution (Botvinick et al., 2001; 
Botvinick et al., 2004), in this process. Previous research has shown that activity in left, 
right or bilateral DLPFC may be associated with decision-induced preference change, 
but none of these studies can allow causal inferences. Harmon-Jones and colleagues 
(2008) measured choice-induced preference change after left DLPFC activity was 
manipulated by EEG biofeedback training. They found that participants who received 
neurofeedback training to decrease left frontal cortical activity showed a significant 
reduction in changing their preferences following difficult decisions. Consistently with 
these results, Qin and colleagues (2010) used fMRI to monitor neural activity as 
subjects rated musical CDs both before and after making difficult choices and they 
observed that individual difference in preference change (increase of preference for the 
chosen items minus decrease of preference for the rejected items) was predicted by 
post-choice neural activity in left DLPFC, dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC) 
and right precentral cortex. Although the above-mentioned literature focused on the role 
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of left DLPFC in cognitive dissonance reduction processes, there are studies that 
reported a crucial role of DLPFC especially in the right side. For example, Jarcho and 
colleagues (2010) examined brain activity while participants were taking difficult 
decisions in fMRI and they noticed that greater post-decisional preference change was 
associated with increased activity of right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and with 
decreased activity in anterior insula. Finally, Izuma and colleagues (2010) tested brain 
activity as independent measure of preference in a neuroimaging study and they found 
bilateral DLPFC activity, during the post-choice re-rating of the items, to be positively 
associated with the degree of cognitive dissonance, computed as the discrepancy 
between subjects’ past decisions and their reported preferences for each item.  
These studies suggest that DLPFC may be involved in resolving the conflict between 
actions and attitudes by bringing our attitudes into line with behavioural commitment. 
Although DLPFC activity is strongly associated with attitude change, this does not 
necessarily mean that DLPFC is causally engaged in this process. In order to explore 
whether DLPFC activity is crucial in choice-induced preference change we need to 
recur to the lesion method. To this end, we applied inhibitory transcranial Direct 
Current Stimulation (tDCS) to the right or to the left DLPFC during a revised version of 
Brehm’s free-choice paradigm (1956). In addition, we included a control condition 
where we applied sham stimulation to the right or left DLPFC. Each subject participated 
in only one of the three conditions (Right DLlPFC, Left DLPFC, Sham). In this 
procedure, participants were first required to rank two sets of art prints, from most liked 
to least liked. Then, they were asked to choose between pairs of prints, among which 
those images they had seen before were included and ranked as equally pleasing. 
Finally, after tDCS stimulation, they ranked the two sets of prints again. We 
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hypothesized that subjects who received tDCS stimulation on DLPFC would not show 
any preference change after difficult decisions compared to controls, and that their 
ratings would remain relatively stable in time. Moreover, because Harmon-Jones and 
colleagues (2008) found that a manipulated decrease in left frontal cortical activity led 
to a corresponding decrease in post-decisional preference change, we conjectured that 
disruption of the left DLPFC, and not of the right DLPFC, might be associated with this 
effect. 
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8.2 Methods and Materials  
 
Participants 
48 healthy volunteers (28 women; mean age = 24, 7; range: 20-38; mean years of 
education = 16, 9; range: 13-21), recruited through posted advertisements, participated 
in the experiment. Participants were not taking psychoactive medication, and they were 
free of current or past psychiatric or neurological illness as determined by history. None 
of the participants had contraindications to brain stimulation. All were naïves to tDCS 
effects and to the nature of the experiment and they were not explicitly informed of the 
experimental variable tested. All participants gave informed written consent before 
entering the study. The experiment was performed in accordance with the ethical 
standards laid down in the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki, and was approved by the 
Ethical Committee of the Department of Psychology, University of Bologna.  
 
Direct Current Stimulation (tDCS) 
Participants were randomly assigned to receive either unilateral active stimulation with 
the cathode electrode over the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (referred to as right 
DLPFC group) (F4, international EEG 10/20 system), unilateral active stimulation with 
the cathode electrode over the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, referred to as left 
DLPFC group (F3, international EEG 10/20 system), or placebo stimulation over the 
same cortical areas (sham or control group). In all three conditions the anode electrode 
(which was the reference electrode) was placed over the controlateral supraorbital area. 
This electrode arrangement has been shown effective to induce unilateral modulation of 
159 
 
one DLPFC in various studies (Kincses et al., 2004; Fregni et al., 2005). Each condition 
consisted of 16 participants and they were matched for sex (Χ² (2) = 1. 75, p = 0. 41), 
age (F (2, 45) = 1. 82, p = 0. 17) and years of education (F (2, 45) = 0. 87, p = 0. 42).  
Referring to previous literature (Herwig et al., 2003), coordinates in Talairach space 
(Talairach & Tournoux, 1988) corresponding to F3 were x = -37 y = 27 z = 44 (BA 8/9) 
and those corresponding to F4 were x = 39 y = 26 z = 43 (BA 8/9). Electrodes position 
was identified on each participant’s scalp with the SoftTaxic Navigator system (Electro 
Medical Systems, Bologna, Italy). Skull landmarks (nasion, inion and two preauricular 
points) and ~100 points providing a uniform representation of the scalp were digitized 
by means of a Polaris Vicra digitizer (Northern Digital Inc, Ontario, Canada). Talairach 
coordinates were automatically estimated by the SofTaxic Navigator from an MRI-
constructed stereotaxic template.  
For active stimulation, cathodal direct current, generated by a battery-driven electrical 
stimulator, was constantly delivered for 15 minutes at 1 mA intensity (current density: 
0,028 mA/cm²) through two saline-soaked surface sponge electrodes (35 cm²). We 
ramped current up over the first 40 s of the stimulation and down over the last 40 s. 
Cathodal tDCS decreases cortical excitability in the targeted brain region (Nitsche & 
Paulus, 2001). For sham stimulation, instead, the stimulator was turned on only for 15 
seconds. Thus, participants felt the initial itching sensation associated with tDCS, but 
received no active current for the rest of the stimulation period. This method of sham 
stimulation has been shown to be reliable (Gandiga et al., 2006). 
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Procedure 
We reworked the Lieberman and colleagues (2001) modified version of Brehm’s free-
choice paradigm (1956). As cover story, on entering the testing room participants were 
informed that they would be performing some tasks aimed to assess the influence of 
classical music on their aesthetic preferences. All tasks were completed in a single 
session divided in four phases.  
In phase 1, participants were given two sets of 15 art prints measuring 9x9 cm and were 
asked to rank them in order of preference (from 1 = the most liked to 15= the least 
liked). A sorting board measuring 57x40 cm was placed on the table to help the 
participant in sorting the cards while making the rankings. Participants sorted a set of 15 
cards that reproduced seascape paintings from French impressionism, and a second set 
of 15 cards that reproduced paintings from Aboriginal art. The order in which these two 
sets were sorted was counterbalanced across participants, and the second set was always 
referred to as the critical set. As soon as the rankings were completed, participants were 
asked to wear headphones and sit quietly for 15 minutes, listening to classical music. In 
the meantime, the experimenter removed two pairs of prints from the critical set. These 
were designated as the critical pairs. One pair consisted of the 4th- and 10th- ranked 
prints (referred to as the 4-10 pair), and the other pair consisted of the 6th- and 12th-
ranked prints (referred to as the 6-12 pair). Thus, each critical pair was composed of a 
relatively liked and a relatively disliked print. 
Once the 15 minutes were finished, the phase 2 of the study began. In this phase, 
participants were informed that they were now going to complete another aesthetic task.  
More specifically, they were asked to choose which of two pairs of art prints they would 
prefer if they could have full-size reproductions of that pair to take home with them. 
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Participants made six such choices for each set. For the critical set, five choices 
involved novel pairs of prints (but always of the same art category) and one involved 
the critical pairs. For the noncritical set, everything was identical to the critical one but 
all the choices included novel pairs of prints, never seen by the participant during the 
session. For each choice, two pairs of prints were placed on the table in front of the 
participant, with one pair on the left and one pair on the right. The participant indicated 
the pair that he or she preferred and this pair was designated as the selected pair. The 
other pair was designated as the rejected pair. As soon as the participant chose, the next 
pairs of prints were placed before him/her. The pairs of prints used for the participant’s 
fourth choice in the critical set were the two critical pairs drawn from the first ranking. 
The left and right sides of the table on which the 4-10 pair and 6-12 pair were placed, as 
well as the order of presentation of the two (critical and noncritical) sets were 
counterbalanced across participants. Once the last choice was made, the tDCS was 
applied, and the participant was required to remain seated and relaxed for 15 minutes. In 
the sham condition the stimulation period was the same because participants were not 
aware of the absence of active stimulation. 
Phase 3 followed the end of the stimulation period and it was similar to phase 1. Once 
again, the participants were asked to rank each set of prints in order of their preference. 
It was specified that this was not a memory test and that they had to classify the pictures 
according to their preferences in that particular moment. The order of presentation of 
the two sets followed that one of phase 2, so it was counterbalanced across participants 
as well.  
In the last phase, phase 4, participants were shown the 15 prints from the critical set 
(either the seascape set or the Aboriginal set) and asked to identify the 4 prints that had 
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appeared in phase 2 (memory of the critical pairs). As a test of memory for their 
previous choice, participants were also asked to remind which pair they had selected 
and which pair they had rejected during phase 2. 
Finally, participants had to complete the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT, Frederick, 
2005), which assess the cognitive ability to suppress an intuitive and spontaneous wrong 
answer in favor of a reflective and deliberative right answer (that can be considered a 
measure of intelligence). Participants indicated also their level of discomfort during the 
tDCS in a Likert scale (from 1 = not at all annoyed to 7 = extremely annoyed). 
The primary measure of choice-induced preference change was the mean change in 
ranks of the selected and rejected pairs between Phases 1 and 3.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.1 A schematic illustration of the experimental paradigm.
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8.3 Results 
 
The higher ranked pair 4-10 was chosen 81% of the time by Left DLPFC group, 69% of 
the time by Right DlPFC group and 75% of the time by Sham group. The three groups 
did not differ significantly in the percentage of choice of 4-10 pair, Χ² (2) = 3.12, p = 
.20. These percentages were also consistent with those existing in previous literature: in 
Lieberman and colleagues’ study (2001) 64% of their participants chose the higher-
ranked pair in the first experiment, and 75% in the second one; as well as Gerard and 
White (1983) reported that 75% of their participants chose the 4-10 pair. Eliminating 
the data of those participants who selected the lower-ranked pair (6-12 pair) did not 
change our results, so we chose to include them in our analysis. 
 
Preference change - For both the critical and noncritical sets, to assess preference 
change we measured the mean ranks of the selected and rejected pairs in phase 1 and 
phase 3, using a 2 (Phase: 1 vs. 3) x 2 (Pair: Selected vs. Rejected) x 3 (Group: Left 
DLPFC vs. Right DLPFC vs. Sham) repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA). 
An increase in the mean ranks of the selected pair (more liking) and a decrease in the 
mean ranks of the rejected pair (less liking) in phase 3 compared to phase 1, 
respectively, would indicate the typical choice-induced attitude change. 
For the critical set, the analysis yielded a significant main effect of Pair, F (1, 45) = 
43.11, p < .0001. The mean ranks of the chosen pair (M = 7.17) were significantly 
higher than the mean ranks of the rejected pair (M = 8.93). This indicates that 
participants liked more the chosen pair than the rejected one. Moreover, the typical 
choice-induced attitude change was shown by a significant two-way Phase x Pair 
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interaction, F (1, 45) = 16.90, p < .001: there was a larger difference between the mean 
ranks of the selected and rejected pairs in phase 3 than in phase 1, given that selected 
pairs increased in ranking and rejected pairs decreased in ranking between phase 1 and 
3 (phase 1: M selected pair = 7.50, M rejected pair = 8.50; phase 3: M selected pair = 
6.83, M rejected pair = 9.35).  
 
                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.2 Mean ranks of selected and rejected pairs of the critical set in phase 1(Ranking) and Phase 3 
(Re-ranking). To be noticed that higher number in rank indicates less liking, while lower number 
indicates more liking.  
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More importantly for the purpose of the present study, a significant three-way Phase X 
Pair X Group interaction [F (2, 45) = 3.04, p = .05] revealed that the manipulation of 
DLPFC disruption was successful and the three groups acted differently relative to 
attitude change. To further examine this interaction, three two-way 2 (Phase: 1 vs. 3) x 
2 (Pair: Selected vs. Rejected) repeated measures ANOVAs were performed separately 
on the Sham group, the Right DLPFC group and the Left DLPFC group. The analysis on 
the Sham group showed a significant Phase x Pair interaction, F (1, 15) = 9.42, p < .01. 
The analysis on Right DLPFC group demonstrated similar results, F (1, 15) = 31.49, p < 
.0001. Post hoc comparisons (Newman-Keuls test) showed a significant difference 
between ratings for selected and rejected pairs across phase 1 and 3: the mean rank of 
the selected pair indicated more liking in phase 3 than in phase 1 (p = .18 and p < .01, 
for Sham group and Right DLPFC group respectively) whereas the mean rank of the 
rejected pair indicated less liking in phase 3 than in phase 1 (p < .01 and p < .01, for 
Sham group and Right DLPFC group respectively). That is, for participants in both 
Sham and Right DLPFC conditions, the chosen pair decreased in ranking (liking), and 
the rejected pair increased in ranking (disliking), following decision. On the contrary, 
the same analysis on the Left DLPFC group provided no such a significant interaction, F 
(1, 15) = 0.09, p = .76: participants who received stimulation on the left DLPFC did not 
show any changes in their rankings between phase 1 and 3, and consequently showed no 
attitude change. To sum up, participants who received tDCS on the left DLPFC did not 
present the typical choice-induced attitude change, as compared to participants who 
received stimulation on the right DLPFC and sham stimulation. 
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Figure 8.3 Upper panel: Change of preference for selected and rejected pairs of the critical set in Sham, 
Left DLPFC and Right DLPFC groups. Lower panel: Change of preference for pairs in non critical set 
with initial rank equivalent to the ranks of selected and rejected pairs of the critical set in Sham, Left 
DLPFC and Right DLPFC groups. 
 
We also analysed data from the noncritical set, considering as selected and rejected 
those pairs of prints with initial ranks equivalent to the ranks of the selected and rejected 
prints from the critical set (for similar method see Lieberman et al, 2001). Note that 
prints from the noncritical sets were ranked twice with no intervening choice, so that 
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they provided baseline levels of attitude change in the absence of choice. As before, a 2 
(Phase:  1 vs. 3) x 2 (Pair: “Selected” vs. “Rejected”) x 3 (Group: Left DLPFC vs. Right 
DLPFC vs. Sham) repeated measures statistical analysis was performed on the mean 
ranks of these pairs in the noncritical set. This ANOVA indicated only a significant 
main effect of Pair [F (1, 45) = 12.53, p < .001], showing that the mean ranks of the 
“selected” pair (M = 7.55) were significantly higher than those of the “rejected” pair (M 
= 8.52). This is because, in the critical set, participants choose more frequently the 4-10 
pair than the 6-12 pair, therefore explaining why the “selected” pair in the noncritical 
set was ranked higher than the “rejected” pair. 
The analysis did not exhibit any other significant main effect or interaction, indicating 
that participants’ ratings for those images remained stable across the study. Hence, the 
differences shown by the three groups in the attitude change in the critical set could not 
be ascribed to chance variations in preferences because there were no changes in the 
ratings of the corresponding prints in the noncritical set. 
 
Questionnaires and Control Tests - We tested for participants’ memory of the critical 
pairs and of their choice. All the three groups had some difficulty identifying the 4 
critical prints constituting the 2 critical pairs they evaluated in phase 2, from the set of 
15. Indeed, accuracy was 50% in the Left DLPFC condition, 55% in the Right DLPFC 
condition and 45% in the Sham condition. The three groups did not significantly differ 
from each other in this percentage, as demonstrated by a one-way (Group: Left DLPFC 
vs. Right DLPFC vs. Sham) between-participants ANOVA, F (2, 45) = 0.32, p = .72. 
Similarly, of the pictures correctly identified as critical prints, Left DLPFC group 
categorized 53% of the prints correctly as selected or rejected, Right DLPFC group 71% 
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and Sham group 45%. Thus, the three groups did not differ in the ability of correctly 
remembering which of the critical prints they had previously selected or rejected, as 
revealed by a one-way (Group: Left DLPFC vs. Right DLPFC vs. Sham) between-
participants ANOVA, F (2, 45) = 2.12, p = .13.  
This kind of memory specifically refers to the counter-attitudinal behavior. Two 
analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) Phase (1 vs. 3) x Pair (Selected vs. Rejected) x 
Memory were then performed so that individual differences in memory of the critical 
pairs and of their choice or rejection could be statistically controlled: the results showed 
that the memory of the 4 critical prints and of which they chose or rejected did not 
explain post-decisional attitude change [F (1, 44) = 0.09, p = .75 and F (1, 44) = 0.33, p 
= .56, respectively]. 
Moreover, we controlled for participants’ cognitive ability to resist their first instinct in 
decision making by means of the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT, Frederick, 2005). 
Participants had a mean score of 6.38 (out of 9) in the Left DLPFC condition, 7.25 in 
the Right DLPFC condition and 6.13 in the Sham condition. A one-way (Group: Left 
DLPFC vs. Right DLPFC vs. Sham) between-participants ANOVA conducted on the 
mean scores at the CRT revealed no differences in cognitive abilities between the three 
groups, F (2, 45) = 2.31, p = .11. An ANCOVA Phase (1 vs. 3) x Pair (Selected vs. 
Rejected) x CRT Scores also showed that individual differences in cognitive abilities as 
measured by CRT did not account for the attitude change existing between phase 1 and 
3: F (1, 44) = 3.28, p = .07. 
Finally, participants indicated the level of discomfort they experienced during tDCS in a 
seven-point Likert Scale ranging from 1 (not at all annoyed) to 7 (extremely annoyed). 
Data indicated no significant differences in the degree of discomfort between Left 
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DLPFC group (M = 2.63), Right DLPFC group (M = 2.38) and Sham group (M = 2.38), 
as demonstrated by a one-way (Group: Left DLPFC vs. Right DLPFC vs. Sham) 
between-participants ANOVA, F (2, 45) = 0.22, p = .80. 
 
 
8.4 Discussion 
After making choice between equally attractive options, people no longer find the 
alternatives similarly desirable and they often change their existing preferences to align 
more closely with the choice they have just made. In line with previous literature 
(Brehm, 1956; Kitayama et al., 2004), our behavioral results showed the typical attitude 
change that follows a difficult choice between two similarly likable options. After 
making a choice, participants increased their liking for the chosen paintings and 
decreased their liking for the rejected ones. This study aimed at investigating the neural 
correlates of attitude change after a difficult choice is made. Previous functional studies 
suggested that activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, either on the left (Harmon-
Jones et al., 2008; Izuma et al., 2010; Qin et al., 2010) or the right (Jarcho et al., 2010) 
hemisphere, is associated with choice-induced preference change. Most of the studies 
mentioned above are correlational which means that they do not allow establishing the 
effective function of this region in cognitive dissonance. Observing behavioral 
modulation after disruption of activity in lateral prefrontal cortex would provide a direct 
evidence of the effective role of this area in cognitive dissonance. In the current study 
we meant to investigate this issue in a causal way. We therefore used transcranial direct 
current stimulation (tDCS) on Left and Right DLPFC as well as Sham stimulation while 
participants performed a revised version of Brehm’s free-choice paradigm. According to 
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cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957), inconsistency between behavior and 
attitudes triggers an unpleasant emotional state which requires that cognitive processes 
step in for its reduction. In accordance to this theory, Van Veen and colleagues (2009) 
pointed the dACC as one candidate region for the detection of cognitive dissonance, for 
one of dACC’s functions is monitoring conflicts between incompatible streams of 
information or processes (Botvinick et al., 2001, 2004). Using the induced compliance 
procedure in an fMRI design, they found that during the counter-attitudinal argument 
(to respond to target sentences as though they were enjoying the scanner and the task) 
magnitude of activity in dACC predicted the final attitude change of participants in the 
dissonance condition. They were not monetary rewarded for lying, unlike the 
participants in the control group. Moreover, cognitive dissonance and dACC activation 
have been related to negative affect and consequent autonomic arousal (Croyle & 
Cooper, 1983; Losch & Cacioppo, 1990). In line with previous functional studies, 
suggesting that DLPFC is implicated in post-decisional attitude change (Harmon-Jones 
et al., 2008; Izuma et al., 2010; Jarcho et al., 2010; Qin et al., 2010), and  consistent 
with theories on engagement of DLPFC in cognitive control (Miller, 2001; Carter & 
Van Veen, 2007), emotion regulation (Ochsner et al., 2005), as well as Self control 
(Hare et al., 2009), here we hypothesized a pivotal role of DLPFC in the processes 
responsible of dissonance reduction.  
Our results showed that only cathodal tDCS on the Left DLPFC impaired cognitive 
dissonance reduction. In sharp contrast, those participants who received Sham 
stimulation or tDCS on the Right DLPFC kept the typical attitude change after the 
choice, ruling out the possibility of a widespread effect of the tDCS per se. Two 
important conclusions can be inferred from these results. Firstly, that DLPFC is 
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crucially implicated in dissonance reduction processes and, secondly that left, but not 
right, DLPFC plays a crucial role in change of preference after a difficult decision. The 
differences shown by the three groups in attitude change in the critical set were not 
present in the non-critical set, where the mean ranks of the corresponding prints 
remained stable across the ratings in all the conditions. Only when a forced difficult 
choice intervenes and generates a mismatch between prior attitudes and present 
behavior the participant changes his attitudes consistently with his decision. Indeed, the 
left DLPFC group did not display any differences between the mean ranks of the critical 
and noncritical set, suggesting that the inhibitory tDCS on this particular cortical region 
could have prevented the cognitive process of preference change from occurring. This is 
a further demonstration that interfering with DLPFC activity has not a general and a-
specific effect on the stimuli evaluation per se.  
In addition, the obtained results could not be attributable to other factors such as 
memory of the critical pairs and of the choice made in phase 2, cognitive abilities or 
level of discomfort experienced during tDCS, because we controlled for differences 
across the three groups. Consistent with our findings, previous studies showed that 
neither explicit memory nor attentional resources are responsible for behavior-induced 
preference change and that this process may occur automatically (Lieberman et al 
2001a, 2001b). 
We found DLPFC to be crucial in change of preferences after a difficult choice, but 
what are the mechanisms underlying this process? Our findings are consistent with 
several prior observations. Previous research has associated relative left frontal cortical 
activity to a reduction in the amount of spreading of alternatives that typically occurs 
following a difficult decision (Harmon-Jones, 2011). Harmon-Jones and colleagues 
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(2008) measured attitude change after participants made a difficult choice and their 
relative left PFC activity was manipulated using EEG biofeedback training. This 
technique provides the participant real-time feedback on brainwave activity and is able 
to induce changes in EEG after only 3 days of training (even if previous literature has 
demonstrated that this brief neurofeedback training was effective at decreasing but not 
increasing left frontal activity; Allen et al., 2001). Participants who received 
neurofeedback to decrease, as compared to increase, left frontal activity showed a 
significant reduction in changing their attitudes after choice. According to Harmon-
Jones and colleagues (2008), these results indicate that it is specifically the left PFC that 
is involved in dissonance reduction. Although in line with our findings, this study lacks 
a control condition in which other cortical regions (i.e., the right PFC) are likewise 
manipulated by neurofeedback training of EEG, or the decrease-left and the increase-
left frontal groups are compared to a sham condition (that is, a left frontal group with no 
real manipulation occurring). Since the current study included these critical control 
conditions it provides stronger evidence of the causality of left DLPFC in attitude 
change, and compensate for such methodological limitations. Similarly, findings from 
an fMRI study (Qin et al., 2010) on choice justification showed that post-decisional 
neural activity in the left DLPFC was positively correlated with overall attitude change 
scores. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that choice justification requires 
regulation processes that are mediated by the left DLPFC: it would enhance choice-
consistent information while would inhibit choice-inconsistent information (by boosting 
the preference for chosen items and weakening that for rejected ones). Accordingly, 
event-related fMRI studies (McDonald et al., 2000) have previously shown that left 
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DLPFC was involved in processes aimed at resolving cognitive conflict and that more 
activity in this region is associated with conflict decrease.  
Theories that associate DLPFC activity to self-control processes are also consistent with 
our results. We suggest that cognitive processes mediated by left DLPFC (i.e. 
rationalization) occur in order to cope with the inconsistency between behavior and 
attitudes and led to consequential attitude change. Left hemisphere propensity for 
rationalization is well recognized. Based on  studies on split-brain patients, Gazzaniga 
(1996) postulated that the left brain contains an “interpreter” which helps to grant a 
sense of order to our lives, allowing us to settle our present attitudes with our past 
actions and feelings and vice versa. Similarly, Ramachandran (1995, 1996) proposed 
that, once an anomaly or discrepancy is detected by the Right hemisphere (which 
generates the appropriate emotion too), the Left hemisphere tries to restore Self 
consistency by ignoring or suppressing the dissonant evidence. There are displays of an 
important role of left, but not right, DLPFC also in intention, self-regulation, planning 
processes (Tomarkenand & Keener, 1998), as well as affective modulation (Boggio et 
al., 2008). In an fMRI study, Hare and colleagues (2009) examined neural processes 
responsible for the deployment of self-control in dieters making real decisions about 
which food to eat. Greater activity in left DLPFC was found during implementation of 
self-control strategies and in those participants who were more capable to regulate 
themselves. In addition, testing rTMS on DLPFC in inter-temporal choices, Figner and 
colleagues (2010) demonstrated that only disruption of the Left, but not Right, DLPFC 
led to increased impatient choice for immediate but less available rewards. Additional 
evidence coming from EEG and fMRI indicated high levels of baseline Left prefrontal 
activation to be associated with increased capacity to voluntarily suppress negative 
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emotions (Pena-Gomez et al., 2011). Recent reviews on emotion regulation (Ochsner & 
Gross, 2008; Berkman & Lieberman, 2009) showed how nearly all the published studies 
indicate dorsal and ventral portions of the lateral PFC, especially left-lateralized, 
dorsomedial PFC and dACC as consistently activated by reappraisal strategy. These 
studies conclude that regulation trials recruit a top-down executive control, possibly 
mediated by DLPFC. One hypothesis is that this high-level cognitive form of regulation 
may depend upon systems engaged in working memory, language and goal 
representation (Left DLPFC) when subjects are asked to reinterpret situational or 
contextual aspects of stimuli (as the individual creates a new story about its meaning), 
whereas it may rely more upon medial PFC, implicated in estimating one’s own 
affective states, and right PFC, involved in attentional control, when they have to 
distance themselves from stimuli. Moreover, reappraisal-related increases in Left 
ventrolateral PFC are negatively correlated with the activity in the amygdala and medial 
orbito-frontal cortex (MOFC), regions implicated in detecting affective salience 
(Ochsner et al., 2002). Our results seem to be in line with these previous evidences and 
confirm that left DLPFC is a crucial neural substrate for Self control and Self regulation 
processes. 
In contrast with our findings, Jarcho and colleagues (2010) examined brain activity with 
fMRI during the decision phase of a free-choice paradigm and observed that increased 
activity in Right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) was positively correlated with decision-
related attitude change. According to Jarcho and colleagues, these results are consistent 
with studies suggesting that cognitive dissonance can be resolved rapidly, without 
extended awareness and deliberation, as an automatic byproduct of decision-making 
itself (Lieberman et al., 2001; Egan et al., 2007). This study, however, scanned the brain 
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during the choice and did not assess the differences in cortical activity before and after 
it, so it is not clear whether and how attitude change might occur as a consequence of a 
choice (Qin et al., 2010). Moreover, Jarcho and colleagues found also left regions being 
engaged in cognitive dissonance reduction: activity in left anterior insula was in fact 
negatively correlated with attitude change and with activity in right IFG during trials 
with large, compared to small, amount of attitude change.  
Our findings illustrate the importance of tDCS for progress in understanding the neural 
substrates of cognitive dissonance reduction and provide a causal evidence for the role 
of DLPFC in the self regulation process of attitude change. One putative neural network 
underlying the cognitive strategy of preference change to reestablish self consistency 
might include the DLPFC, the ventromedial PFC and the striatum. When individuals are 
confronted with goal-directed decision-making, the deployment of self control is needed 
and DLPFC activity is required to modulate the value signal of stimuli encoded in the 
VMPFC, as demonstrated by Hare and colleagues (2009). In their study, in fact, activity 
in the left DLPFC increased during successful self-control trials and was negatively 
correlated with activity in the VMPFC, that otherwise makes the choices driven only by 
the immediate value of the stimuli. This value is actually computed in the VMPFC-
striatal network (Kable & Glimcher, 2007). Several fMRI studies on cognitive 
dissonance showed how post-choice changes in desirability of the chosen and rejected 
alternatives were reflected in parallel changes in the activation of the dorsal striatum, 
specifically in the caudate nucleus (Sharot et al., 2009; Izuma et al., 2010). This region 
is a key target for the dopaminergic system and is commonly related to reward 
processing (Delgado, 2007). Attitude change resulted in alterations in the physiological 
representation of the stimuli’s expected hedonic value. So, choice can modify 
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individual’s self-report likings as well as their neural representations. Importantly, our 
data add to these findings that DLPFC, a widely known region for its role in the 
implementation of cognitive control, conflict resolution and top-down modulation, is 
responsible for dissonance-induced preference change. 
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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
Over the course of the last decades, cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience 
have dedicated much attention to the relationship between emotion and cognition.  
Although historically the view of emotion and cognition as two distinct and well 
separated processes has been dominating, recently the view of a dynamic and interactive 
relationship of these two processes has become more prevalent. Several studies have 
provided evidence that complex human behaviors result from a joint contribution of 
both emotional and cognitive processes and that brain regions previously indicated as 
exclusively emotional are also involved in cognition as well as cognitive brain regions 
also being involved in emotion (for review see Pessoa, 2008). Thus, the idea that 
emotion and cognition not only interact with each other, but they influence each other, 
is becoming increasingly central to theories in this area of studies.  
The present work has focused on two main fields, such as attention and decision-
making, which highlight how emotion and cognition mutually affect and sometimes 
compete with each other. In particular, the first part of this dissertation reported three 
experimental studies concerning emotional perception and attention and how these 
processes may be modulated by other factors such as personality, internal states of the 
individuals and social context.  
In experiment one the impact of aggression traits of personality on recognition of 
emotion has been investigated, showing that individuals that are more aggressive are 
also less sensitive to facial expressions of emotion and need more time to discriminate 
them. In accordance with previous literature on clinical and non-clinical populations 
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(Van Honk et al., 2000, 2001; Matheson et al., 2005) we concluded that traits of 
aggression are associated with an impairment in recognition of emotion. Even if to date 
it did not receive much attention compared to other traits of personality (i.e. anxiety), 
we showed aggression to be a crucial aspect of personality. It is noteworthy indeed that 
the ability to discriminate emotion is an important prerequisite for recognition of social 
cues and consequently for a good functioning of social interactions. Previous literature 
has shown that aggression has several components, such as impaired recognition of 
social cues and enhanced impulsivity (for review see: Nelson & Trainor, 2007). Much 
further research is required to expand on these results and test their potential for future 
research and their implications in other fields.  Indeed, behavioral results may represent 
the basis for further investigation on the role of personality traits in modulating brain 
activity. A plausible hypothesis concerning emotion recognition is that personality 
characteristics may contribute to modulate activity in specific brain regions, such as the 
amygdala, implicated in the discrimination of emotional facial expressions. 
Furthermore, it could be interesting to expand knowledge on the effects of aggression 
traits of personality on attentional processes and to investigate whether attention 
towards certain kind of stimuli is affected by aggression traits. This could have 
implications in both developmental and clinical fields. In addition, the current results 
are more generally in line with previous observations that personality is a determinant 
factor in our relationship with the environment and in how we react to information 
coming from the environment. The influence of aggression traits in modulating emotion 
recognition represents a good example. Nevertheless, the ability to detect information in 
the environment and process it based on its current relevance or salience is attributed to 
selective attention (Driver, 2001). If in experiment one we showed that personality may 
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influence how we observe and perceive emotional expressions, experiment two 
investigated how internal motivational states of the individuals may affect information 
processing and subsequent allocation of attention. Several recent studies have suggested 
that the emotional significance of sensory events can determine how visual attention is 
allocated (Lang et al., 1997; Vuilleumier, 2005). Accordingly, we showed that 
transitory changes in the pleasantness and the rewarding value of the stimuli play an 
important role in modulating the functioning of covert mental processes, such as visual 
selective attention. In particular, we found that a food-specific devaluation treatment 
induced a considerable decrease in the attentional bias for devalued foods, parallel to 
the perceived pleasantness of those foods, whereas visual selective attention to valued 
foods remained stable.  These findings are in line with the idea that mechanisms of 
selective attention are flexibly regulated to optimize interaction of the individual with 
the environment, depending on his/her current motivational state (Lang et al., 1997). 
Interestingly this could find clinical applications in treatment of obesity or eating 
disorders by working on the motivational and affective value patients attribute to food 
stimuli. In addition, these results expand on the evidence that attentional processes are 
mediated by the affective and motivational value of the stimuli. The results of 
experiment three are also in line with this assumption. Indeed, experiment three showed 
that emotional stimuli, with both positive and negative valence are more likely to draw 
attention compared to neutral stimuli. Moreover, we explored the possible influence of 
an external factor such as the presence of another individual on the emotional 
enhancement of attention. We found that social presence selectively decreases early 
attentional capture and emotional arousal prompted by pleasant erotic stimuli, while it 
leaves unaltered behavioral and physiological responses to equally arousing (salient) 
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unpleasant pictures. This is of particular interest in understanding the strong influence 
that cultural aspects have in our everyday life and in behavior modulation. The crucial 
difference between processing pleasant erotic images and negative threat images in a 
social context is that only the former is culturally considered as highly inappropriate,  
thus providing the potential for negative social evaluation and rejection (social-
evaluative threat). These results suggest that automatic influence of emotion on 
attentional processes may, in turn, be regulated, providing more evidence of interactive 
and jointed mechanisms involving emotional and cognitive processes in parallel. Indeed 
a possible explanation for these results is that in social contexts individuals may 
automatically regulate their responses to emotionally pleasant but inappropriate stimuli 
to avoid social negative evaluation. This explanation is in accordance with theories and 
evidence that concern cognitive control of emotions. Indeed even if we usually refer to 
emotion regulation as a set of conscious processes (Beauregard et al., 2001) aimed at 
modulating emotional response in accordance with individuals’ current goals and 
intentions, there is also evidence that regulatory processes may occur without awareness 
(Fujita & Han, 2009; Mauss et al., 2007). The second part of this thesis has addressed 
this issue by showing that cognitive brain regions are effectively and unconsciously 
implicated in regulative processes of emotional responses. 
Experiment four showed that in particular types of decision-making such as moral 
judgments, implicating strong emotional engagement as well as cognitive resources, 
DLPF, a well-known cognitive brain region, is causally associated with regulation of 
emotional responses and moreover with utilitarian (cognitive) answers. Indeed, we 
found that after disruption of activity in this area utilitarian judgment requires longer 
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time responses, thus suggesting greater cognitive effort in order to compete with the 
overwhelming emotional response that would lead to moral condemnation.  
While experiment four showed that DLPFC is necessary in regulating emotional 
responses to form decisions, experiment five expanded on this showing that similar 
control mechanisms are also involved in shaping preferences, once difficult choices 
between equally attractive options are made. According to cognitive dissonance theory 
(Festinger, 1957), inconsistency between behavior and attitudes triggers an unpleasant 
emotional state that requires cognitive processes to be reduced. Our results showed that 
when we interfered with left DLPFC activity by tDCS stimulation after a difficult 
choice, participants no longer showed the choice-induces change of preferences that 
typically occurs after difficult choices implicating conflict between prior attitudes and 
effective decisions. Therefore, we argued DLPFC to be crucial in reduction of negative 
affect due to inconsistency, as well as in implementation of regulative strategies such as 
change of preferences. The use of different stimulation techniques allowed us to 
illustrate the crucial importance of some brain regions for modulation of behavior. 
Moreover, we reported a good display that these techniques themselves are effective in 
establishing causal association between some brain regions’ activity and specific 
functions. It is worthwhile to note the distinction between the roles of left and right 
DLPFC in cognitive dissonance reduction. Although the study on moral judgment 
indicated right DLPFC as crucially involved in conflict reduction in moral decision-
making, since activity in left DLPFC has not been tested, the possibility that left 
DLPFC is also implicated in the same mechanisms cannot be excluded. This probably 
represents a limitation of the study and might be the starting point for further research.  
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Taken together the results of the experiments reported in this thesis lead to important 
conclusions. First of all, they confirm the importance of emotion in perceptual and 
attentional processes, by showing that emotional and motivational value of stimuli is 
crucial in guiding allocation of attention. Secondly, although historically emotional 
responses are considered quick and automatic, they demonstrate that emotional 
responses are in some way modulated and influenced by different factors such as factors 
inherent to the individuals (e.g. personality traits), temporary factors (e.g. individuals’ 
internal states), and external factors (e.g. social context). This evidence suggests that 
emotional processes may be rapid but are not entirely automatic. Therefore, definition 
of emotion as an automatic reflex may require qualification perhaps with reference to 
specific circumstances, types of stimuli in question or with reference to specific- 
emotional states of the individuals. Moreover, we reported valid evidence that cognitive 
resources are required for the modulation and regulation of emotional responses to drive 
them in accordance with current intentions. In general cognitive processes seem to be 
crucial in the resolution of conflictual states.  
In conclusion all these data converge in affirming that emotion and cognition are not 
well distinguished processes but rather that they interact and compete to shape human 
behavior.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
IAPS (Lang et al., 2005) code for the target and control pictures:  
Unpleasant target pictures: 2141, 2683, 2691, 2694, 2703, 3064, 3210, 3500, 3530, 
6212, 6312, 6313, 6315, 6540, 6571, 6836, 9400, 9410, 9429, 9433. 
Neutral target pictures: 2037, 2038, 2102, 2104, 2221, 2320, 2370, 2372, 2381, 2383, 
2393, 2396, 2397, 2480, 2485, 2570, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2605. 
Pleasant target pictures: 4001, 4002, 4006, 4180, 4210, 4232, 4250, 4290, 4300, 4311, 
4320, 4649, 4652, 4666, 4670, 4676, 4677, 4680, 4681, 4683, 4687. 
Control pictures: 5000, 5001, 5010, 5020, 5120, 5130, 5200, 5201, 5220, 5250, 5300, 
5390, 5471, 5480, 5500, 5510, 5520, 5530, 5534, 5535, 5593, 5594, 5631, 5660, 5711, 
5731, 5740, 5750, 5760, 5779, 5780, 5781, 5800, 5811, 5814, 5870, 5890, 6150, 7000, 
7002, 7004, 7006, 7009, 7010, 7020, 7025, 7030, 7031, 7034, 7035, 7036, 7037, 7038, 
7039, 7040, 7041, 7042, 7050, 7052, 7053, 7055, 705, 7057, 7058, 7059, 7080, 7090, 
7100, 7110, 7130, 7140, 7150, 7161, 7175, 7190, 7205, 7207, 7211, 7217, 7224, 7233, 
7234, 7235, 7242, 7490, 7495, 7500, 7501, 7504, 7508, 7545, 7546, 7547, 7560, 7595, 
7700, 7705, 7710, 7920, 7950.  
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